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Introduction
Not for the first time, as an elected official, I envy economists. Economists
have available to them, in an analytical approach, the counterfactual. [. . . ]
They can contrast what happened to what would have happened. No one has
ever gotten reelected where the bumper sticker said, “It would have been worse
without me.” You probably can get tenure with that. But you can’t win office.
Former U.S. Representative Barney Frank
Two key policy objectives for governments around the world are to increase the
production of new ideas and to create jobs. Whilst there is broad consensus on
the goals themselves, the means to achieve them are less agreed upon. Govern-
ments of different political convictions have enacted various policies that are too
numerous to count and the amount of public money spent on them is stagger-
ing. For example, in order to increase the production of new ideas, the public
sector in Germany spent around e 30 billion or 1 percent of GDP on research and
development activity in 2016 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018). To save and create
jobs in wake of the Great Recession, Germany and other countries enacted large
fiscal stimulus programs. In Germany, close to e 90 billion were spent and the
American Recovery and Reconstruction Act in the US amounted to more than
$ 800 billion (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2009; Congressional Budget Of-
fice, 2014).
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However, whether this money is well spent and which of these policies actually
work is far from clear. One of the main reasons why we know so little is that
it is very difficult to approximate what would have happened in absence of the
policy. In the case of public subsidies for research and development, selection
issues abound. Both academic scientists and private firms need to apply for
grants and subsidies, and applications are then selected on their merit. Hence,
we do not fully understand whether public funding for scientists affects their
productivity or whether subsidies for firms cause additional innovation (Gools-
bee, 1998, Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). Similar problems arise in the evaluation
of fiscal stimulus policies, as worse hit regions may be disproportionately tar-
geted by stimulus spending. For example, prior to the passage of the Recovery
Act in the United States, estimates of the employment effects ranged from 1.2m
to 3.6m additional jobs (Congressional Budget Office, 2009). Even ex post, the
estimated employment effects in the literature differ by a factor of seven (Conley
and Dupor, 2013, Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012).
This thesis exploits three quasi-experiments in Germany to further our under-
standing of which policies are successful at increasing science, innovation, and
employment. Natural quasi-experiments allow us to construct counterfactuals
and are now a standard part of the applied economist’s toolkit (Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2010). Each chapter of this thesis studies a different setting and can be read
on its own. The first chapter shows that the structure and amount of funding for
academic scientists has a first order effect on their productivity. The second chap-
ter concludes that subsidizing research and development projects of private firms
does not necessarily increase their amount of research and development spend-
ing. Last, the third chapter demonstrates that counter-cyclical stimulus measures
and place-based policies may be a viable tool to stimulate employment.
The first chapter studies how the amount and duration of a research grant affects
2
Introduction
the scientific productivity of elite scientists. Basic scientific research would not be
viable without public funding and the design of funding schemes is a key lever
for governments to incentivize scientists (Stephan, 2012). However, we know
fairly little about the productivity effects of various funding design choices, such
as the amount or duration of funding. The main issue is that there is little vari-
ation within funding programs and comparisons across programs are fraught
with selection issues. Scientists self-select and are selected into different pro-
grams based on past and expected future productivity. Hence, any comparison
across schemes usually suffers from endogeneity issues.
To circumvent such selection issues, we look at the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Prize, Germany’s most important and most prestigious research prize. Each year,
around ten elite scientists from all disciplines receive this prize which comes with
a large, non-renewable research grant which they can use at their full discretion.
In 2007, the size of this research grant was increased by e 1m and the time over
which the money could be spent was lengthened by two years. This allows us to
compare the recipients of the same prize who are exposed to a different funding
amount and duration. We compare the scientific output of Leibniz Prize recip-
ients who received their prize after the reform to the output of prize recipients
prior to the reform in a difference-in-differences framework.
The analysis shows that the Leibniz Prize recipients who received a larger grant
amount and longer grant duration reduce their overall number of publications
per year by 53 percent. This reduction in the overall quantity of publications is
accompanied by an increase in the number of publications in top ranked journals.
For both top ranked multidisciplinary journals and top ranked field journals, the
increase is around 50 percent relative to the respective mean number of publi-
cations. This effect cannot be explained by simple time trends in the life-cycle
productivity profile of academics.
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Additional analyses investigate whether it is the additional grant amount or grant
duration that matters. By exploiting the fact that there is substantial variation in
the amount of funding in real terms due to inflation, we show that additional
grant amount and duration seem to be complements. The pattern of a reduction
in overall publications and an increase in top-ranked research is only present
when both the grant amount and the grant duration are larger. There is little to
no response to an increase in funding amount or duration alone.
The chapter contributes both to the literature on the effects of the amount of
funding and to the literature on the structure of funding. It is among the first to
show the complementarity of funding amount and funding duration, which has
implications for the design of science funding policies. Furthermore, this paper is
unique in its within-prize comparison. This alleviates remaining concerns about
selection on unobservables that the prior literature using matching on observ-
ables cannot rule out. Also, most papers comparing recipients of a prize or grant
to non-recipients cannot discern whether it is the money or the prestige of the
prize or grant that affects productivity. In the context of the Leibniz Prize, any
prestige effects or “Matthew effects” where prize winners find it easier to pub-
lish their research should be constant across the two groups, isolating the causal
effect of additional funding amount and duration.
The second chapter, which is based on joint work with Monika Schnitzer and
Martin Watzinger, changes its focus from the knowledge creation by academic
scientists to how research and development activities of firms can be incentivized.
Due to the public goods nature of new ideas, the private sector may invest less
in research and development than is socially optimal. In light of this fact, many
governments subsidize knowledge creation of private companies, for example
via subsidies for research and development projects (EY, 2018). However, it is
unclear whether these subsidies have the desired effect. The subsidy may simply
4
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“crowd out” the private investment a firm would have conducted even in absence
of the subsidy. In addition, as firms usually need to apply for a subsidy and
applications are selected on their merit, any comparison of subsidy recipients to
non-recipients is fraught with selection issues.
To circumvent these issues, we study a change in the eligibility criteria for the
main research and development subsidy scheme in Germany. The Zentrales In-
novationsprogramm Mittelstand (ZIM) has a budget of around e 500m per year to
subsidize research and development projects of small and midsize German firms.
As part of the second stimulus package in wake of the Great Recession in 2009,
the eligibility criteria were changed and firms with up to 1000 employees were
allowed to apply, in contrast to prior to the reform when only firms with fewer
than 250 employees could apply.
This change in eligibility criteria can be used in a regression discontinuity design.
Under the assumption that the firms just above and below the threshold of 1000
employees are comparable, we can estimate the causal effect of being eligible to
apply for the ZIM. This circumvents the selection issues that are inherent in a
simple comparison of ZIM recipients and non-recipients. We use administrative
data on the German manufacturing sector that is ideally suited for this purpose,
as it includes research and development expenditures and a wide range of further
firm covariates.
We find a large positive effect of being newly eligible for the ZIM on subsequent
research and development expenditures. However, these differences already exist
prior to the change in the eligibility criteria, implying that firms with fewer than
1000 employees already had higher research and development expenditures prior
to the reform. We address this issue using a difference-in-discontinuity design
which requires any differences between the two groups of firms to be constant
over time. Under this assumption, we do not find any significant effects of ZIM
5
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eligibility on firm outcomes. However, the confidence intervals are very wide;
hence, we cannot evaluate the effectiveness of the ZIM in a definitive fashion.
Yet, a power analysis for a randomized controlled trial evaluation of the ZIM
suggests that such an evaluation would be feasible within the budget currently
appropriated for the ZIM.
The chapter is the first quasi-experimental evaluation of the ZIM. It contributes to
the literature on measuring the effect of research and development subsidies on
firm outcomes in three ways. First, we are, to our knowledge, the first to use ad-
ministrative data on German manufacturing to study the effects of research and
development subsidies. Second, by studying the largest German subsidy pro-
gram with a difference-in-discontinuity design, we can interpret our estimates
as causal. Lastly, we can trace out the effects of the ZIM on research and devel-
opment inputs and firm outcomes, allowing us to assess the effects of ZIM in a
comprehensive fashion.
The last chapter, which is based on joint work with Lukas Buchheim and Martin
Watzinger (Buchheim et al., forthcoming), assesses whether it is easier for gov-
ernments to create employment in times and places of high unemployment com-
pared to times and places with low unemployment. Specifically, it investigates
whether the fiscal multiplier is state-dependent. Assessing the state-dependence
of the multiplier is challenging for three reasons: First, identifying the multi-
plier requires exogenous demand shocks. Second, these shocks need to vary
sufficiently within each state of the economy. Otherwise there is potentially not
enough statistical power to estimate the multiplier for each state. Third, the
shocks have to be comparable in their composition across the different states.
We assess the state dependence of the multiplier in the context of investment in
photovoltaics in Germany. This is an ideal setting as photovoltaic installations
constituted an exogenous, frequent, and comparable demand shock in all states
6
Introduction
of the economy. First, the variation in photovoltaic installations over time and
across space was mainly driven by factors that are exogenous to the economic
circumstances. Second, there is ample identifying variation in these investments
for any partition of counties into groups with slack and tight labor markets, as the
installation of rooftop photovoltaic systems was profitable in all German regions.
Third, the composition of investment has been constant as each photovoltaic in-
stallation of a given size constituted the same demand shock.
Our main finding is that the installation of photovoltaic systems created at least
twice as many jobs in slack labor markets characterized by high unemployment
than in tight labor markets with low unemployment. Our preferred specifications
compare job creation in tight and slack markets using two splits: First, along the
time series dimension, we compare counties at times when their unemployment
rate is above or below its long-run average. Second, along the cross-sectional
dimension, we compare counties with high or low unemployment relative to their
state average in a given year. When we use our estimates to approximate a local
labor earnings multiplier, we arrive at a multiplier of 1.1 in slack markets and
below 0.5 in tight markets. These results are robust to various alternative ways
of classifying slack and tight markets, and remain qualitatively unchanged when
we instrument photovoltaic installations with their profitability as measured by
the investments’ net present value.
Furthermore, we make progress on identifying the mechanism underlying the
state dependence of the effects. The evidence is most consistent with crowding-
out, i.e. that in tight markets workers are drawn from other jobs whereas they
are drawn from non-employment in slack markets. Consistent with this chan-
nel, there is evidence that investments lead to additional wage growth in the
construction sector in tight markets, but not in slack markets.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is only the
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second paper to investigate potential channels for state-dependence. In line with
the evidence from a cross-country setting in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013),
we identify crowding-out as the most plausible mechanism. Second, this chapter
is unique in ruling out price and composition effects as potential confounding
factors for state-dependent multipliers, an issue neglected by the literature thus
far. Third, we demonstrate the robustness of our results with respect to a wide
array of different ways of classifying slack and tight markets.
Taking the three chapters of this thesis together, they contribute to our knowl-
edge of which policies are successful at increasing science, innovation, and em-
ployment. This knowledge can in turn be used as a foundation for the evidence-
based design of future policies. To date, Germany is lagging other countries in
this domain, both in the evaluation of past policies and in the use of scientific ev-
idence in the design of future policies (Boockmann et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2019).
This thesis addresses the former and may hopefully contribute to the latter.
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1Truly Legendary Freedom: Funding,
Incentives, and the Productivity of Scientists
1.1 Introduction
Scientific breakthroughs have spurred productivity growth for the past decades
and many great inventions have roots in the labs of universities and research
institutes (Mokyr, 2016; Bush, 1945; The Economist, 2011). Most, if not all, of
these breakthroughs would not have been possible without funding to pay for
the research (Stephan, 2010). Funding comes in a variety of shapes and sizes. It
ranges from grants for individual projects to grants for entire research institutes
and from a few thousand to several million or even billions of dollars (Stephan,
2012).
The design of funding is a key lever for governments to incentivize scientific
research. Potential design choices include the size of individual grants, the du-
ration over which grants can be spent, how a grant can be spent, and how the
allocation of a grant is decided. These design choices are the topic of an extensive
debate, as critics contend that the current system of academic funding discour-
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ages risky research, limits academic freedom, and pushes scientists to publish
ever larger numbers of papers of little scientific value (Stephan 2012, Nicholson
and Ioannidis 2012, Sarewitz 2016).1
Unfortunately, we know little about how different funding amounts and struc-
tures affect scientific output. There is little variation within funding programs
and comparisons across programs are fraught with selection issues. Scientists
self-select and are selected into different programs based on past and expected
future productivity. Hence, any comparison across schemes usually suffers from
endogeneity issues.
This chapter studies a reform of Germany’s most important research prize to
assess how elite scientists react to an increase in the total grant amount and du-
ration of a grant that comes without any strings attached. It compares recipients
of the same prize with different grant amounts and durations in a difference-in-
differences framework, circumventing selection issues. We find that scientists
after the reform reduce their overall number of publications, but increase their
number of publications in top ranked journals. Additional analysis suggests that
this effect is due to the combination of both a larger grant amount and a longer
grant duration.
The reform of the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize is the ideal testing ground to
assess how the amount and structure of funding impacts scientific productivity.
It is Germany’s most prestigious research prize and recipients cannot apply, but
must be nominated. It bestows both honor for past achievement and comes with
a research grant for the following years. In the words of the German Research
Foundation’s (DFG) former president Hubert Markl, the DFG wants to provide
the recipients with truly legendary freedom to conduct their research (Finetti, 2010).
1Examples in the popular press are Dr. No Money: The Broken Science Funding System (Scientific
American, 01 May 2011) or Grant System Leads Cancer Researchers to Play it Safe (The New York
Times, 27 June 2009).
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Hence, the grant can be spent at the full discretion of the recipient. In 2007,
there was an increase in this truly legendary freedom. The total grant amount was
increased from e 1.55m to e 2.50m, and the period over which these funds could
be spent was increased from five to seven years. Since the selection criteria and
selection process of Leibniz Prize recipients remained the same, we can use this
natural experiment to study how very similar researchers behave under different
funding schemes.
We use a difference-in-differences identification strategy and study how the pro-
ductivity of prize recipients differs before and after the reform, comparing the
change in publication output before and after receiving the Leibniz Prize. We
measure academic productivity in several ways. First, we count the number of
publications per year, irrespective of the outlet (journals, conference proceedings,
books). Second, we differentiate journal publications by the rank of the journal.
We use two separate measures for top ranked journals: top ranked multidisci-
plinary journals (Nature, Science, PNAS, Nature Communications) and the top
three journals for each scientific discipline. Third, we complement the analysis
by studying how scientists change their research direction over time by study-
ing the text similarity of the abstracts of their research papers. We measure how
similar abstracts are to each other within a given year and how similar subse-
quent research is to the research of a winner conducted five years prior to the
prize. Lastly, we build on the approach of Uzzi et al. (2013) and study how novel,
conventional, or potentially impactful their research is, based on which journal
combinations are referenced together in a paper.
We find that the post reform prize recipients reduce their overall number of pub-
lications by 53 percent relative to the mean, or by 5.62 publications per year. This
reduction in the overall quantity of publications is accompanied by an increase in
the number of publications in top ranked journals. For both top ranked multidis-
ciplinary journals and top ranked field journals, the increase is around 50 percent
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relative to the respective mean number of publications. We find some evidence
for a change in the research direction relative to the early stock of publications,
but no change in the diversity of research within a given year. Similarly, there is
no significant effect on the average novelty or conventionality of the prize win-
ners’ research. However, there is an increase in the number of publications with
high novelty and high conventionality (p-value 0.12).2 Since there are only few
such potential high impact publications, their increase does not affect the overall
means of novelty and conventionality. These results are similar across all sci-
entific fields (engineering, life sciences, natural sciences, social sciences) under
study.
A triple differences specification shows that our results are not driven by time-
varying shocks differentially affecting the treatment cohorts relative to the control
cohorts. Researchers who have won a prestigious early career prize, but did not
receive a Leibniz Prize, form an additional control group. These early career prize
winners should be affected by the same concurrent shocks as the Leibniz Prize
winners, allowing us to difference out any effects of, e.g., the introduction of ERC
grants.3 The results from this exercise are in line with our baseline estimate.
We can rule out many prominent alternative explanations for our productivity
effects through our within prize comparison. A form of “Matthew effect” (Mer-
ton, 1968) where Leibniz Prize recipients find it easier to publish their research
in top ranked journals due to their increased prestige should affect Leibniz Prize
recipients before and after the reform in the same fashion. The same holds for an
increase in the personal threshold of what is deemed “publishable” research by
the scientist. Moreover, the Leibniz Prize is just as prestigious before and after
2These publications have been shown by Uzzi et al. (2013) to be more likely to have high
impact.
3The European Research Council (ERC) is a public funding body for scientific research within
the EU. It has a budget of e 13 billion and funds early and peak career researchers with grants
of e 1.5m to e 3.5m, similar in magnitude to the Leibniz Prize. These grants were introduced in
2007.
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the reform.
Additionally, we shed light on the question whether it is the increase in the grant
amount, the grant duration, or the combination of the two that matters. We use
the fact that the funding of the Leibniz Prize stayed constant in nominal terms
from 1986 to 2006, whereas money lost 45 percent of its value in real terms.
Hence, the earliest Leibniz prize recipients prior to 1992 had almost the same
grant amount in real terms as the post reform cohorts after 2007.
Three comparisons aim at disentangling the effects of grant amount and grant
duration. First, to isolate the effect of the grant amount, we conduct a comparison
within the control group. We compare the 1986 to 1992 prize recipients to the
2000 to 2006 cohorts. Both groups had five years to conduct their research, but
the former received e 600,000 more funding in real terms than the latter. Second,
to isolate the effect of the grant duration, we compare the 1986 to 1992 recipients
to the 2007 to 2010 recipients. Both groups received comparable amounts of
funding in real terms, but the latter had two more years to conduct their research
than the former. Lastly, we compare the 2007 to 2010 recipients to the 2000 to
2006 prize winners, where there was an increase in the grant duration and the
increase in grant amount was strongest.
We only find significant effects in the last comparison, indicating that increasing
the grant amount or the grant duration alone would have had little impact on
scientific productivity. Hence, it seems that the combination of the two gave
Leibniz prize recipients truly legendary freedom to conduct their research.
This study sheds light on the question: “What is the effect of increasing both
the funding amount and the period over which the funds could be spent, given
that the recipient has full discretion to spend her grant?” In doing so, it speaks
to two strands of the literature, which have focused on two separate, but related
13
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questions.4 First, it adds to the literature studying how scientists react to the
amount of funding. Most of these studies compare recipients of a competitive
grant to non-recipients.5 Jacob and Lefgren (2011) use an instrumental variables
approach to compare recipients of National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants to
equally qualified researchers who were barely rejected for the same type of grant.
They find an increase in the subsequent number of publications, but this effect
is small in magnitude as the rejected researchers simply shift to other grants.
Benavente et al. (2012) find a sizable increase in the number of publications for
recipients of a Chilean research fund using a regression discontinuity design.
Similar increases are found in the case of New Zealand (Gush et al., 2018) and
Denmark and Norway (Langfeldt et al., 2015). An exception to the finding of
positive effects of funding on output is Lerchenmueller (2018). He finds negative
effects of NIH funding on the subsequent number of publications. Theoretically,
it is unclear whether funding should have positive effects, zero effects, or negative
effects. For example, increases in funding may be used to increase wages of
scientists (Goolsbee, 1998) or scientists may shift their research strategy in such
a way that their output declines, e.g. by crowding out intrinsic motivation. Our
study contributes to this literature by studying an increase in funding within
the same program, holding many other factors constant, such as the prestige of
a grant or the strings attached to the grant. In addition, we complement the
analysis of large scale programs such as NIH grants by focusing on a set of elite
scientists.
Second, this chapter also speaks to the literature on how elite scientists react to
the structure of funding, such as the duration of a grant or the amount of discre-
4Although we study the most important German research prize, our within prize compari-
son does not directly speak to the incentive effects of receiving a prestigious research prize on
subsequent productivity (Borjas and Doran 2015, Chan et al. 2014).
5We only survey the literature on the effects of grants on individual researchers. Whalley and
Hicks (2014) study how the research output of universities reacts to increases in funding and find
positive effects.
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tion in spending funds. Azoulay et al. (2011) look at the effects of becoming a
Howard-Hughes Medical Institute Investigator (HHMI) on subsequent research
productivity.6 They compare recipients of the HHMI to matched-on-observable
recipients of prestigious early-career prizes who are funded by the NIH. The
HHMI program has, among other features, longer funding periods, higher fund-
ing amounts, and more discretion for researchers in spending their funds than
grants by the NIH. The paper finds an increase in both the overall number and
the number of highly cited publications of HHMI researchers relative to non-
HHMI researchers. Our different finding of a reduction in the overall number of
publications is most likely explained by the different structure of the HHMI and
the Leibniz Prize program. Whereas both offer scientists a lot of freedom and
funding to conduct their research, HHMI researchers are subject to evaluations
and renewal rounds. The Leibniz Prize, in contrast, is non-renewable and hence
does not have any reward (or punishment) for long-term success (or failure).
This chapter contributes to this literature by showing how elite scientists react
to an increase in the amount and grant duration of discretionary funding across
multiple scientific disciplines. Furthermore, our approach of comparing different
cohorts of Leibniz Prize recipients mitigates remaining concerns about selection
on unobservables that cannot be ruled out by matching only on observables.7
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
Leibniz Prize and the reform of 2007 in detail. Section 1.3 explains measurement,
data and identification. Section 1.4 presents the results and Section 1.5 discusses
the mechanism. Section 1.6 concludes.
6An additional example is Wang et al. (2018) who survey scientists in Japan and compare the
correlation between the novelty of research and whether it was based on competitive or block
funding.
7This chapter also complements recent analyses of incentive structures in German academia,
but focuses on a set of elite scientists instead of the universe of management researchers (Bian
et al., 2016) or the universe of university scientists (Ytsma, 2017).
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1.2 The Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize
The Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize is the most important research prize in Ger-
many. Since 1986, the DFG has awarded it annually to around ten recipients.
The prize is both recognition of past achievement and aims to improve the work-
ing conditions of outstanding researchers, expand their research opportunities, relieve
them of administrative tasks, and help them employ particularly qualified early career
researchers.8 It is awarded to peak career researchers (recipients are on average 45
years old when receiving the prize) across all scientific disciplines. Apart from
prestige and accolades, prize winners receive a non-renewable seven figure re-
search grant for several years. This research funding is not attached to specific
projects, institutions, or other strings and can be spent by prize winners with full
discretion, as long as it is for research purposes. Anecdotally, funds have been
spent on hiring junior scientists, purchasing equipment and books, undertaking
travel and expeditions, and hosting guests (Finetti, 2010).
In this chapter, we exploit a change in the amount of funding and in the funding
period in 2007. Prior to 2007, each prize was endowed with e 1.55m in total and
the funds could be spent over five years.9 From 2007 onwards, the funding for
each prize was increased to e 2.50m and the funds could now be spent over a
period of seven years, increasing both grant size and duration by at least 40 per-
cent. The DFG undertook this reform to adjust the funding amount for inflation
(funding had stayed constant in nominal terms from 1986 to 2006), to signal the
status of the Leibniz Prize as the premier research prize in Germany, and in re-
sponse to feedback of past recipients that the time period was too short for some
8See http://www.dfg.de/en/funded_projects/prizewinners/leibniz_prize/index.html,
last accessed on 01 August 2018.
9In less than 10 percent of cases, one prize is split among several (usually two, in one case four)
prize winners. In these cases, the award sum is split equitably. Furthermore, prior to 2002, the DFG
differentiated between theoretical and more capital intensive research. Theoretical researchers
received half as much funding as researchers more reliant on physical equipment.
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projects (Finetti, 2010). This reform was announced publicly on 30 May 2006 by
the DFG, prior to the communication of decisions for the 2007 prize in December
2006.10 Hence, any anticipation effect of scientists should be minimal. In addi-
tion, apart from the change in funding amount and period, no other feature of
the prize changed. Importantly, the funding amount and time frame is the same
across disciplines, only researchers affiliated with a German research institution
are eligible, and the nomination process also remained unchanged.
The amount of funding from the Leibniz Prize and the increase in 2007 con-
stitute a sizable shock to recipients’ research budgets. For example, in 2010
the average amount of third-party funding per university professor in Germany
was e 261,000 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014b, p.70). In medicine and engineer-
ing, which have the highest third party funding of all scientific fields, average
funds per professor were around e 550,000 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014b, p.70).
Hence, the reform of the Leibniz Prize with its increase in funding of e 1m
constitutes at least two years of third party funding for the average university
professor. Some Leibniz Prize recipients head research institutes outside of uni-
versities, such as Max-Planck Institutes or institutes of the Helmholtz Society.
Unfortunately, there is no systematic data on the average third-party funding per
professor for these institutes. A back-of-the-envelope calculation for one selected
institute suggests average third-party funding of around e 1m per professor.11
Here, the increase in Leibniz Prize funding constitutes a smaller, but still relevant
shock.
Researchers cannot apply themselves for the Leibniz Prize, but must be nomi-
nated by a third party. These third parties are mostly universities (represented
by their presidents) who put forward a slate of nominations to the DFG. Each
10Prize winners themselves are informed shortly before the general public each year in early
December. The prize itself (and the funding) is then awarded in March of the following year.
11Specifically, we look at the Alfred-Wegener-Institute for Polar and Marine Research. In 2010,
this institute had e 21m in third-party funding and 21 professors according to its annual report
(Alfred-Wegener-Institut für Polar- und Meeresforschung in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft, 2012).
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year, around 120 to 150 researchers are nominated. In a next step, the selection
committee for the Leibniz Prize of the DFG comes up with a recommendation
and the final selection is then made by the joint committee of the DFG, its main
funding decision body. The selection committee for the Leibniz Prize consists of
former prize winners and other eminent scientists.12 The joint committee consists
of scientists as well as representatives of the German federal government and the
state governments. Due to this highly regulated multistage process, any strategic
selection of scientists into earlier or later prize years seems unlikely.
In line with the aim of the Leibniz Prize to fund outstanding researchers, re-
cipients of the Leibniz Prize have gone on to receive other distinctions as well.
Seven recipients have received a Nobel Prize and two received the Fields Medal
in mathematics.13 Most prize winners are tenured professors when they receive
the prize and usually continue in academia, often taking on prestigious positions
such as heading research institutes of the Max Planck Society, the Fraunhofer
Society, and the Helmholtz Society.14
1.3 Empirical Framework
In this section, we first describe how we measure scientific productivity and
which data sources are used. Additional details on the data construction can
be found in Appendix A.1. Second, we present the identification strategy and
evidence for the validity of the identifying assumption.
12The composition of the selection committee did also not change substantively in 2007. Several
old members left and new members joined the committee, but not out of line with turnover in
previous year (Finetti, 2010). To our knowledge, there are no term limits for the committee.
13Nobel laureates are Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard (Leibniz Prize: 1986/ Nobel Prize: 1995),
Erwin Neher (1987/1991), and Bert Sakmann (1987/1991) in physiology, Hartmut Michel
(1986/1988), Gerhard Ertl (1991/2007), and Stefan W. Hell (2008/2014) in chemistry, and Theodor
W. Hänsch (1989/2005) in physics. Fields medalists are Gerd Faltings (Leibniz Prize: 1996/ Fields
Medal: 1986) and Peter Scholze (2016/2018).
14Two notable exceptions are Wolfgang A. Herrmann (Leibniz Prize 1987), who has served as
president of Technical University Munich since 1995, and Joachim Milberg (Leibniz Prize 1989),
who was the CEO of BMW from 1999 to 2002 and chairman of the board from 2004 to 2015.
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1.3.1 Data and Measurement
The sample encompasses all Leibniz Prize recipients from 1986 to 2010, except
those from the humanities and law. These fields are not covered in our publica-
tion data. In total, we study 257 Leibniz Prize winners, of whom 36 received the
prize after 2007. We follow the literature and use bibliometric measures to proxy
for scientific output and productivity (e.g. Azoulay et al., 2011; Borjas and Doran,
2015; Lee2015; Wang et al., 2017a). All of our measures are based on data from
Microsoft Academic, which contains information on the title, authors, outlet, doc-
ument type, references, and abstracts of scientific publications including journals,
some books, and conference proceedings. In our primary set of results, we fo-
cus on publication counts, irrespective of the type of publication (journal article,
conference proceeding, book, book chapter). We weight all publications equally.
In additional regressions, we split publication counts in academic journals by the
quality of the outlet, focusing on two measures. We count all publications in the
four most cited multidisciplinary science journals (Science, Nature, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Nature Communica-
tions) to measure hit publications. In addition, we use a broader definition of top
journals by counting publications in the top three journals by field according to the
2006 ranking of Scimago Lab.15
To get a more nuanced measure of whether and how the output of Leibniz Prize
winners changes, we look at the text similarity of abstracts.16 We focus on two
measures that are defined for each scientist. The first measure compares pub-
lications within a given year to each other to identify how broad the research
portfolio of a winner is. The second measure compares the publications in a
15The ranking can be found here: https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?year=2006,
last accessed 02 August 2018. A list of these journals is in Appendix A.1. We do not use a
time-varying journal ranking as the Scimago Ranking only goes back to 1999 and choose the last
ranking prior to the reform.
16This limits attention to publications for which Microsoft Academic includes an abstract. This
is the case for two thirds of the publications in our data.
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given year to the early stock of publications. This measures how much a prize
winner branches out over time. We use standard text analysis methods and first
pre-process all abstracts by removing very common words (stop words) and by
stemming words (i.e. innovate and innovation are stemmed to innov). We then
treat each abstract as a document and construct a document-term matrix of all
abstracts and words appearing in the corpus of abstracts. In addition, we use
term frequency–inverse document frequency (tf-idf) weighting. Each abstract is a
row in the document-term matrix and each word a column. For the first measure,
we then calculate the similarity of all abstracts within a given year to each other
by calculating the cosine-similarity between all pairs of abstracts and taking the
average.17 For the second measure, we treat all early stock abstracts (from 10
years prior to receiving the prize to six years prior) as a single document and
calculate the average cosine similarity of the abstracts in a given year to this early
stock.
The measures of abstract similarity are only defined within a scientist. We ad-
ditionally build on the approach of Uzzi et al. (2013) to see how a prize win-
ner’s research changes relative to science as a whole. The underlying idea is
that new scientific ideas are often recombinations of old ideas (Weitzman, 1998).
Hence, the combination of prior literature referenced together in a publication
is indicative for how novel or conventional an idea is. Uzzi et al. (2013) look at
the pairwise combinations of journals referenced together in a paper and define
a measure of novelty and conventionality for each publication.18 They find that
papers that score high on novelty and conventionality are more likely to be im-
17The cosine-similarity between two abstracts A1 and A2 is given by the cosine-similarity
between the two corresponding row vectors in the document-term matrix, similarity =
∑ni=1 A1,i A2,i√
∑ni1 A
2
1,i
√
∑ni1 A
2
2,i
.
18Specifically, they compare how the observed frequencies of observing a given journal pair
compare to those expected by chance. Comparing these two distributions, one can generate a z
score for each journal combination. Uzzi et al. (2013) then use two summary statistics on the pub-
lication level to characterize how novel (a paper’s 10th percentile z score) and how conventional
(a paper’s median z score) a given paper is.
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pactful, i.e., to land in the top five percent of the citation distribution. We use the
approach of Lee et al. (2015) that is based on the same idea as Uzzi et al. (2013),
but computationally easier to implement.
The basis for measuring novelty and conventionality on the paper level is to look at
how common a combination of two referenced journals is. Simply counting how
often two journals are referenced together would give disproportionate weight
to journals that are heavily cited. Hence, we standardize the number of actually
observed co-appearances with the expected number of co-appearances. For the
expected number of co-appearances, we assume that journals are cited indepen-
dent of each other and calculate how many co-appearances one would expect
based on how often each individual journal is cited.19 We follow Lee et al. (2015)
and sort all journal combinations on the publication level by their commonness.
We then measure the novelty of a paper using the 10th percentile of this distri-
bution. As in Lee et al. (2015), we transform this value using the negative of
the logarithm to facilitate the interpretation such that increases in this score are
increases in novelty. In addition, we use the (logarithm) of the 50th percentile
as a measure of the conventionality. In addition, we classify publications by their
potential impact by counting only those publications with high novelty and high
conventionality.20
All of our measures are ex-ante measures, i.e., they measure the novelty, conven-
tionality, and quality at the point of publication. We cannot condition on ex post
measures as evidenced by citations as the reform of the Leibniz Prize was fairly
recently and the publications of the treatment cohorts have not had enough time
19Letting t denote a given year, the commonness between two journals j1 and j2 is defined as
Nj1,j2,t
Nj1,t
Nt
· Nj2,tNt ·Nt
where Nj1,j2,t is the number of times journal j1 and journal j2 are referenced together
in year t. Nt, Nj1,t, and Nj2,t are the number of all journal pairs, the number of journal pairs
containing j1 and the number of pairs containing j2 in year t, respectively.
20Specifically, a paper is classified as having high novelty if it is below the 10th percentile of the
year specific distribution of novelty and as having high conventionality if it is above the median
of the year specific distribution of conventionality.
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to garner citations. This issue is especially relevant as Wang et al. (2017b) have
shown that papers with high novelty take longer to accrue citations.21
1.3.2 Identification
To estimate the impact of the increased funding amount and duration, we use a
difference-in-differences model. We compare the change in productivity of prize
winners receiving the increased grant size and duration to that of prize winners
under the old scheme. This means we compare the productivity of the prize
winners from 2007 to 2010 to the productivity of the prize winners from 1986 to
2006, both before and after receiving the Leibniz Prize. As pre-period we study
the five years prior to receiving the Leibniz Prize and as post period we use the
seven years after prize reception. We focus on this window to capture the full
seven years of Leibniz Prize funding after the reform of 2007. The five years prior
to receiving the Leibniz Prize are chosen to limit attention to the period where
researchers have usually received tenure and head their own labs or research
groups.22 We cannot study any prize winners who received their prize after 2010
as they have not yet completed their Leibniz Prize funding period.
We estimate the following difference-in-differences specification for the prize co-
horts from 1986 to 2010:
yi,t = β1 · Post Prizet + β2 · Post 2007i · Post Prizet
+Winner FE+ Year FE+ ei,t
(1.1)
where i indexes prize winners and t indexes time. As dependent variable, yi,t, we
use the various measures of scientific productivity described above. Post Prize is
21Appendix A.2 presents results weighting all publication counts with three year forward cita-
tions, excluding the most recent years. The results are qualitatively similar.
22On average, professors in Germany receive tenure at age 41 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014a,
p.189). In a robustness check in Table A.3, we extend the pre period to 10 years prior to the prize
and find similar results.
22
Truly Legendary Freedom
an indicator equal to one for the years after receiving the Leibniz Prize. Post 2007
is an indicator equal to one if the prize recipient received her prize between 2007
and 2010. We include both winner and (calendar) year fixed effects as controls.23
Standard errors allow for clustering on the level of the prize cohort to account
for serial correlation across years and potential correlation within prize cohorts.
Since this yields relatively few clusters (25), we also use the wild cluster bootstrap
proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) as a robustness check in Appendix A.2.
The coefficient of interest, β2, measures the average yearly change in the depen-
dent variable in the seven years after receiving the Leibniz Prize post 2007 relative
to the period before receiving the prize and relative to the prize winners receiving
the Leibniz Prize prior to 2007. To be able to interpret β2 causally, Leibniz Prize
recipients prior to 2007 must be a good counterfactual for Leibniz Prize recipi-
ents after 2007. This untestable assumption appears plausible, since the selection
mechanism and criteria of the Leibniz Prize did not change over time.
The plausibility of this assumption is underlined by the fact that although there
are differences in levels, the two groups have parallel trends prior to receiving
their respective Leibniz Prizes. Summary statistics for all main variables prior to
receiving the Leibniz Prize can be found in Table 1.1. Leibniz Prize recipients are
on average 28 when they receive their PhD and 45 when they receive the Leibniz
Prize. The natural sciences account for the largest share of prize recipients and
the social sciences for the smallest. All of these covariates are balanced across the
two groups, as expected given that the selection process remained unchanged.
However, there are significant differences in the share of female recipients, the
share of recipients at research institutes such as Max Planck Institutes, and the
number of authors per publication. This is likely due to a general time trend in
23Note that the baseline effect of Post 2007 is taken up by the winner fixed effects. In addition,
in robustness checks we include field by year, affiliation type by year, and gender by year fixed
effects (see Table 1.3).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics Prior to Prize
1986-2006 2007-2010 Difference
Age at Prize 45.20 45.03 0.18 (0.81)
Age at PhD 27.76 27.92 −0.16 (0.64)
Female 0.07 0.19 −0.13∗ (0.07)
University 0.78 0.56 0.23∗∗ (0.01)
Social Sciences 0.06 0.08 −0.02 (0.62)
Engineering 0.17 0.19 −0.02 (0.75)
Life Sciences 0.30 0.28 0.02 (0.80)
Natural Sciences 0.47 0.44 0.03 (0.77)
Number of authors per pub 3.33 4.08 −0.75∗∗∗ (0.00)
Number of publications per year 7.74 13.72 −5.97∗∗∗ (0.00)
Science/ Nature / PNAS 0.12 0.19 −0.06 (0.21)
Number of Top 3 pubs per year 0.47 0.70 −0.23 (0.11)
Number of pubs with potential
impact
0.04 0.03 0.00 (0.91)
Text similarity within year 0.19 0.32 −0.13∗∗∗ (0.00)
Text similarity rel. to early pubs 0.16 0.19 −0.02∗∗∗ (0.01)
Average Novelty 1.53 2.11 −0.58∗∗ (0.02)
Average Conventionality −0.47 −0.80 0.32 (0.22)
Observations 221 36 257
Note: This table shows summary statistics for the treatment and control group prior to receiving
the Leibniz Prize. Values are averaged over the five years prior to receiving the Leibniz Prize. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Effect of the Leibniz Prize Reform on Scientific Productivity (Non-
Parametric Evidence)
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tions in Panel (b)) per year, relative to the year of Leibniz Prize reception. Means within groups
are calculated using the weights of Iacus et al. (2012). Values are normalized with respect to
relative year -1. Data for relative years 6 and 7 is not averaged.
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academia, an issue we revisit below.24 In terms of our outcome variables, there
are differences in levels for the overall publication count, the text similarity of
abstracts, and the average novelty prior to receiving the prize.
Figure 1.1 investigates whether trends are parallel prior to receiving the Leibniz
Prize. We focus on the overall number of publications and the number of hit
publications as our main dependent variables.25 The figure shows the average
number of publications per year for the two groups of prize winners, normalized
to the year prior to receiving the prize. In order to minimize noise, we show a
five year moving average (where the last two years are not averaged anymore) of
the means.26 As can be seen in Panel (a) for the overall number of publications,
prior to receiving the Leibniz Prize, the two groups behave similarly and are
virtually indistinguishable in the three years prior to the prize. Foreshadowing
our treatment effect, the counts quickly diverge after receiving the prize. For the
number of hit publications in Panel (b), the two groups publish on the same trend
prior to the reception of the prize. About two years after the prize, the treatment
group increases its number of hit publications.
A separate concern would be broader time trends affecting prolific researchers
at the same time as the reform of the Leibniz Prize. An example would be the
introduction of ERC grants in 2007, which may have changed how researchers
react to receiving a Leibniz Prize independently of the reform of the Leibniz Prize
itself. To deal with these concerns, we estimate a demanding triple differences
specification in Section 1.4.2. This incorporates winners of early career prizes
who are also subject to the ERC shock as an additional control group. We find
comparable results.
24See e.g. Wuchty et al. (2007) for evidence on increasing team sizes.
25Results for the other dependent variables are available from the author upon request.
26In Figure A.9 in the Appendix, the same data is shown without the moving average adjust-
ment. The pattern is somewhat more noisy, especially for the number of hit publications.
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1.4 Results
This section presents the main findings. Leibniz Prize recipients react to the in-
creased funding amount and increased funding period in two ways. They reduce
their overall number of publications and increase the number of articles in top
ranked journals. This finding is not driven by concurrent shocks such as the
introduction of ERC grants.
1.4.1 Main Findings
Table 1.2 presents the main results using the baseline specification from equation
(1.1). In the first column, we see that prize winners after 2007 write 5.62 fewer
publications than those receiving a Leibniz Prize before 2007, relative to before
receiving the Leibniz Prize. This effect is large in relative terms, corresponding
to a 53 percent reduction relative to the mean. In columns (2) and (3), we see
that this decrease in the overall quantity of publications is accompanied by an
increase in the number of publications in highly ranked journals. Irrespective
of whether only publications in top multidisciplinary journals (Nature, Science,
PNAS, Nature Communications) are counted or field-specific top three publica-
tions, we see a relative increase of around 50 percent (statistically significant on
the 10 percent level). Columns (4) and (5) show that for both measures of text
similarity of the abstracts there is a decrease in similarity. However, this is only
statistically significant for the measure relative to the early stock of publications.
The treatment group of Leibniz Prize winners engages in research more distant
from their early work than the control group, after receiving the Leibniz Prize.
This effect is smaller in relative terms than the effect for publication counts, with
a 15 percent reduction in similarity. Last, we turn to the measures of novelty,
conventionality, and potential high impact publications of Uzzi et al. (2013) and
27
Truly Legendary Freedom
Table
1.2:Effect
of
the
Leibniz
Prize
R
eform
on
Scientific
Productivity
(D
iff-in-diff
Estim
ates)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A
ll
Top
M
ultidisc.
Top
Field
A
bstract
A
bstract
N
ovelty
C
onvent.
H
igh
Im
pact
Pubs
Pubs
Pubs
Sim
.I
Sim
.II
Pubs
Post
Prize
1.57 ∗∗
−
0.03
−
0.08
0.02
−
0.01
0.15 ∗∗∗
−
0.08 ∗
0.01
(0.59)
(0.03)
(0.09)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
Post
Prize×
Post
2007
−
5.62 ∗∗
0.08 ∗
0.29 ∗
−
0.06
−
0.02 ∗∗∗
−
0.13
0.15
0.13
(2.24)
(0.04)
(0.16)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.08)
M
ean
D
ep.
10.64
0.15
0.54
0.27
0.13
1.88
−
0.69
0.05
R
2
0.15
0.03
0.03
0.10
0.39
0.06
0.05
0.02
W
inners
257
257
257
252
248
256
256
257
O
bservations
3341
3341
3341
2719
2536
2964
2964
3341
N
ote:This
table
show
s
the
results
from
a
difference-in-differences
estim
ation
w
ith
five
years
before
receiving
the
Leibniz
Prize
as
pre-period
and
seven
years
after
as
post-period.
T
he
estim
ation
equation
is
as
in
equation
(1.1).
The
dependent
variable
in
colum
n
(1)
is
the
count
of
alltypes
of
publication
per
year.
In
colum
n
(2)
only
publications
in
top
general
interest
journals
(Science,N
ature,PN
A
S,N
ature
C
om
m
unications)
are
counted.
C
olum
n
(3)
uses
publications
in
field
specific
top
3
journals
(See
Table
A
.2
for
the
fulllistof
journals).In
colum
n
(4),the
dependentvariable
is
the
textsim
ilarity
of
abstracts
to
each
other
w
ithin
a
given
year.
In
colum
n
(5),text
sim
ilarity
is
calculated
relative
to
the
early
stock
of
publications
of
an
author.
N
ote
that
the
num
ber
of
observations
drops
as
not
every
researcher
publishes
in
every
year.
In
colum
ns
(6)
and
(7),novelty
and
conventionality
are
defined
as
in
Lee
et
al.(2015).
Lastly,in
colum
n
(8),the
dependent
variable
is
the
count
of
publications
w
ith
potentialhigh
im
pact,i.e.
having
high
conventionality
and
novelty.
In
all
regressions,
w
e
use
the
w
eights
suggested
by
Iacus
et
al.
(2012)
to
identify
the
average
treatm
ent
effect
on
the
treated.
Standard
errors
in
parentheses
are
clustered
on
the
levelof
the
year
of
the
prize. ∗, ∗∗
and
∗∗∗
denote
significance
on
the
10
percent,5
percentand
1
percentlevel,
respectively.
28
Truly Legendary Freedom
Figure 1.2: Time-Varying Treatment Effect on the Number of Publications
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Note: This figure shows the yearly average treatment effects on the treated of receiving the
Leibniz Prize in 2007 or later on the average number of publications (all types) per year relative
to the average number of publications of researchers who received the Leibniz Prize in 2006 or
prior. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered on the year of prize
reception. I use the weights of Iacus et al. (2012) to arrive at the average treatment effect on the
treated.
Lee et al. (2015). Whereas the abstract similarity is measured within a scientist,
novelty and conventionality are defined relative to science as a whole. Neither
novelty nor conventionality are statistically significant and the relative magni-
tude of the point estimates is comparatively small. In terms of sign, the results
indicate a reduction in novelty and an increase in conventionality. The number
of publications with potential high impact (those with high novelty and high
conventionality) increases, although the coefficient is not significant on standard
levels (p-value = 0.12).
To investigate the timing of the effect, we estimate yearly treatment effects by
interacting the treatment dummy with an indicator for each year before and after
the prize.27 For brevity, we once again focus on the overall number of pub-
27The estimation equation is: yi,t = ∑7τ=−5 βτ · Post 2007i · 1{t = τ}+ Winner FE + Year FE +
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lications as our main dependent variable.28 As can be seen in Figure 1.2, the
coefficients prior to receiving the prize are all insignificant and centered around
0. This is further evidence for the plausibility of the identifying assumption that
Leibniz Prize recipients from 1986 to 2006 are a valid counterfactual to Leibniz
Prize recipients from 2007 to 2010. After receiving the prize, the number of pub-
lication decreases fairly quickly and continues to fall over time. In addition, all
coefficients after receiving the Leibniz Prize are statistically significant. Given
that turnaround times in the natural and life sciences are much quicker than in
economics, this is plausible.29
Due to the inclusion of winner and year fixed effects, these results cannot be ex-
plained by constant differences between the researchers or common shocks to all
researchers, such as an increase in the pressure to publish. However, it is evident
in the summary statistics that the later cohorts differ with respect to certain de-
mographics from the earlier control cohorts, primarily with the larger share of fe-
male prize winners and the lower share of prize winners at universities. It might
be that for scientists in specific fields, at research institutes, or female scientists,
the increase in the pressure to publish might be smaller. This group-specific time
shock could then drive our results. To rule out any shocks that disproportion-
ately affect scientists in specific fields, at research institutes, or female scientists,
we use different year fixed effects in Table 1.3. In Panel A, we repeat the base-
line results for comparison. In Panel B, we include field (social sciences, natural
sciences, engineering, life sciences) by year fixed effects and find similar results.
The coefficient for the overall number of publications is somewhat smaller. In
Panels C and D, we interact the year dummies with the university and gender
dummy, respectively. Results are again similar. Thus, shocks disproportionately
ei,t.
28The results for the other dependent variables are available from the author upon request.
29Moreover, another immediate response might be to stop existing projects that were not sub-
mitted for publication yet after receiving the Leibniz Prize to focus on other projects.
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affecting certain fields, institutions or genders do not drive the results.
One contribution of this study is to extend the analysis from one discipline to
multiple scientific fields (we only exclude the humanities and law). In Table 1.4
we explore heterogeneity across fields by interacting the treatment indicator with
an indicator for each field.30 Focusing on the number of publications in column
(1), the effects are similar in engineering, natural sciences, and the life sciences.
They are somewhat smaller in the social sciences, which may be due to the fact
that journal publications are less important in these disciplines. For the number
of publications in top ranked journals (both multidisciplinary and field journals)
in columns (2) and (3), the coefficients are all positive and mostly insignificant,
but tend to be smaller in the social sciences. In columns (4) and (5), the effect on
text similarity is negative across all fields (except for the within year similarity in
the social sciences) and similar in magnitude to the baseline estimate. Columns
(6) and (7) show a similar pattern for novelty and conventionality, respectively.
The social sciences have an opposing sign to the other fields (except the engineer-
ing effect on novelty which is positive but very small). Lastly, in column (8), the
point estimate for potential high impact publications is positive for all fields, but
only significant in engineering. Overall, there is little evidence of heterogeneity
across fields. The effect in social sciences differs somewhat from the effect in all
other fields, but by and large is qualitatively similar. One potential reason may be
that knowledge production and the publication process work differently in social
sciences than in other fields. However, the small number of social scientists in
the sample does not allow us to draw firm conclusions.
Taken together, increasing funding by e 1m and extending the time frame by two
years had the following effect: Leibniz Prize recipients reduce their overall num-
ber of publications. However, they increase their number of publications with
30The field assignment of the DFG at the time of the prize is used. Since fields are defined
broadly (social sciences, engineering, life sciences, natural sciences), movement of prizewinners
across fields does not play a role.
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potential high impact and their number of publications in top ranked journals,
both multidisciplinary ones and top field journals. The effects are also large in
economic terms, with a decrease in the overall number of publications of around
50 percent and a similarly sized increase in the number of hit publications. This
pattern is similar across fields and robust to including different time fixed effects.
1.4.2 Robustness: Triple Difference Relative to Early Career Prize
Winners
One remaining concern would be other time-varying shocks that differentially af-
fect younger and older researchers. For example, the introduction of ERC grants
in 2007 may have affected the treatment group differently than the control group,
as the former was younger than the latter in 2007. Additional examples are the
so-called “Exzellenzinitiative” for German universities starting in 2005/06 or the
decision of the DFG to limit the length of publication lists on grant applications
in 2010. The introduction of these programs may have changed the incentives re-
garding which type of research to focus on. Younger researchers might respond
more strongly to this change, as career concerns loom larger for them.
To deal with these issues, we use a difference-in-differences-in-differences strat-
egy. We employ a third group that does not receive a Leibniz Prize, but is exposed
to the same shocks as an additional control group. We construct this group by
building on the work by Azoulay et al. (2011) and use early career prize winners
as an additional control group. These winners are drawn from a set of presti-
gious prizes and scholarships across all disciplines.31 We focus on early career
prize winners and not on, e.g., the universe of German academics in order to
have a group that is as similar as possible to Leibniz Prize recipients. Most of
these early career prize winners go on to a successful career in academia. How-
31The full list of early career prizes can be found in Appendix A.1.
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ever, they may differ in important (observed and unobserved) dimensions from
the Leibniz Prize winners.32 For example, they are less prolific than Leibniz Prize
winners and publish around 40 percent less per year. However, we expect them
to be subject to the same shocks created by, e.g., the introduction of ERC grants.33
For all 461 early career prize winners, we construct a counterfactual year of Leib-
niz Prize reception by approximating when the researcher “should have” received
a Leibniz Prize based on her age.34 The full triple differences specification is
yi,t = β1 · Post Prizet + β2 · Post Prizet · Leibnizi
+ β3 · Post Prizet · Post 2007 Cohorti
+ β4 · Post Prizet · Leibnizi · Post 2007 Cohorti
+Winner FE+ Year FE+ ei,t
(1.2)
where Leibnizi is an indicator equal to one if the researcher received a Leibniz
Prize and all other variables are defined as in equation (1.1).35 The coefficient
of interest is now β4. It measures the change in the outcome variable (e.g. the
number of publications) of receiving the Leibniz Prize after 2007 (relative to be-
fore 2007), relative to the differential change between Leibniz Prize and early
career prize winners before and after receiving the Leibniz Prize. Due to data
constraints, we restrict attention to the prize years from 2000 to 2010.36 Results
for this specification can be found in Table 1.5. Focusing on the coefficient of
32Some Leibniz Prize recipients also received an early career prize early in their career. We
exclude these Leibniz Prize recipients from the sample of early career prize winners and only
include them as Leibniz Prize winners.
33Each year there have been around four times as many ERC advanced grants as Leibniz Prizes,
making it plausible that also researchers not as successful as Leibniz Prize recipients may respond
to the potential incentive effects of the ERC grants.
34We do not observe actual age of the early career prize winners. Hence, we use a prize-specific
time lag between reception of the early career prize and the counterfactual Leibniz Prize.
35The Leibniz indicator, the Post 2007 indicator, and the interaction of the two is taken up by
the winner fixed effects.
36Many early career prizes are not as long running as the Leibniz Prize. In addition, in the case
of the Heisenberg scholarships, recipients prior to 1999 are unavailable due to data protection
regulations.
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interest (Post Prize × Leibniz × Post 2007), the first takeaway is that qualitatively
the effects are similar to the baseline specification across all dependent variables.
However, only the treatment effects on the overall number of publications and
the similarity of abstracts within a year are statistically significant on conven-
tional levels. Reassuringly, though, the relative decrease in the overall number of
publications is 55 percent, which is almost identical to our baseline estimate of
53 percent. Hence, time-varying shocks that differentially affect the two cohorts
such as the introduction of ERC grants do not seem to be a cause of concern for
our identification.
1.4.3 Additional Robustness
Appendix A.2 presents additional robustness checks in detail, which we briefly
summarize here. One possible concern pertains to inference. Standard errors
allow for clustering on the level of the prize year. This yields comparatively
few clusters, 25 in the baseline specification and only 11 in the triple difference
specification. For most coefficients, inference is unchanged if we use the wild
cluster bootstrap proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) and hence any bias from the
relatively small number of clusters is likely small as well (Tables A.6 to A.8).
As a test of our identifying assumption, we conduct a placebo exercise and assign
(placebo) treatments in Figure A.1. The coefficient for the actual treatment is
one of the few statistically significant ones and largest in absolute magnitude.
Furthermore, we show that extending the pre-prize time period to ten years prior
to prize reception (Table A.3 and Figure A.2) or dropping individual prize cohorts
(Figures A.3 and A.4) does not change results in a meaningful way. In Table
A.5 we investigate how results change if we normalize publication counts by the
number of authors or weight publications by their forward citations. Normalizing
publication counts with the number of authors does not alter our results. The
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citation-weighted results have the same qualitative pattern as the main results.
However, only the increase in publications in top field journals is statistically
significant. Lastly, we investigate further heterogeneity of results by estimating
individual treatment effects (Figures A.5 to A.8).
1.5 Mechanism
The analysis so far has always focused on the interaction of increased funding
amount and funding duration. Yet, it is unclear whether it is the additional
funding amount, the additional time to spend the money, or a combination of
the two that caused the decline in overall publications and increase in top ranked
publications. In order to shed light on this issue, we exploit the fact that the
nominal funding amount of the Leibniz Prize remained constant from 1986 to
2006, whereas money lost 45 percent of its value in real terms.
We look at three groups of prize recipients: the (treatment) group of 2007 to
2010 prize recipients, the 2000 to 2006 prize recipients, and the 1986 to 1992 prize
recipients. In real terms, the 2007 to 2010 prize recipients received e 2.54m, the
2000 to 2006 recipients received e 1.74m, and the 1986 to 1992 prize recipients
e 2.35m.37 Hence, the increase in funding amount for the 2007 to 2010 recipients
is much larger relative to the 2000 to 2006 recipients than relative to the earliest
prize recipients from 1986 to 1992. However, both the 2000 to 2006 group and the
1986 to 1992 group had five years to conduct their research, whereas the 2007 to
2010 recipients had seven years.
37All real monetary amounts are in 2010 Euros and deflated using the consumer price index
published by the Federal Statistical Office. Note that this is based on the maximum prize funding
of (nominal) e 1.55m and does not take into account that prior to 2002, theoretical researchers
usually only received half the amount. Unfortunately, there is no data available on their share of
theoretical researchers prior to 2000. In 2000 to 2002, the share is around 25 percent, implying
that the 1986 to 1992 control group may have had average real funding of e 2.05m and the 2000 to
2006 cohorts e 1.64m. Even under this conservative estimate, the change in funding is still much
larger relative to the 2000 to 2006 prize winners than relative to the very early recipients.
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We conduct three comparisons to disentangle whether it is the grant amount,
the grant duration, or a combination that matters most. First, to shed light on
the effect of the grant amount alone, we compare the 1986 to 1992 cohorts to
the 2000 to 2006 cohorts. We use the 1986 to 1992 group as treatment group,
as these researchers had a much larger monetary amount than the 2000 to 2006
control group. Importantly, both groups had a constant five years to conduct their
research. Second, to investigate the effect of grant duration alone, we compare the
2007 to 2010 cohorts to the 1986 to 1992 prize recipients. The two groups receive
rather similar amounts of (real) funding (e 2.54m vs. e 2.35m), but the 2007 to
2010 researchers had seven years to conduct their research, whereas the 1986
to 1992 group only had five years. Third, to look at the interaction of funding
amount and duration, we compare the 2007 to 2010 recipients to the 2000 to
2006 recipients. Here, the increase in real funding amount is largest (e 2.54m vs.
e 1.74m) and the 2007 to 2010 recipients have two more years to conduct their
research.
Table 1.6 shows the results of this exercise. In Panel A, we vary only the funding
amount by comparing the pre 1992 prize recipients to those researchers awarded
a Leibniz Prize between 2000 and 2006. Except for the similarity of abstracts
within a given year, all coefficients are statistically insignificant and most are
very small in economic magnitude. For example, the point estimate for a reduc-
tion in the overall number of publications is -0.4, much smaller than our baseline
estimate of -5.62. Hence, increasing funding alone does not seem to suffice. In
Panel B, we do the converse and focus on the increase in grant duration by com-
paring the 2007 to 2010 prize recipients to the 1986 to 1992 recipients. Similarly to
Panel A, most coefficients are statistically insignificant (except the number of po-
tential high impact publications) and small in economic magnitude. An increase
in the time span to spend a grant of a given size does not have an effect on sci-
entific productivity. Lastly, in Panel C we only look at those receiving a Leibniz
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Prize after 2000. Here, the treatment group (2007 to 2010 recipients) has both a
larger funding amount and a longer duration than the control group. Here, we
see a decrease in the number of overall publications (38 percent relative to the
mean) and an increase in the number of publications in top field journals. The
coefficient for the top multidisciplinary is positive, but insignificant on standard
levels (p-value = 0.23). This is similar to our baseline results for the entire sample
and indicates that it is indeed the combination of additional funding amount and
funding period that matters.38
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
At the first Leibniz Prize ceremony in 1986, the president of the DFG, Hubert
Markl, chose the words truly legendary freedom to describe the Leibniz Prize in
a nutshell. Anecdotally, many Leibniz Prize recipients also viewed the prize as
giving them more freedom to conduct the type of research they wanted to do
in the way they deemed appropriate. Leibniz Prize winner Herbert W. Roesky
(1988) said that it freed him from the writing of annoying grant proposals and the
lecturing comments of reviewers; Manfred Schmidt (Leibniz Prize 1995) described
it as a research paradise (Finetti, 2010). The reform of 2007 with its increase in
funding amount and period can be viewed as an increase of this truly legendary
freedom. Due to this increase in freedom, scientists can focus on research projects
resulting in publications in top ranked journals instead of the more "‘bread and
butter"’ work which would be necessary otherwise to attract grant funding. In
line with this interpretation, we provide tentative evidence in Appendix A.3 that
the treatment group has fewer other, non Leibniz Prize grants from the DFG
compared to the control group.
38In addition, this provides further evidence that our results are not an artifact of more general
time trends in science. These time trends should have a much larger effect in the comparison
with the 1986 to 1992 cohort, which is not borne out in the data.
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We can rule out many other potential explanations for the productivity effects
based on the within Leibniz Prize analysis. For example, a form of “Matthew
effect” where Leibniz Prize recipients find it easier to publish their work in top
ranked journals cannot explain our results, as we are conducting our compari-
son solely amongst Leibniz Prize recipients. The same holds for the notion that
receiving a Leibniz Prize may raise the bar for research that is submitted for pub-
lication or that it raises the demand for other activities such as being asked to
advise, give speeches, or sit on boards and committees.
This chapter sheds light on how the amount and structure of funding affect sci-
entific output. Despite the importance of basic and applied research for long-run
economic growth, we know fairly little about this issue. We use a natural exper-
iment in the context of German academia and show how elite scientists react to
an increase in truly legendary freedom to conduct their research. The response to
an increase in grant amount of e 1m and grant duration of two years is to reduce
the number of publications overall, but increase publications in top ranked jour-
nals. It is most likely the combination of the increased grant amount and grant
duration that drives these effects, and additional funding or time alone would
not have sufficed.
The dogma of “publish or perish” is increasingly under attack. Academics and
funding bodies alike bemoan that most effort is spent on publishing as many pa-
pers as possible without taking time to focus on few high quality publications.39
The German Research Foundation has tried to steer its grants towards more free-
dom and flexibility, a development called Leibnizization by DFG president (and
Leibniz Prize recipient) Matthias Kleiner (Finetti, 2010, p.9). Although this is a
promising development in light of our results, it may also require to be accompa-
nied by an increase in the amount of funding to impact scientific productivity.
39See for example Benedictus et al. (2016), Kolata (2009), and Sarewitz (2016).
42
2Do Subsidies for Research Increase Firm
Innovation?
2.1 Introduction
Private sector innovation is one of the key drivers of overall economic growth.
However, due to the public good nature of new ideas, the private sector might
underinvest in research and development (R&D) activities. In line with this fact,
many countries offer incentives for private sector R&D activity in the form of
project-based subsidies (EY, 2018). The idea behind these subsidies is to lower
the costs of R&D activity and ease financing constraints, thus increasing R&D
investment and innovation.
In this chapter, we evaluate the largest project-based R&D subsidy program
in Germany, the Zentrales Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand1, or ZIM for short.
With a total budget of around e 500m per year, the ZIM offers companies non-
refundable grants of up to e 380,000 for R&D projects. The ZIM is open to all
technologies and industries. All companies in Germany with fewer than 500 em-
This chapter is based on joint work with Monika Schnitzer and Martin Watzinger.
1“Main innovation program for small and medium sized companies”, authors’ translation.
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ployees are eligible to apply. Its stated aim is to improve competitiveness, foster
firm growth, and create jobs.2
In the first part of the chapter, we analyze the cross-sectional patterns of who can
apply for the ZIM. Due to the differential firm size distribution across industries
and regions, the size cutoff of the ZIM implies that the program is not neutral
with respect to industry or region. It favors industries with small companies, such
as Fabricated Metal Productions, over industries with large companies, such as
Automotive. It also favors companies in the East German states over companies
in the West. In the second part of the chapter, we analyze whether the program
effectively increases R&D spending in eligible companies. From our analysis
we cannot conclude that the program increases R&D spending or influences any
other variable indicating company performance. The reason is that the variances
of the outcome variables are too high to separate the signal from the noise using
purely observational data.
To evaluate whether a subsidy program increases R&D spending of subsidy re-
cipients over and above the level without the subsidy, we face two challenges:
First, there is a paucity of data on R&D and innovation activity. Very few data sets
contain information on variables such as R&D spending or R&D employment.
Those that do, such as Compustat, usually cover mostly large, publicly traded
companies. However, many subsidy programs focus on small and medium sized
companies. Second, in terms of identification, firms usually self-select into apply-
ing for a subsidy program and project proposals are then selected on their merit.
This double selection makes it difficult to construct counterfactuals for subsidy
recipients, as there may be (unobserved) differences between recipients and non-
recipients driving self-selection and differences in outcomes. Hence, any simple
comparison of recipients and non-recipients is bound to be biased.
2The mission statement is from the website: https://www.zim.de/ZIM/Navigation/DE/
Infothek/UeberZIM/ueber-zim.html, last accessed 23 October 2018.
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In our study of the ZIM, we can address both of these challenges. First, instead
of a publicly available data set, we use proprietary and restricted administra-
tive data on German manufacturing. This data includes information on R&D
expenditures and employment, in addition to firm outcomes such as sales. An
additional unique firm outcome in our data is new product introduction. This
outcome is particularly relevant in the context of R&D subsidies, as new product
introduction is the final outcome of the innovation process. The data set “AFiD -
Amtliche Firmendaten für Deutschland” (“AFiD - Official company data for Ger-
many”) is collected by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany in a consistent
manner since 1995. It covers the universe of all firms in German manufactur-
ing with more than 20 employees, irrespective of their ownership structure or
location.
To address the self-selection of companies into the program, we exploit an unan-
ticipated reform of the ZIM program in the wake of the Great Recession in 2009.
This reform increased the eligibility threshold from 250 to 1000 employees. This
change in the eligibility criteria allows us to estimate an intent-to-treat effect. We
compare newly eligible companies to companies with more than 1000 employees
that continued to be ineligible after the expansion. To make sure that companies
are similar, we only compare companies within the same industry.
Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), we show that after 2009 there is
a clear discontinuity in R&D spending and the number of R&D workers, but no
discontinuity in sales. The average effect is an increase of around e 2.24m that
is statistically different from zero on the 10 percent level. Yet, when we use the
same outcome variable to estimate a counterfactual treatment in the period prior
to the expansion, we find effects of the same magnitude. This speaks in favor
of permanent differences between the companies in the treatment and control
group. Thus, the identification assumption that treatment companies would have
similar outcomes without subsidies as the control sample is most likely not valid.
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To address this issue, we control for time-invariant differences between the two
groups of firms using a difference-in-discontinuity model (Grembi et al., 2016).
When we control for firm and year fixed effects, we do not find any significant
effects of eligibility for ZIM on R&D spending or employment. This is also not
due to a shift in the composition of R&D spending or a shift of subsidy funds
to other investment programs, as we also do not find any significant effects on
sales, employment, or new product introduction.
In all these regressions, the confidence bounds encompass all plausible effect
sizes for the ZIM. For example, for R&D spending, the 95 percent confidence
bounds for the effect of ZIM range from e -1.8m to e 1.1m. For that reason, we
can neither conclude that the program did not work nor that it did work. This
points to the fact that our study is underpowered. Yet, as we already analyse the
universe of German manufacturing companies, it is not possible to increase the
size of the estimation sample to get more precise estimates. In auxiliary analysis,
we show that a randomized controlled trial with at least 520 treated companies
and an equal number of control companies might have a reasonable chance of
finding an effect, if there is any.
Our chapter contributes to the literature on measuring the effect of R&D subsi-
dies on firm outcomes in three ways. First, we are, to our knowledge, the first to
use administrative data on German manufacturing to study the effects of R&D
subsidies. Second, by studying the largest German subsidy program with a re-
gression discontinuity design, we can interpret our estimates in a causal fashion.
Lastly, we can trace out the effects of the ZIM on R&D inputs, R&D outputs,
and firm outcomes, allowing us to assess the effects of ZIM in a comprehensive
fashion.
Our chapter is closely related to several studies that use regression discontinuity
designs to address the issue of selection based on observables and unobservables.
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Most of these studies have access to administrative data from the funding bod-
ies and use the score for an application as a running variable and exploit the
discontinuity around some cutoff. The exception is De Blasio et al. (2014) who
use time as their running variable around a cutoff date when funding ran out.
Bronzini and Iachini (2014), Bronzini and Piselli (2016), and De Blasio et al. (2014)
look at Italy and find that effects are mostly confined to smaller firms. Zhao and
Ziedonis (2012) study a subsidy program in Michigan and find increased firm
survival but no increase in patenting. Howell (2017) looks at the US Department
of Energy’s SBIR grant program and finds positive effects on patents, financing,
and firm survival. Wang et al. (2017b) study a program in China and find that
although the program is good at picking winners, it does not seem to have any
treatment effect on the recipients. Given that RDD estimates are inherently local
and institutional details differ across countries, this may explain why the results
in the literature range from no effect to quite sizable effects on innovation.
In addition, our chapter is related to the existing literature on the effects of Ger-
man R&D subsidy programs. Most of these studies have used matching-on-
observable techniques, but unobserved differences between firms remain a se-
rious concern. Examples include Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Czarnitzki and
Lopes-Bento (2014), Aerts and Schmidt (2008), and Aschhoff (2009). None of
these studies, however, use the administrative data we employ in this chapter.
Other studies using matching-on-observables have looked, among other coun-
tries, at Spain (González and Pazó, 2008), New Zealand (Jaffe and Le, 2015), or
Ireland (Görg and Strobl, 2007). Becker (2015) and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014)
are two fairly recent surveys of this literature.3
Lastly, we are closely related to Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) who study the R&D
tax credit in Great Britain from a methodological point of view.4 They exploit
3An earlier survey is David et al. (2000).
4The same reform of the R&D tax credit in Great Britain is studied by Guceri and Liu (2019).
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a similar change in eligibility criteria and use assets as their running variable.
They find very strong effects of the R&D tax credit. As Germany does not have a
system of R&D tax credits, their results do not directly speak to the German case.
We complement their study by looking at project-based subsidies in Germany.
In Section 2.2 we describe the institutional background and details of the reform.
In Section 2.3 we present our data. Section 2.4 presents the cross-sectional pat-
terns of which firms are eligible to apply and discusses the results from the RDD
and the differences-in-discontinuities design. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
The Zentrales Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand (ZIM) is the main program that
subsidizes research and development activities in Germany. This program of-
fers project-based subsidies that cover between 25 percent and 55 percent of the
eligible costs of an R&D project for small and medium-sized companies. The
maximum subsidy is around e 160,000 per project. The subsidized share varies
with the size of the firm and is higher for firms in East Germany. Eligible costs
encompass mostly wages, but other costs and payment for third-party services
may also be included.5 The program is open to small and medium enterprises
from all regions, industries, and technologies.6
In our empirical strategy, we exploit the exogenous variation caused by the shift
in the size cut-off for the eligibility to the ZIM program during the Great Re-
cession. As part of the second stimulus package from February 2009, funding
5For details, see the respective versions of the regulations governing the ZIM, available at
https://www.zim.de/ZIM/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Richtlinien/richtlinien-archiv.
html, last accessed 13 March 2019.
6The two predecessor programs, INNO-WATT and NEMO, focused solely on firms located
in East Germany and Pro Inno II and INNONET had less stringent eligibility criteria for firms
located in East Germany. All programs were discontinued with the start of the ZIM except
INNO-WATT, which ended in December 2008.
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for ZIM was increased by e 900m and eligibility was extended to firms with up
to 1000 employees. Projects approved under the extended eligibility had to be
finished by the end of 2011. Prior to this and beginning with ZIM’s inception
in July 2008, a firm had to meet the small and medium enterprise definition of
the European Union. Firms meet this definition if they have less than 250 em-
ployees and either less than e 50m turnover or a balance sheet of less than e 43m
(Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC).
After the stimulus package ended, the eligibility bar dropped again to 250 em-
ployees in January 2011. In the following years there were several further changes
in the eligibility criteria: From July 2012 to December 2013, eligibility was ex-
tended to firms with up to 500 employees; from January 2014 to April 2015 it
dropped again to 250; lastly, it increased again in April 2015 to include firms
with up to 500 employees that fulfill the other two EU criteria (turnover and
balance sheet size).
According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 440 newly
eligible firms undertook 670 projects during the expansion due to the stimulus
package. Similar to the overall distribution of firms in space, most recipients are
located in the states of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia.
Lastly, the vast majority of firms is active in manufacturing, especially in the
manufacturing of machinery (Depner et al., 2011, p. 22-26). On average, each
project received around e 80,000 in subsidies. In our empirical exercise we aim
to measure the effect of these e 53m in subsidies on R&D spending of these
companies.
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2.3 Data
For our study, we use data on the universe of German manufacturing firms with
more than 20 employees. This data is collected by the Federal Statistical Office
and the Statistical Offices of the German states. Firms are required by law to
respond. The data contains information on employment, turnover, location, in-
dustry affiliations, and which products they produce in which quantity. A subset
of these companies, which are representative for the population of firms, are
obligated to give detailed cost information in a more detailed survey, the Kosten-
strukturerhebung. Due to the high administrative burden of collecting the data,
small companies are usually surveyed only for four years in row. Companies
with more than 500 employees are surveyed every year.7
A key advantage of this data set relative to commonly used data sets, such as
Compustat and Amadeus, is that it contains data on R&D expenditures and R&D
employees for companies of almost all sizes. R&D expenditures encompasses all
types of spending (labor costs, material costs, investment) for R&D activity con-
ducted within the boundaries of the firm.8 R&D employment are all employees
that are either directly tasked with R&D activity or perform directly related ser-
vices, such as R&D managers or office assistants.
For this data set, each company also has to report which products it produces
using a 9-digit code for each product category. In total, there are around 5,000
different product codes with an accompanying high level of granularity. For ex-
ample, in the classification of 2009, there are different product codes for regular
and diet cola products (product codes 1107 19 301 and 1107 19 302) or cars with
7For further details please see Statistisches Bundesamt (2017).
8We convert all nominal values into 2010 Euros using the consumer price index of the Federal
Statistical Office (https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/
Preise/Verbraucherpreisindizes/Tabellen_/VerbraucherpreiseKategorien.html?cms_gtp=
145110_slot\%253D2&https=1), last accessed 16 May 2018.
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petrol or diesel motors of different sizes (product codes 2910 22 301, 2910 22 302,
2910 23 100, 2310 23 303, 2310 23 305). Hence, we are able to measure very accu-
rately whenever a company changes its product mix, either by adding or drop-
ping a product. Since the development of novel products is a central goal of the
ZIM, it seems natural to assess whether there are any positive effects on new
product introduction.9
For our main analysis, we restrict attention to firms that are in the data in all
years to arrive at a balanced sample.10 In total, we have information on 1,007
firms with 500 to 1,500 employees that report in all years.11
2.4 Results
In this section, we first discuss the cross-sectional patterns of the eligibility cri-
teria of the subsidy program under consideration. We show that due to the size
limit for companies, industries and regions with on average smaller companies
can benefit more than industries and regions with larger companies. In a sec-
ond step, we use a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the effectiveness
of the subsidy program in inducing additional R&D spending. Lastly, we use a
differences-in-discontinuities design to address a likely violation of the identify-
ing assumption of the RDD. The results of these exercises are inconclusive.
9One issue in accurately determining product entry and exit is the introduction of a new
product classification scheme in 2009. Appendix B.1 gives details on how we deal with this issue.
10This is due to the fact that if we cease to observe a firm, this can be due to multiple rea-
sons. For example, the company may move its operations away from Germany, shut down their
business, or switch sectors. As we cannot disentangle these reasons in the available data, we
circumvent this issue by focusing on a balanced panel.
11This roughly corresponds to the universe of German manufacturing firms of this size. This is
also borne out by two separate sources. First, the firm registry of the Federal Statistical Office lists
around 4,200 firms in German manufacturing with more than 250 employees and the Amadeus
database by Bureau van Dijk lists 857 companies in German manufacturing with 500-1500 em-
ployees.
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Figure 2.1: Share of Firms by State and Size Group
Note: This figure shows the share of the number of firms in the manufacturing sector falling into
each size group, by state. The number of firms in a state ranges from 102 in Bremen to 3749 in
North Rhine-Westphalia. Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of
the Federal States, AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
2.4.1 Cross-sectional Patterns of ZIM Eligibility – Who Can Ap-
ply?
In 2018, companies with fewer than 500 employees are eligible to apply for the
ZIM. As the firm size distribution is not the same in every industry and in every
region, this size criteria steers funding from industries and regions with larger
companies to regions and industries with smaller companies.
In Figure 2.1 we present the size distribution of firms across German states. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the distribution of sales across industries and firm sizes (Panel (a)),
and the distribution of R&D by industry and firm size (Panel (b)). The data is for
the year 2008, the last year before the onset of the Great Recession and prior to
the beginning of our treatment period in the next section.12
12Since the firm size distribution, the distribution of firms across space, and the industry struc-
ture are all very stable over time, these patterns should still be broadly present today. Unfortu-
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Figure 2.2: Cross-Sectional Patterns of Sales and R&D Spending
(a) Distribution of Sales Across Sectors and Size Groups
(b) Distribution of R&D Across Sectors and Size Groups
Note: Panel (a) depicts the share of total R&D spending in 2008 falling into each size group,
by two digit industry. Panel (b) shows the share of total firm sales in 2008 falling into each
size group, by two digit industry. The “other industries” category encompasses the following
two-digit industries: Manufacturing of tobacco products, wood products, printing, coke and
petroleum. Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal
States, AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
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Figure 2.1 shows that the eligibility criteria favors East German Firms over West
German firms. The share of firms below 500 employees is much smaller in West
German states (the first 10 bars) than in East German states and Berlin (the latter
6 bars). The ZIM subsidy program follows in the footsteps of its predecessor
programs that were specifically focused on aiding East German firms.
Notionally, the ZIM is open to firms from all sectors. Yet, its limitation to com-
panies with below 500 employees makes it non-neutral with respect to indus-
try. Panel (a) in Figure 2.2 shows the share of sales of companies with differ-
ent sizes. The sales share of companies with less than 500 employees varies
widely from around 10 to 20 percent in the Motor vehicles and Pharmaceuti-
cals industries to over 50 percent for companies in the Food/Beverages and Tex-
tiles/Apparel/Leather industries.
The effective focus of the ZIM program is on companies that are actually doing
R&D. When looking at the share of R&D across industries, the picture is even
more skewed. In the Motor vehicles and Pharmaceutical industries, virtually no
R&D spending is undertaken by firms that are eligible to apply for the subsidy. In
contrast, in the Fabricated metals, Paper, and Computer/Electronics industries,
more than 20 percent of all R&D is done by companies with fewer than 500
employees (Panel (b) of Figure 2.2).
Is it optimal that the considered subsidy program favors some regions, industries
and thus technologies over others? The literature provides several arguments
under which circumstances the direction of research might be improved by gov-
ernment intervention (Akcigit et al., 2013; Hopenhayn and Squintani, 2016; Bryan
and Lemus, 2017). For example, companies might do too little basic research. Yet,
as the program is intentionally neutral, these conditions are at best fulfilled by
accident.
nately, we do not have data for 2018 to directly assess these patterns for the current eligibility
criteria of the ZIM.
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For a general R&D subsidy program, the usual justification is two-fold. First,
R&D activities produce new knowledge that spills over to other companies. As
a consequence, the social return of R&D is larger than the private return and
companies underinvest in R&D relative to the social optimum. Second, small
companies might face borrowing constraints and therefore cannot implement the
optimal investment plans. These borrowing constraints are more likely to be
binding for R&D investment than for investment in real assets, because real assets
can be pledged as security for a loan.
Neither of these justifications maps neatly into a size cut-off of 500 employees.
There is no evidence available that the R&D activities of small companies produce
more knowledge spillovers than the R&D programs of large companies. To the
contrary, Bloom et al. (2013) show that small companies are more active in techno-
logical niches and therefore their R&D program have fewer knowledge spillovers.
Schnitzer and Watzinger (2017) show that spillovers from venture capital-backed
start-ups are larger than for established companies. Yet, next to none of the com-
panies applying for ZIM are venture capital financed. Taken together, while it
might be sensible to subsidize the research of small firms, spillovers are not a
good argument to restrict it only to small firms.
Similarly, while smaller companies are thought to face more financing constraints
than larger companies, it is unclear why these constraints should change discon-
tinuously at a size of 500 employees or any other arbitrary point in the firm size
distribution. In a representative sample of 4400 German companies in August
2006, around 10 percent of companies with more than 250 employees reported
restrictive credit policies, while 30 percent of companies with less than 50 em-
ployees reported a restrictive credit policy. In contrast, at the height of the crisis
in August 2009, around 45 percent of companies of all size classes reported prob-
lems in arranging a loan (Kunkel, 2010). Therefore, the employment size of a
company seems to be a rather imprecise measure for financing constraints.
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Taken together, it is unclear why an optimal R&D subsidy program should use a
size cut-off. Additionally, even if the size cut-off is necessary for legal reasons, the
program could be improved by targeting credit constrained companies directly,
e.g. companies with few pledgeable assets (Almeida and Campello, 2007). An al-
ternative would be to link subsidies to firm age instead of firm size. Haltiwanger
et al. (2013) show that young and small companies create more jobs and grow
faster than companies that are old and small. Therefore, such a subsidy program
would directly reward job-creation and foster the entry of new companies.
2.4.2 Did ZIM Increase R&D Outlays?
In this section, we analyze whether the ZIM subsidies increased R&D spending
of companies. If companies use the subsidy for the intended purpose, we should
observe more R&D spending, more R&D workers, and more new products. If
companies substitute their own R&D spending with the government funds, the
effect of the subsidy on R&D spending might be zero.
Regression Discontinuity Design
From observational data alone, it is difficult to learn whether the ZIM R&D sub-
sidy is effective because firms need to apply for the subsidy program and project
proposals are then selected on their merit. This double selection makes it dif-
ficult to construct counterfactuals for subsidy recipients, as there may be (un-
observed) differences between recipients and non-recipients driving differences
in outcomes. Hence, any simple comparison of recipients and non-recipients is
bound to be biased.
To address this identification problem, we exploit the unanticipated reform in
2009 in wake of the Great Recession. This reform increased the eligibility thresh-
old from 250 to 1000 employees. The new threshold of 1000 employees made the
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group of firms between 250 and 1000 employees newly eligible, whereas firms
with more than 1000 employees continued to be ineligible. In order to ensure
comparability of firms, we limit attention to firms with more than 500 employees
and less than 1500 employees.13 The change in the cutoff lends itself to a (fuzzy)
regression discontinuity design with employment as the forcing variable.
Using this variation in eligibility, we can estimate the intent-to-treat effect of the
subsidy. By focusing on the intent-to-treat effect instead of the average treatment
effect, we circumvent the bias resulting from self-selection and proposal selection
on merit. Also, arguably, the intent-to-treat effect is the policy relevant effect as
politicians can change eligibility but cannot force firms to apply for the grant.14
We estimate the following specification:
yi,t = γ0 + γ1Ti,2008 + γ2Ei,2008 + γ3Ei,2008 · Ti,2008 + ei,t (2.1)
where yi,t is the dependent variable (R&D spending, R&D employees, sales) of
firm i in year t. Ti,2008 is a treatment indicator whether employment of company
i is below the threshold of 1000 employees in 2008. We use employment in 2008
prior to the enactment of the second stimulus package as forcing variable to
alleviate any concerns that companies might shed employees to become eligible
for the subsidy program.15 Ei,2008 is employment in 2008. As controls we include
employment in 2008 linearly on both sides of the threshold (Ei,2008 · Ti,2008).16 We
cluster standard errors on the firm level. To make sure that companies on the
left and right of the cut-off are similar, we only compare companies within the
same industry using coarsened exact matching (CEM) as proposed by Iacus et al.
13In addition, this ensures that all firms are surveyed in all years.
14However, if we had data on which firms actually apply and which ones receive funding from
ZIM, we could also estimate the local average treatment effect by using the change in eligibility
as an instrumental variable. In absence of this data, we focus on the intent-to-treat effect.
15Also, the stimulus package was passed after minimal debate and very quickly, so we do not
expect firms to be able to anticipate or influence the new threshold.
16Including higher order polynomials does not change our results substantively. These are
available from the authors upon request.
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(2012).17 We choose a symmetric bandwidth of 500 employees, i.e. we include
firms with 500 to 1500 employees.18 Appendix B.2 shows summary statistics for
the treatment and control group.
Implementing this RDD strategy, Figure 2.3 shows a binned scatter plot for av-
erage R&D expenditures from 2009 to 2011, the treatment period. Our forcing
variable, employment in 2008, is grouped into bins of 50 employees and we show
fitted linear regressions on either side of the cutoff.19
There is a clear discontinuity at 1000 employees with firms with 500 to 999 em-
ployees spending significantly more on R&D between 2009 and 2011 than firms
with 1000 to 1500 employees, conditional on employment in 2008. The corre-
sponding regression results are shown in Column (7) of Table 2.1. From 2009
to 2011, firms eligible for ZIM spend around e 2.2m more on R&D, a very large
difference of over 50 percent relative to the mean of the treatment group prior to
the expansion.
This effect is significantly larger than what we would expect given the size and
structure of the program. The maximum eligible project size is e 380,000, which
would constitute a 12 percent increase relative to the pre-treatment mean of
e 3.2m. As we only observe the intent-to-treat effect, we have to scale this number
by the likelihood that a company gets funding. To calculate the expected magni-
tude, we assume full directionality, i.e. that the entire project is only undertaken
due to the ZIM. This seems plausible, as 99 percent of firms that received the
subsidy stated in Depner et al. (2011) that funding via ZIM was relevant for
17Our results are also fairly robust to varying the strata used for the CEM procedure. For
example, using three or four digit industries or two-digit industries × East/West Germany do
not alter our results to a great extent. The results are available by the authors upon request.
18We validate this ad-hoc bandwidth by showing in the robustness section that our results
are not too sensitive to varying this bandwidth. The Imbens-Kalamanyaran optimal bandwidth
algorithm suggests an optimal bandwidth of only 28. For this small bandwidth we are left with
only 28 firms.
19The bin for 500 employees includes all firms with 500 to 549 employees. The number of
underlying companies per bin varies from nine to 120.
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their project. Given that 440 firms with more than 250 employees received ZIM
funding and the firm size distribution, we arrive at a scaling factor of 5 to 57
percent, implying an effect of between 0.6 percent to 6.8 percent of additional
R&D spending. A reasonable middle-ground scaling factor implies an increase
of 3.9 percent, or around e 124,000. This expected effect is much smaller than our
estimated effect of e 2.2m.
We find a similar discontinuity for R&D employment, as can be seen in Panel (b)
of Figure 2.3. The point estimate in the second row of Column (7) in Table 2.1
is large and positive, but not statistically significant. In terms of magnitude, we
estimate an intent to treat effect of around 14 additional employees.
In contrast to the results on R&D outcomes, we do not find a discontinuity for
the sales of a company. In Panel (c) of Figure 2.3 there is no visual difference
between treatment and control group, indicating that the ZIM had no effect on
overall firm sales. This might be due to our time horizon, as many projects only
ended in 2011. Many firms indicated in Depner et al. (2011, p.50) that they have
not yet monetized the results of their R&D project and need additional time to do
so. The regression coefficient in row 3 of column (7) in Table 2.1 is small and not
statistically different from zero. Given the time lags between R&D activity and
introduction in the market, our findings of no discontinuity in sales from 2009 to
2011 could also be seen as an indication that firms around 1000 employees are
comparable to each other, conditional on employment.
The key identifying assumption in a RDD is that all pre-determined and unre-
lated variables vary smoothly around the threshold. To see whether this is the
case, we redo our main analysis for the period prior to the stimulus package ex-
pansion, i.e. from 2007 to 2008, where none of the companies were eligible for
ZIM. In Figure 2.4, we plot the pre-treatment outcomes for R&D expenditures,
R&D employees, and sales for the period from 2007 to 2008. The picture looks
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Figure 2.3: Outcomes in Post-period: 2009 to 2011
(a) R&D Expenditures
(b) R&D Employees
(c) Sales
Note: In Panel (a) we show average R&D expenditures from 2009 to 2011 (in 2010 Euros) by em-
ployment bins in 2008. In Panel (b) we show average R&D employees and in Panel (c) the average
sales for the same period. The fitted lines and 95 percent confidence intervals are estimated on
the full data. The number of firms in each bin ranges from 9 to 120. Source: RDC of the Fed-
eral Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen
[2008-2011], own calculations.
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virtually identical to Figure 2.3. There is a sizable discontinuity for R&D expen-
ditures and R&D employees, but none for sales. In column (6) in Table 2.1, we
repeat the RDD regression for the pre-period. The difference in R&D expendi-
tures and R&D employees has the same magnitude as in the post-period.
The results using the counterfactual treatment in the pre-period therefore in-
dicate a clear violation of our identification assumption underlying the RDD,
namely that companies to the left and to the right of the cut-off would have com-
parable outcomes without the subsidy. In unreported analyses, we have tested
a battery of further dependent variables such as wage bill, average wages, total
costs, investment in physical capital, and exports, and consistently found smooth
variation around the threshold. Hence, a straightforward explanation would be
an additional R&D focused policy using this cutoff. However, to the best of our
knowledge, no such policy exists and unobserved firm heterogeneity is the most
likely remaining explanation. The full results can be found in Table 2.1, where
we follow Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) and also present results for each year sep-
arately.
Difference in Discontinuities Design
Under the assumption that this unobserved firm heterogeneity does not vary over
time, we can nevertheless estimate the causal intent-to-treat effect by employing a
difference-in-discontinuities (“diff-in-disc”) specification as in Grembi et al. (2016).
This approach deals with any confounding factors that vary at the same cutoff
as our policy of interest, but do not vary over time. Grembi et al. (2016) pro-
vide a detailed discussion of the properties of this estimator and the underlying
assumptions. The key assumption is that the effect of a confounding policy at
the threshold may not vary over time. This assumption seems reasonable in our
setting, given that only the cutoff for the ZIM was changed to 1000 employees
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Figure 2.4: Outcomes in Pre-period: 2007 to 08
(a) R&D Expenditures
(b) R&D Employees
(c) Sales
Note: In Panel (a) we show average R&D expenditures from 2007 and 2008 (in 2010 Euros)
by employment bins in 2008. In Panel (b) we show average R&D employees and in Panel (c)
the average sales for the same period. The fitted lines and 95 percent confidence intervals are
estimated on the full data. The number of firms in each bin ranges from 9 to 120. Source:
RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, AFiD Panel
Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
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but to our knowledge all other policies around this threshold stayed in place. In
the diff-in-disc specification, we estimate the following equation:
yi,t = β0 + β1Ti,2008 · Pi,t + β2Ti,2008 + β3Pi,t + β4Ei,2008
+ β5Ei,2008 · Ti,2008 + β6Ei,2008 · Pi,t + β7Ei,2008 · Pi,t · Ti,2008 + ηi,t
(2.2)
where Pi,t is a post-period indicator equal to one for the years 2009 to 2011. All
other variables are defined as in equation (2.1). As we focus on a balanced panel
of firms, this specification is equivalent to the inclusion of firm and year fixed
effects. The coefficient of interest is now β1. It yields the causal intent-to-treat
effect of being eligible to apply for the ZIM, relative to the pre-existing difference
between the eligible and ineligible group.
We present the results for our diff-in-disc estimates in Table 2.2. The first col-
umn shows the results of estimating equation (2.2) with R&D expenditures as
the dependent variable and column (2) with R&D employees, respectively. In
column (3) we focus on the extensive margin and use an indicator for positive
R&D expenditures as our dependent variable. In all specifications, we find statis-
tically insignificant effects for the interaction term of after 2009 and smaller than
1000 employees. The point estimate is negative for all three dependent variables.
For R&D expenditures, the point estimate would imply a reduction of e 380,000
due to the ZIM and 95 percent confidence bounds range from e -1.8m to e 1.1m.
One benign explanation for us not finding an effect on R&D inputs such as ex-
penditures or R&D employees might be that firms keep their overall R&D efforts
the same, but shift the composition of their R&D projects. For example, they
might pursue riskier projects with potentially higher upsides. Alternatively, they
might use the received subsidy for other productive investment that is not clas-
sified as R&D. Such a change might lead to differences in firm outcomes such as
higher growth in employees or sales, an entry into exporting, or changes in the
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Table 2.2: Effect of ZIM Eligibility on R&D Inputs, Diff-in-Disc Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
R&D exp. R&D empl. R&D ind.
< 1000 employees 2638.81∗ 18.75 0.16∗∗
(1407.70) (12.97) (0.07)
After 2009 −182.22 5.79 0.01
(619.86) (8.39) (0.02)
< 1000 employees × After 2009 −380.15 −4.51 −0.01
(768.74) (8.57) (0.03)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.09
Number of firms 989 989 989
Observations 4945 4945 4945
Note: Firms between 500 and 1500 employees in 2008, covering 2007 to 2011. Diff-in-disc estimate
of the impact of becoming eligible for the ZIM. Regression includes employment in 2008 on both
sides of the threshold in pre- and post-policy period as in equation (2.2). Standard errors are
clustered on the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1
percent level, respectively. Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of
the Federal States, AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
Table 2.3: Effect of ZIM Eligibility on Firm Outcomes, Diff-in-Disc Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Empl. Sales Export Add prod. Drop prod.
< 1000 employees −4.57 −3.30 0.08 0.02 −0.00
(7.73) (47.64) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
After 2009 −9.44 −35.57∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.01
(21.13) (16.20) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
< 1000 employees 3.17 17.41 0.01 −0.02 −0.01
× After 2009 (24.69) (17.27) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
R2 0.87 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
Number of firms 989 989 989 989 989
Observations 4945 4945 4945 4945 4945
Note: Firms between 500 and 1500 employees in 2008, covering 2007 to 2011. Diff-in-disc estimate
of the impact of becoming eligible for the ZIM. Regression includes employment in 2008 on both
sides of the threshold in pre- and post-policy period as in equation (2.2). Standard errors are
clustered on the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1
percent level, respectively. Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of
the Federal States, AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
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product mix of firms.
To see whether this is the case, we use sales, employees (overall, not only employ-
ees tasked with R&D), an exporter dummy, and dummies for adding or dropping
a product as outcome variables. Especially studying adding and dropping of
products is of interest, as over 70 percent of firms stated in Depner et al. (2011, p.
31) that the goal of their project was product development. Given the granularity
of product codes in our data, we expect to measure new product development as
long as it is not merely an upgrade of an existing product. In Appendix B.1 we
explain in detail how we define entry and exit.
Using our specification from equation (2.2) once more, we also find statistically
insignificant effects for these firm outcomes, with positive point estimates for all
outcomes except product entry and exit (Table 2.3). Taken together, we cannot
find any statistically significant impact of becoming eligible for the ZIM on firm
innovation investments or firm outcomes.
Given the wide range of our confidence intervals, we cannot conclude anything
about the effects of the ZIM on firms using observational data at the cut-off of
1000 employees. Due to the large variability of the outcome variables in the data
and our sample size, we do not have enough statistical power. However, we can-
not increase the sample size as we are already studying the universe of German
manufacturing firms. Theoretically speaking, one could expand the sample to
non-manufacturing firms. Yet, from Depner et al. (2011) we know that the vast
majority of the ZIM recipients are manufacturing firms and from Stifterverband
für die deutsche Wissenschaft (2018) we know that manufacturing accounts for
96 percent of private sector R&D expenditures. Hence, manufacturing firms seem
the right population to study.
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Table 2.4: Inputs for Power Calculation
Parameter Value
Share of treated units 0.5
Minimum detectable effect 190,000
Standard deviation of R&D spending 1,206,592
t-value corresponding to desired significance level 1.96
t-value corresponding to desired power 0.84
R2 of regression of R&D spending on covariates 0.1774
Note: All variables are measured in 2011. Covariates are size as measured by employment and
three digit industry dummies. Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices
of the Federal States, AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
Power Calculation for a Randomized Controlled Trial
The results of our study support the idea that the ZIM should be evaluated with a
randomized controlled trial. If we take the current structure of the ZIM as given,
i.e. the focus on firms with fewer than 500 employees, our power calculations
suggest that the randomized controlled trial should have at least 1040 companies,
split equally into a treatment and control group.
To arrive at this number, we consider a very simple experimental design with
randomization on the individual firm level and an equal number of treated and
control units. We assume that the minimum detectable effect size should be
e 190,000, i.e. half of the maximum eligible project size of e 380,000. We follow
convention and set the desired power to 80 percent. From the data we estimate
the standard deviation of R&D spending and how much covariates explain in the
outcome variable (R2 of 18 percent). As covariates, we use industry fixed effects
and firm size as measured by employment. Table 2.4 lists all of the inputs.
Using these inputs, the required sample size is 520 treated firms and the same
number of control firms. The manufacturing sector covered in our data has 13,800
firms with fewer than 500 employees. Hence, one would need to randomly subsi-
dize 3.7 percent of the universe of all manufacturing companies to study whether
the ZIM is effective. Given the average subsidy size of e 135,000 (Depner et al.,
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2018, p.33), the required funds for this study would be e 70m. Given that the bud-
get for ZIM is around e 500m per year and around 2500 projects are conducted
by firms each year (Depner et al., 2018, p.19), such a randomized controlled trial
would be feasible within the budget currently appropriated for ZIM.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we show additional results to document that our conclusions
are robust to changes in the empirical specification. First, we repeat our main
estimations, but include industry × year interactions or state × year interactions
(Table 2.5) to see whether these soak up some of the firm variability. Second,
we vary the bandwidth of our running variable and run some placebo checks by
varying the threshold (Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.5). Furthermore, we show
that the results do not change if we selectively drop single industries or firms
(Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 2.5).
In Table 2.5, we include state × year interactions in the odd numbered columns
and industry × year interactions in the even numbered columns. Overall, the
results are very similar to our baseline results with our coefficient of interest
having a negative sign and large standard errors (except in column (6), where
the sign flips). In addition, the coefficients are also very close to the baseline
estimate in terms of magnitude. Looking at the R2, we see that the industry ×
year interactions substantially add explanatory power, with little change for the
state × year interactions. However, the standard errors are unaffected by the
inclusion of these interactions, indicating that there is still substantial variability
between firms even within industries.
In Panel (a) of Figure 2.5, we vary the bandwidth around our threshold of
1000 employees between 100 and 700 employees in 2008 and plot the resulting
coefficient on the below 1000 employees and post 2009 interaction. This implies
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Figure 2.5: Robustness Checks
(a) Varying Bandwidths (b) Placebo Check with Varying Thresholds
(c) Dropping Industries One-by-One (d) Dropping Firms One-by-One
Note: In Panel (a) we vary the bandwidth between 100 and 700 employees in 2008 around the
threshold of 1000 employees. Bandwidth of 500 corresponds to the baseline estimate. Reported
are the coefficient and the 90 percent confidence intervals on the post-treat interaction in regres-
sion (2.2). In Panel (b) we show the results using different placebo thresholds. Cutoff of 1000
corresponds to the baseline estimate. A constant bandwidth of 500 is chosen for all cutoffs. In
Panel (c) we sequentially drop each of the two-digit NACE industry one-by-one. In Panel (d) we
sequentially drop each firm one-by-one. Matching is done each iteration and sample size varies
from 837 to 988 firms. Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the
Federal States, AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
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that for the smallest bandwidth we only include firms with between 900 and
1100 employees, whereas for the largest bandwidth we include firms from 300
to 1700 employees. We face a trade-off between reducing bias by shrinking our
bandwidth and choosing more similar firms and reducing variance by increas-
ing our bandwidth to obtain a larger number of observations. The number of
firms ranges from 104 for a bandwidth of 100 to 1686 firms for a bandwidth of
700. As expected, the standard errors get smaller as we increase the bandwidth
and the estimates are very noisy for the smallest bandwidth choices. Overall, all
coefficients are close to zero with large standard errors.
Next, we keep the bandwidth constant at 500 employees, but re-estimate our
baseline model using placebo cutoffs in 50 employee intervals between 650 and
1350 employees. Results can be found in Panel (b) of Figure 2.5.20 The number of
firms varies between 420 for a cutoff of 1350 employees and 2370 for a cutoff of
650 employees. The estimated coefficients are once again around zero and tend
to be positive for other placebo cutoffs than our real cutoff of 1000. However,
the confidence intervals include zero for almost all cutoffs and get much larger
as our number of firms drops for higher cutoffs. In unreported regressions, we
conducted the same exercise for our simple RDD model. Here we find that a
positive significant effect is only found for our actual cutoff of 1000 employees
and not the placebo cutoffs. This supports the underlying RDD assumption,
but unfortunately this pattern also exists for the pre-treatment period. Hence, we
prefer the diff-in-disc estimates presented here. Since our baseline estimates were
insignificant, the absence of a significant effect for placebo cutoffs is only limited
support for our identifying assumption.
In the last two panels, we investigate whether our results are driven by any in-
dustries or firms in particular. In Panel (c) of Figure 2.5, we do a leave-one-out
exercise and re-estimate our baseline model and drop each industry one-by-one.
20Note that the horizontal axis is relative to our actual cutoff of 1000 employees.
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We then plot the resulting coefficient of interest and its associated confidence in-
tervals. The coefficients are mostly fairly close to each other and are all within
the confidence intervals of each other. All coefficients are below zero, except
when we drop the motor vehicles industry and obtain a coefficient of 277.61,
which, however, is also not statistically significant. Lastly, we drop each firm in
turn in Panel (d) of Figure 2.5. There is some variability in the estimates, but
regardless of which firm we leave out, the coefficient is negative and statistically
insignificant.
Taken together, our robustness checks imply that the large variability in the data
cannot be absorbed by industry × year interactions and regardless of the exact
specification we obtain statistically insignificant effects of the ZIM on R&D in-
puts. Our results are also not driven by particular outliers nor by the exact choice
of our bandwidth.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We study the largest German R&D subsidy program and assess its causal effect
on firm innovation outcomes. We first document that changes in the employment-
based eligibility criteria have implications regarding which sectors and regions
can disproportionately apply for the subsidy. By exploiting a change in the eli-
gibility criteria due to the stimulus package in wake of the Great Recession, we
estimate the causal intent-to-treat effect of being able to apply for ZIM. We find
inconclusive results due to the large variability of the outcome variable in the
data.
This chapter is the first study to assess the effectiveness of ZIM in a causal fash-
ion. Whereas so far ZIM has only been evaluated by asking recipient companies
about their experience, the current wave of ZIM is supposed to be evaluated
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with a matched control group design.21 However, such a design does not miti-
gate concerns about selection on unobservables. An alternative way to evaluate
the ZIM would be to randomly assign ZIM grants to eligible firms, e.g. via an
oversubscribed lottery. However, as our back-of-the-envelope power calculation
indicates, the sample size for such an effort needs to be quite large and should
encompass at least around 1000 firms.
21See the Appendix to the Evaluation Plan for ZIM, available at www.evergabe-online.de/
tenderdetails.html?id=189659, last accessed 06 March 2018.
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3Job Creation in Tight and Slack Labor Markets
3.1 Introduction
The Great Recession has sparked renewed interest in the effects of stimulus
spending. One focus of the debate is whether the size of the multiplier depends
on the state of the economy, i.e., whether additional demand shocks have larger
effects on output in times of slack resources than in times of full capacity uti-
lization. This question is still unresolved: The growing empirical literature using
either variation on the national level over time or cross-sectional variation on the
regional level has not come to a consensus yet.1
Assessing the state-dependence of the multiplier is challenging for three rea-
sons: First, identifying the multiplier requires exogenous demand shocks. Sec-
ond, these shocks need to vary sufficiently within each state of the economy.
Otherwise there is potentially not enough statistical power to estimate the multi-
This chapter is based on joint work with Lukas Buchheim and Martin Watzinger, which is
accepted for publication in the Journal of Monetary Economics (Buchheim et al., forthcoming).
1For example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Fazzari
et al. (2014), Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Shoag (2015), and Dube et al. (2018) find evidence
for state dependent multipliers, while others find little differences in the multiplier by the state
of the economy (e.g., Owyang et al., 2013; Caggiano et al., 2015; Biolsi, 2017; Ramey and Zubairy,
2018).
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plier for each state. Third, the shocks have to be comparable in their composition
across the different states.
The literature to date has addressed the first and second challenge. Shocks that
are plausibly exogenous to the economic circumstances have been identified, for
example, from structural VARs, Ramey’s (2011) military news, and a variety of
instrumental variables on the subnational level.2 In order to have a sufficient
amount of shocks across different states of the economy, prior work has extended
time series data to the late 19th century (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018), combined
data from multiple countries (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013), and focused
on the regional level (Dube et al., 2018). In contrast to addressing the issues of
exogeneity and statistical power, the literature has been silent about the third
challenge: a differential composition of spending across the states of the econ-
omy. Specifically, one issue could be that the primary goal of public investments
in booms is to increase the long-run growth potential with projects characterized
by long planning horizons. Spending during recessions, in contrast, may be de-
signed to deliver a quick boost to the economy. In this case, the state-dependent
composition of demand may lead to differential short-run effects on economic
activity, even for demand shocks of the same size.
In this chapter, we are the first to tackle all three challenges at once. We do so
by studying local demand shocks from investment in rooftop photovoltaic (PV)
systems in Germany between 2003 and 2012. In this time period, over e 60 billion
were invested in PV systems due to a guaranteed price for photovoltaic electricity.
Using the cross-sectional and time-series variation resulting from this program,
this chapter seeks to answer the following question: Did PV installations create
more jobs in slack than in tight labor markets?
2Examples for instrumental variables used in the literature are windfall profits from state
pension plans (Shoag, 2015), exposure to military spending (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014), or
shocks to population counts from the decennial census (Suárez Serrato and Wingender, 2016).
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The setting of PV investment in Germany is ideal to estimate state-dependent
multipliers as PV installations constituted an exogenous, frequent, and compara-
ble demand shock in all states of the economy. First, the variation in PV installa-
tions over time and across space was mainly driven by factors that are exogenous
to the economic circumstances: Over time, investment was largely determined by
the world market price of solar modules in relation to the amount of the guaran-
teed price. The spatial variation in investments across the 400 German counties
depends on the local solar radiation and the availability of suitable rooftops. Sec-
ond, there is ample identifying variation in these investments for any partition
of counties into groups with slack and tight labor markets, as the installation of
rooftop PV systems was profitable in all German regions. Third, the composition
of investment has been constant as each PV installation of a given size consti-
tuted the same demand shock. Also, we directly observe the physical amount
of investments. Hence, variation in regional prices, which may be a function of
labor market tightness, cannot affect our results.
Our main finding is that the installation of PV systems created at least twice as
many jobs in slack labor markets characterized by high unemployment than in
tight labor markets with low unemployment. Our preferred specifications com-
pare job creation in tight and slack markets using two splits: First, along the time
series dimension, we compare counties at times when their unemployment rate
is above or below its long-run average. Second, along the cross-sectional dimen-
sion, we compare counties with high or low unemployment relative to their state
average in a given year. For these sample splits, the installation of PV systems
with a capacity of one megawatt peak (MWp) led to about 37 new jobs in slack
labor markets, but created only around 13 jobs or less in tight labor markets. This
implies that e 100,000 of investment created 1.2 job-years in slack and fewer than
0.5 job-years in tight markets. Moreover, using these estimates to approximate a
local labor earnings multiplier, we arrive at a multiplier of 1.1 in slack markets
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and below 0.5 in tight markets.3 These results are robust to various alternative
ways of classifying slack and tight markets, and remain qualitatively unchanged
when we instrument PV installations with their profitability as measured by the
investments’ net present value.
Furthermore, we make progress on identifying the mechanism underlying the
state dependence of the effects. For example, higher crowding out in tight la-
bor markets may explain our findings, consistent with the model of Michaillat
(2014).4 Additional demand for PV installations might draw workers from other
jobs and put upward pressure on wages in tight markets, while it creates new jobs
in slack markets. Another mechanism could be that in a tight market, companies
substitute labor for capital. For example, they might use a machine instead of
labor to move solar panels to roofs. Lastly, in slack markets additional demand
in a county might be accommodated by an increase in employment in the same
county, while in tight markets it might lead to an increase in employment mainly
in other regions.
The evidence is most consistent with the crowding-out mechanism put forward
by Michaillat (2014). First, a county’s employment is largely unaffected by ad-
ditional demand in surrounding regions, irrespective of the state of the county’s
labor market. This excludes regional spillovers as a mechanism. Second, the
differential employment gains in slack and tight markets are driven both by the
directly exposed sector installing PV systems as well as indirectly exposed local
3Abusing terminology slightly, a local labor earnings multiplier of x means that a local invest-
ment of the yearly gross median wage delivers x additional local jobs. This figure accounts for
the fact that of the total costs of installing rooftop PV systems only one third accrue locally, while
two thirds are spent on tradable parts (solar panels and components).
4In the search and matching framework of Michaillat (2014), higher crowding out in tight
markets is a consequence of a convex quasi-labor supply function. Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2017)
suggests a similar mechanism based on search frictions and downward-rigidity in prices. Recent
work by Rendahl (2016) also emphasizes the role of the labor market for generating differential
effects of fiscal spending in booms and recessions, albeit with a different channel. The mechanism
in this paper relies on differential expectations regarding the path of the entire economy at and
away from the zero lower bound. For most of our sample these differential expectations are likely
not present and, hence, cannot explain the results.
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service sectors. This rules out a simple substitution of labor and capital. Finally,
consistent with crowding-out, there is evidence that investments lead to addi-
tional wage growth in the construction sector in tight markets, but not in slack
markets.
Taken together, we provide evidence that the employment effects of PV invest-
ment in Germany are state-dependent and that crowding-out is the mechanism
behind this finding. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that we estimate local
multipliers from relative employment gains across regions. In consequence, our
estimates do not account for the general equilibrium effects of monetary policy,
Ricardian equivalence, and regional spillovers. For this reason, local multipliers
tend to be larger than the national multiplier in theory (Nakamura and Steinsson,
2014; Farhi and Werning, 2016), and converting local into national multipliers re-
quires additional assumptions (see, e.g., Chodorow-Reich, forthcoming).5
This chapter is thus complementary to the time-series literature on the state-
dependence of multipliers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013, 2012; Bachmann
and Sims, 2012; Fazzari et al., 2014; Caggiano et al., 2015; Biolsi, 2017; Ramey
and Zubairy, 2018). Specifically, in addition to this chapter, only Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013) investigate potential channels for state-dependence. In a
cross-country setting, they show that at times of low output growth, employment
responds stronger to demand shocks while wage growth is muted. The opposite
is true at times of high output growth, also pointing towards crowding-out as a
likely mechanism.
This chapter adds more directly to the literature on local multipliers. So far, this
literature is primarily concerned with estimating the unconditional multiplier.6
Our chapter and recent work by Dube et al. (2018) are the first to focus on its
5See, however, Dupor and Guerrero (2017), who show empirically that the difference between
the local and aggregate multipliers of military spending is small.
6See Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan (2016) and Chodorow-Reich (forthcoming) for recent re-
views.
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state-dependence, although some papers evaluate the state-dependence of their
estimates in auxiliary analyses (Cohen et al., 2011; Brückner and Tuladhar, 2014;
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014; Shoag, 2015; Suárez Serrato and Wingender, 2016;
Adelino et al., 2017).7 The majority of these papers find—as we do—that multi-
pliers are larger if production inputs are slack.
In relation to these papers, we make progress on three fronts. First, this chapter is
unique in ruling out price and composition effects as potential confounding fac-
tors for state-dependent multipliers. Ruling out local price effects is important, as
otherwise the same nominal amount of spending may constitute a different real
shock. Ruling out composition effects is important, as the state of local economies
may directly affect the composition of public funds.8 Second, we are the first to
provide evidence for crowding-out as the mechanism for larger multipliers in
slack than in tight labor markets. Third, we demonstrate the robustness of our
results with respect to a wide array of different ways of classifying slack and tight
markets.
While PV installations and their constant composition are ideal to test the state-
dependence of the multiplier, it is unclear whether they are an effective tool to
stimulate local demand: The scope for installing PV systems is limited; once one
system is mounted to the roof there is little economic rationale to add another
one. Furthermore, two thirds of the investment costs accrue to the tradable sys-
tem components which are mostly produced overseas. Nevertheless, to the extent
that our findings are informative about the job gains from small-scale construc-
tion activity, they suggest that such undertakings may be a viable stimulus at
times of slack (see also Buchheim and Watzinger, 2017).
7Specifically, Dube et al. (2018) show that the projects financed by the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act during the Great Recession had a stronger effect on employment and earnings
in counties hit harder by the recession.
8This is an important concern if local governments have discretion in how to best use available
funds. This applies to the work by Shoag (2015), Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2016), and
Adelino et al. (2017), who all instrument spending with changes in the local government’s budget
constraints.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
institutional background and the data. We lay out the empirical approach in
Section 3.3, where we also discuss the identifying variation in PV installations.
Section 3.4 reports the main results. Section 3.5 discusses potential mechanisms
and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Data
The German Renewable Energy Act (Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien)
went into effect on April 1st 2000 with the aim to increase the share of renewable
energy in German energy production. The current target is that 80 percent of
German electricity consumption stems from renewable energy sources by 2050.
In order to achieve this, the law rests on two key mechanisms: First, the law
mandates grid operators to connect all (household) renewable energy systems
to the grid and to purchase the produced electricity. Second, this electricity is
remunerated with a guaranteed feed-in tariff specified in the law. The relevant
feed-in tariff for a given source of renewable energy is determined at the time
at which it is connected to the grid and remains fixed for 20 years thereafter.
In other words, for an existing renewable power plant (e.g., a PV system), the
feed-in tariff cannot be changed retroactively. The feed-in tariff is independent of
the market price for electricity, but has always been considerably higher than the
market price during the sample period.
3.2.1 Physical Investments in Rooftop PV Systems
An additional provision of the Renewable Energy Act is that until July 2014 it
mandated grid operators to collect and publish data on all renewable energy
power plants. The data provided by the grid operators has been aggregated,
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cleaned, and validated by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sonnenenergie (DGS), which
is the German branch of the International Solar Energy Society. We use the data
up to and including 2012 as data postings have become more sketchy in 2013
ahead of the change in the data publishing requirements.
Every entry in the DGS database contains the type of the renewable energy power
plant (photovoltaics, biomass, wind, hydropower, geothermal), the exact street
address, the date of commissioning, and the power output capacity. The date of
commissioning determines the applicable feed-in tariff (which, thereafter, is fixed
for 20 years). For this reason, plant operators usually commission each system
as soon as it is connected to the grid, as the feed-in tariff has been falling over
time. We can thus exactly pinpoint when the installation of a PV system was
finished. The power output capacity, in turn, is a measure of the size and, hence,
the physical investment volume of a PV system. For PV systems, output capacity
is measured by its peak energy production under ideal working conditions, de-
nominated either in kilowatt peak (kWp) or megawatt peak (MWp, with 1 MWp
equal to 1,000 kWp).
We restrict attention to PV systems with an output capacity of less than 500 kWp
that the DGS has not deemed to have errors such as wrong addresses.9 This
restriction is due to the fact that very large systems are usually mounted on the
ground by few specialized companies, so that their installation does not affect
local labor demand.10 In addition, our instrumental variable is based on the net
present value of rooftop systems and does not predict systems mounted on the
ground.
From these raw data entries, we construct yearly physical investment in PV sys-
tems at the county level as the sum of installed capacity within a county in a
9A rule-of-thumb is that 1 kWp of power output capacity requires around 8-10 m2 of space,
implying that 500 kWp require around 4,000 to 5,000 m2 (43,056 to 53,820 square feet) of space.
10This restriction affects fewer than 1 percent of PV systems installed between 2000 and 2012.
82
Job Creation in Tight and Slack Labor Markets
given year. The main advantage of measuring physical investments, as opposed
to monetary investments, is that physical investments capture real labor demand
irrespective of variation in the prices of the production factors over time or across
space. This is particularly relevant here, given that the price of solar panels varies
considerably over time and given that the relevant wages may vary across space
conditional on the state of the local labor market.
3.2.2 Determinants of Rooftop PV Installations
The volume of PV installations over time and across space is determined by five
main factors: total costs, the feed-in tariff, the prevailing interest rate, solar ra-
diation, and rooftop space. Total costs are obtained from an industry survey
(Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft e.V., 2012) that asks a representative sample of
100 companies about their total installation price per kWp. The resulting cost
data are available quarterly since 2006. Prior to 2006, we use the yearly data from
Janzing (2010). According to this data, the average installation costs of PV sys-
tems in our sample amount to e 3,121 per kWp. We use this figure to calculate
the costs of job creation based on the estimated employment effects of physical
PV installations.
The second investment determinant is the feed-in tariff for electricity from photo-
voltaics specified by the Renewable Energy Act. The feed-in tariff typically varies
by year; when there are multiple changes during a year (as in 2009 and 2012), we
take the yearly average.11
The revenue flow from selling solar electricity at the price of the feed-in tariff
accrues over time. The net present value of these revenues are calculated by dis-
counting the expected payments using the “effective interest rates of commercial
11The capacity bins that determine the exact feed-in tariff for each PV system have been changed
in April 2012. Between April and December 2012, we use the feed-in tariff applicable to PV sys-
tems with a capacity of less than 10 kWp. Prior to April 2012, we use the feed-in tariff applicable
to systems with less than 30 kWp capacity.
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banks for housing loans,” published by the Bundesbank.12
The profitability of PV systems is driven by their energy production, which is a
function of the amount of solar radiation and the available rooftop space. Data on
solar radiation is taken from the Photovoltaic Geographical Information System
of the European Union (Huld et al., 2012). From the grid cell data on the “yearly
average global irradiance on the optimally inclined surface,” we calculate the
average radiation (measured in kWh per m2) at the county level.
For estimating the rooftop potential for solar energy production (in kWp), we
follow the methodology of Lödl et al. (2010), who provide a detailed estimate of
rooftop potential for the state of Bavaria. Lödl et al. first classify municipalities
into four categories (“very rural,” “rural,” “suburban,” and “urban”) based on
five observable municipality characteristics: population, population density, set-
tlement area, average living area per capita, and the number of apartments per
building. Second, they use aerial maps of 4,500 dwellings to estimate the average
rooftop potential conditional on the settlement area and the municipality’s type.
We apply their classification of municipalities to Germany and compute each
municipality’s rooftop potential using the conditional estimates from Lödl et al.
(2010). Rooftop potential at the county level is given by the aggregate of these
municipality-level estimates. Appendix C.1.2 provides a detailed description of
the calculations.13
12This series starts in January 2003. For the calculation of the net present value in Panel (b) of
Figure 3.1, we use the series “average interest rates for mortgage loans” prior to 2003. This latter
series has been discontinued in June 2003.
13A preferable approach would be to use building-level estimates of rooftop potential like
Google’s project “Sunroof.” Google sunroof has been rolled out in Germany in May 2017, but
only includes data for major municipalities thus far (https://www.eon-solar.de/, last accessed
on March 12th 2018).
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3.2.3 Employment Data and Control Variables
The data on employment, unemployment, and wages is from the Federal Employ-
ment Agency, which collects this administrative data to determine social security
contributions and eligibility. The employment data counts every employed in-
dividual who lives in a county and pays social security contributions, including
part-time workers but excluding the self-employed and public servants. In our
main analyses, we use the yearly mean of the quarterly available employment
data measured on the last day of the quarter. The industry-specific employment
data on the three-digit industry level is measured at the end of the second quarter
and the monthly gross median wage in construction is measured at the end of
the fourth quarter.
The covariates are either from the Federal Employment Agency or the Federal
Statistical Office, unless noted otherwise. The data on county types (“non-city”
or “city,” where “city” is a county consisting of a single municipality) and on
spatial planning regions are from the Federal Office for Building and Regional
Planning.
In the empirical analyses, all variables are measured annually at the county level
and normalized by a county’s working-age population (between 15 and 65 years
of age) in 2003 unless noted otherwise. This normalization facilitates the com-
parison of variables across counties. Appendix C.1.1 provides further details
regarding the data.
3.3 Empirical Model
The goal of our empirical strategy is to assess whether the effect of physical
investments in rooftop PV systems on employment differs conditional on the
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state of the labor market. We identify the effect of investment in PV systems on
employment by exploiting variation in installations within German counties from
2003 to 2012 using the following model
Employment p.c.c,t =β PV Installations p.c.c,t + CountyFEc + Controlsc,t
+ δc,t 1[Yeart · Statec · CountyTypec] + ec,t,
(3.1)
where the index c denotes the county, t denotes the year, and “p.c.” (for “per
capita”) in the variable name indicates that the variable is normalized by the
county’s working-age population measured in 2003. PV installations are mea-
sured in megawatt peak (MWp).
We control for county fixed effects and year fixed effects for each county type
and state combination (given by δc,t 1[Yeart · Statec · CountyTypec]).14 To adjust
for labor market dynamics due to population flows, we control for population
growth via the ratio of the working-age population in year t and the working-age
population in 2003. We also account for construction activity as measured by the
number of buildings completed in year t. Construction activity is likely to both
affect the demand for rooftop PV installations and employment. We show in
Appendix C.3 that our results are unchanged for different sets of covariates. The
standard errors are clustered at the level of 94 German spatial planning regions
to account for potential geographic and serial correlation within these regions.15
In our main specification, we estimate equation (3.1) using OLS, separately for
14Counties are defined according to their boundaries in 2012, resulting in a total of 402 counties.
We omit Hamburg and Berlin, as these are city-states and their employment outcomes are fully
captured by the year fixed effects at the state level.
15Note that model (3.1) does not allow for dynamic effects of PV installations. Because PV
installations are correlated over time, empirically separating their contemporaneous and lagged
effects is difficult. Yet, there are reasons to believe that dynamic effects are small: First, the mea-
sure of installed solar power capacity captures only works that have been completed in a given
year, and installing a PV system rarely takes longer than a few weeks. The direct employment
effect should hence be confined to the same year. Second, Appendix C.2.1 follows an approach
suggested by Shoag (2015) to provide evidence suggesting that dynamic effects are indeed negli-
gible.
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Figure 3.1: Feed-in Tariff, Costs, Installations, and Net Present Value of PV Sys-
tems
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Note: Panel (a) shows the average costs (in Euro) per kWp for PV systems smaller than 100 kWp
(solid line, left axis) as well as the feed-in tariff (fixed for 20 years, in Euro-Cents) per kWh
of energy produced by a PV system smaller than 30 kWp conditional on when the system is
connected to the grid (dashed line, right axis). Panel (b) displays the total installations of PV
systems (measured in MWp) with less than 500 kWp capacity (bars, left axis) as well as the net
present value (NPV) per kWp for a PV system with less than 30 kWp of capacity given the costs
and the feed-in tariff from Panel (a) (dashed line, right axis). See the text for details.
each sample of counties with tight and slack labor markets. In a second step,
we repeat this analysis using the potential profitability of PV installations in a
region as an instrumental variable for investment. The next section describes
the identifying variation in PV installations across time and space as well as the
construction of the instrument. Section 3.3.2. explains how we classify labor
markets as being tight or slack.
3.3.1 Identifying Variation
The profitability of a rooftop PV system is determined by how much electricity
can be produced, how high this electricity is remunerated, and by the costs of
installing and maintaining the system. The remuneration and costs exhibit sub-
stantial variation over time, but none across space, whereas the reverse is true for
the potential for electricity production.
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Determinants of Investment over Time
The feed-in tariff is one of the time-varying determinants of the profitability of a
rooftop PV-system. The dashed line in Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 shows the feed-in
tariff per kWh in Euro-Cents (right axis) of produced electricity for rooftop PV
systems with less than 30 kWp, conditional on the date the system was connected
to the grid. The initial feed-in tariff was 50.62 Cents in 2000, and scheduled to
decrease by 5 percent each year from 2002 onwards. However, reflecting the
policy goal of the government at the time to boost renewable energies, the feed-
in tariff was raised to 57.40 Cents in 2004, with yearly degressions of 5 percent in
2005 and of 6.5 percent thereafter. The ensuing boom of solar energy production
led to a steep increase in the cost of the policy. Further amendments of the law in
2009 and 2012 aimed to keep these costs in check, prescribing steeper degressions
conditional on the volume of new installations in the previous year.
Falling costs of PV systems have also contributed to making PV installations more
affordable, as illustrated by the solid line in Panel (a) of Figure 3.1. Costs have
declined steeply from e 7,000 per kWp in 2000 to less than e 2,000 per kWp in
2012. The drop in costs mainly reflects the global decline in the price of the system
components (solar modules, power inverters). This decline has been caused by
technological progress and higher competition due to the market entry of Asian
manufacturers.
The increased feed-in tariff combined with rapidly falling costs made it profitable
to invest into rooftop PV systems in most German regions. This is illustrated in
Panel (b) of Figure 3.1, which depicts the net present value for each kWp of credit-
financed PV installations in a county with median solar radiation (dashed line)
as well as total annual installations in MWp (bars).16 In counties with median
16Most rooftop PV systems are, at least in part, credit financed (Bickel et al., various years).
We assume that the relevant interest rate for financing PV installations is similar to the one for
mortgages, as the PV system and its relatively risk-free income stream can serve as collateral. The
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radiation and above, investing into rooftop PV systems became profitable with
the increase in the feed-in tariff in 2004. The steep decline in costs in 2009 made
the investment very profitable, particularly before lawmakers reacted by reduc-
ing the feed-in tariff accordingly. Yearly PV installations closely track the time
variation in the profitability of these investments. In 2004, photovoltaic systems
with 600 MWp were installed, more than in all previous years combined. After
2004, the upward trend continued until its peak in 2010, when yearly installations
reached 5,000 MWp.17
Determinants of Investments across Space
As the feed-in tariff and the costs of PV systems are (roughly) equal across Ger-
man regions, the extent to which counties may benefit from installing rooftop PV
systems depends on the local potential for electricity production. The latter is, in
turn, a function of the local amount of solar radiation and local rooftop potential,
the space available and suitable for PV installations. Because the electricity pro-
duced by a PV system is proportional to the product of radiation and the amount
of space covered with solar panels, a county’s potential gain from PV installations
is proportional to the product of the county’s yearly radiation (measured in kWh
per m2) and its total rooftop potential (measured in kWp).
Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 shows the spatial distribution of rooftop potential × ra-
diation, normalized by the working-age population in 2003 and relative to the
state-specific mean, across counties. While radiation is generally higher in the
South, there is substantial variation in whether counties are more or less suitable
for rooftop PV installations across all parts of Germany. Panel (b) of Figure 3.2,
average yearly interest rate on new mortgages has fluctuated between 4 and 6.5 percent between
2000 and 2009, and has been dropping to below 3 percent between 2009 and 2012. Equation (3.2)
below gives the exact formula for the net present value.
17For comparison, one reactor of a typical nuclear power plant produces between 500 MW and
1,500 MW of electrical power.
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Figure 3.2: Geographic Distribution of Total Installations and Rooftop Potential
× Radiation
(a) Radiation × Rooftop Potential p.c. (b) Total Installations p.c.
Note: Panel (a) shows the geographic distribution of rooftop potential × radiation per capita
(p.c.) across counties relative to their state-specific mean. Panel (b) depicts the total power output
capacity (in kWp p.c.) installed across counties between 2003 and 2012 relative to the state-specific
mean. The city-states of Hamburg (blank county in the North) and Berlin (blank county in the
North-East) are excluded. The color coding scheme corresponds to quintiles of installations and
rooftop potential × radiation; darker colors indicate higher values. Per capita values are normalized
with the working-age population in 2003.
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in turn, depicts the spatial variation of total capacity installed during the major
expansion of installations between 2003 and 2012, normalized by the working-
age population and relative to the state-specific mean, as before. Comparing the
variation in rooftop potential × radiation and PV installations, it becomes clear that
counties with a higher suitability for PV installations in general also experience
a larger increase in their solar power capacity.
Remuneration Potential
The time-varying costs and benefits of installing PV systems can be combined
with the regional productivity of PV systems in producing solar energy into a
single measure that captures the time-variation in local profitability of PV instal-
lations. This measure, which we call “remuneration potential” and which we use as
an instrument for investments in Section 3.4.2, is the net present value of invest-
ing in PV systems with an output capacity equal to the county’s rooftop potential
in a given year t. Formally, the remuneration potential of county c in year t is
defined as follows:
Remuneration Potentialc,t = Roo f top Potentialc ·t+20∑
τ=t
( 11+ it
)τ−t0.995τ−t · 0.75 · Radiationc︸ ︷︷ ︸
electricity prod. by 1 kWp system
·Tt − 0.01 · Ct︸ ︷︷ ︸
op. costs

− Ct
 . (3.2)
Remuneration potential is the product of the rooftop space suitable for PV sys-
tems, measured in kWp, and the net present value of operating a PV system with
output capacity of 1 kWp for 20 years from year t onwards.18 The net present
value, the term in brackets, is given by the net income stream (discounted using
the interest rate at t, it) less the installation costs at t, Ct. The net income stream,
in turn, equals the electricity production times the feed-in tariff, Tt, where we
18We assume the PV system to be operational for 20 years, as this is the time for which the
feed-in tariff remains fixed.
91
Job Creation in Tight and Slack Labor Markets
Figure 3.3: Remuneration Potential and PV Installations
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Note: This figure plots demeaned PV installations per capita (relative to the county and state ×
year specific mean) against the identically demeaned remuneration potential per capita as defined
by equation (3.2). Panel (a) plots these data for the cross-section of counties in 2004, and Panel
(b) shows the equivalent data for 2010.
need to adjust the power output capacity under optimal conditions for average
working conditions. Here, we follow the European Union’s PVGIS and assume a
performance ratio of 0.75. Following Wirth (2015), we also adjust for gradual per-
formance losses of 0.5 percent per year and annual operating costs of 1 percent
of the installation costs.
Figure 3.3 shows that remuneration potential is a strong predictor of investments
in PV systems.19 It plots PV installations per capita, demeaned by their 2003 to
2012 county mean and relative to the state × year average, against the similarly
demeaned remuneration potential per capita. Panel (a) shows the data for the
start of the PV investment boom in 2004, and Panel (b) shows the data for the
peak of the boom in 2010. In both years, variation in remuneration potential
explains roughly half of the variation in PV installations. The slopes imply that
a e 1,000 increase in per capita remuneration potential is associated with an in-
crease in per capita installations of 0.024 to 0.035 kWp. Given the installation costs
in 2004 and 2010, the latter correspond to additional investments worth roughly
e 140 and e 100, respectively.
19This echoes the formal first stage results in Appendix C.2.2.
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3.3.2 Classification of Slack and Tight Labor Markets
In order to investigate whether the employment effect of PV installations de-
pends on the state of the economy, we need to define whether a labor market
is “slack” or “tight.” We build on the approaches of Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014) and Shoag (2015). In particular, we define the state of the labor market of
a county at time t as slack if the county’s unemployment at time t− 1 is above a
benchmark. Otherwise, the county’s labor market is defined as tight. Given this
definition, the choice of the benchmark specifies in which dimension the sample
is split into counties with slack and tight labor markets. For each sample split,
we then estimate equation (3.1) separately for each subsample and test whether
the employment effects of investments differ between the subsamples.
For the main specifications, we apply two definitions of the benchmark unem-
ployment level that separates slack and tight labor markets. The first definition
follows Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) and splits the sample along the time se-
ries dimension. This exploits the long, ten year period, during which there were
stable and favorable conditions for investments in PV systems. According to this
time-series split, a county’s labor market is defined to be slack if its unemployment
in the previous year is higher than the county’s mean unemployment between
2003 and 2012.20 Panel (a) of Figure 3.4 shows that, according to the time-series
split, most counties’ labor markets are defined to be slack prior to 2008 and tight
thereafter. This reflects the downward sloping trend in German unemployment
over this period.
The second definition of the unemployment benchmark follows Shoag (2015) and
splits the sample along the cross-sectional dimension. According to this cross-
sectional split, a county’s labor market is defined to be slack if its unemployment
20Formally, the labor market is said to be slack according to the time-series split if
unemploymentc,t−1 > 1/10 ∑2012t=2003 unemploymentc,t.
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Figure 3.4: Labor Market Slack across Counties
(a) Time-series Classification of Slack
(b) Cross-sectional Classification of Slack
Note: Panel (a) shows, for each year in the sample, which counties are classified as having a slack
or tight labor market according to the definition of slack in the time-series dimension. Here, the
labor market is defined to be slack if a county’s unemployment in the previous year is higher
than the mean unemployment of the county over the sample period. Panel (b) shows which
counties exhibit slack / tight labor markets according to the definition of slack in the cross-
sectional dimension. Here, the labor market is defined to be slack if a county’s unemployment in
the previous year is higher than the state average of unemployment in the previous year.
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in the previous year is higher than the state mean of unemployment in the same
year.21 Panel (b) of Figure 3.4 shows that the cross-sectional split selects a similar
set of counties to have slack and tight labor markets in the different years.
The two sample splits have different implications. The time-series split com-
pares the same set of counties at different times, so that the two samples of
slack and tight labor markets, respectively, share the same structural features.
The cross-sectional split compares different counties at the same time, thus hold-
ing constant all factors that may affect the employment response to investments
over time (such as innovation in the production technology). Hence, differen-
tial employment effects in the sample splits along both dimensions can neither
be explained by time trends nor structural features alone. To further bolster the
robustness of the results with respect to the definition of slack and tight labor
markets, Section 3.4.3 explores the employment response to investments for a
wide range of additional definitions.
3.4 Results
This section presents the main findings. The empirical analysis shows that phys-
ical investments increase employment more at times and in regions with slack
labor markets compared to times and regions with tight labor markets. This
result holds irrespective of whether we estimate the employment effects of in-
vestments via OLS or IV, and independent of the particular definition of slack
and tight labor markets.
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Table 3.1: The Effect of PV Installations on Employment (OLS)
Employment Rate
Split along Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Installed capacity p.c. 19.98∗∗∗ 36.61∗∗ 2.78 37.91∗∗∗ 13.34∗∗
(6.58) (17.09) (3.86) (13.83) (6.47)
Population growth 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Construction p.c. −0.25 −0.19 0.47 0.04 −0.23
(0.22) (0.14) (0.30) (0.21) (0.26)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
P-value slack < tight 0.017 0.036
Jobs per e100,000 0.64 1.17 0.09 1.21 0.43
Observations 4000 2044 1956 1783 2189
Note: The dependent variable is the average yearly employment rate (employment normalized
by the working-age population in 2003) between 2003 and 2012. Installed capacity p.c. are yearly
PV installations measured in megawatt peak (MWp) normalized by the working-age population
in 2003 (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”). Population Growth is the ratio of the working-age
population in a given year to the working-age population in 2003. Construction p.c. is the number
of residential and non-residential buildings completed in a given year. P-Val slack < tight reports
the p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that the employment effect of PV installations is
smaller in slack than in tight labor markets. The year fixed effects are estimated at the level of the
state × county type (rural or urban county). Note that the observations in the cross-sectional split
do not sum to 4000 due to singleton groups. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
level of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.4.1 OLS Results
Table 3.1 presents the OLS estimates of empirical model (3.1). As a benchmark,
column (1) reports the average effect of physical investments in PV systems on
employment for the full sample. Because both employment and installations are
normalized by the working-age population, the coefficient of installed capacity
p.c. can be interpreted as the number of additional jobs per MWp of PV instal-
lations. Hence, in the full sample, additional PV installations of 1 MWp capacity
lead to, on average, around 20 additional jobs lasting for one year. Given the
average installation costs of e 3.121m per 1 MWp capacity, this estimate implies
that investments of e 100,000 created 0.64 local job-years, corresponding to costs
per job-year of e 156,000.
The magnitude of this estimate is in line with how much work is required to
install rooftop PV systems, the direct effect of additional demand on the labor
market: The industry survey of Brohm (2010) suggests that, in 2008, installing
capacity of 1 MWp required on average between 15 and 20 workers. We also
have access to the internal accounting data of one installation company. Their
data suggests a lower bound of 9 worker-years per MWp.22
Columns (2) and (3) report the estimates for the sample split into slack and tight
labor markets along the time series dimension. Here, we find that at times of
economic slack, additional PV installations of 1 MWp capacity lead to about 37
additional job-years, corresponding to 1.17 job-years per investments of e 100,000.
This effect is 80 percent larger than the baseline effect in column (1). In contrast,
21Formally, the labor market is said to be slack according to the cross-sectional split if
unemploymentc,t−1/Nc,2003 > (∑c∈state(c) unemploymentc,t−1)/(∑c∈state(c) Nc,2003), where Nc,2003 is
county c’s working-age population in 2003.
22This number includes the installation of the panels, the acquisition and the planning of the PV
system as well as the additional jobs at the regional distributor. It does not include jobs outside
of the construction sector. The 9 worker-years are within the 95 percent confidence interval of our
OLS estimate in column (1). If we only consider employment in the high exposure sector—as we
do in Table C.9 in Appendix C.4.2—we arrive at 15.04 job-years per MWp with a standard error
of 4.74. Here, 9 job-years are within the 80 percent confidence interval.
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at times of tight labor markets, the local employment effect of investments into
PV systems is economically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Moreover, we reject the null hypothesis that the investment-induced employment
gains are larger at times of tight labor markets at the five percent level; the p-value
of the respective one-sided test equals 0.017.
The cross-sectional split in columns (4) and (5) leads to similar results as the time
series split. Here, 1 MWp in PV installations leads to 38 more job-years in coun-
ties with slack labor markets, while the same additional demand creates only 13
new job-years in counties with tight labor markets. As before, the null hypothesis
that employment gains in regions with tight labor markets are larger than in ones
with slack labor markets is rejected at the five percent level.
The differences in the employment effects across the two sample splits cannot be
explained by either counties’ structural characteristics or time-varying changes
in the relation between real demand and employment alone. While a correlation
of local investments and structural labor market characteristics—such as higher
investments in less sklerotic labor markets—may explain the difference in the
employment effects in the cross-sectional split in columns (4) and (5), such an ex-
planation cannot account for the difference in the employment creation over time
in the identical sets of counties in the time series split. Conversely, we have seen
in Panel (a) of Figure 3.4 that local labor markets were mostly slack in the first
years of the photovoltaic investment boom and tight in the later years, so that
the results in columns (2) and (3) could potentially be explained by a reduction
in labor demand for new installations.23 However, changes in technology cannot
account for the results of the cross-sectional split, as the latter compares differ-
ent counties with slack and tight labor markets at the same time. Additionally,
the next section uses an instrumental variable approach to provide additional
23Contrary to this hypothesis, conversations with industry experts suggest that there was no
fundamental change to the technology for installing PV systems over time.
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evidence that unobserved third factors are unlikely to drive the results of Table
3.1.
To interpret the magnitude of the employment effect, we approximate the local
labor earnings multiplier. To do so, we divide the median annual earnings by the
costs per job-year implied by our estimates. Median earnings equaled e 32,160
during the sample period. The results in column (1) of Table 3.1 imply costs per
job-year equal to e 100,000/0.64 = e 156,000. Combined, this translates into a
local labor earnings multiplier of 0.21, i.e., local earnings increased by e 0.21 per
e 1 investment in PV systems. In slack labor markets, this multiplier is around
0.38, while in tight labor markets the multiplier is at most 0.14. Finally, it is
important to note that only around a third of the total costs of PV systems, the
basis for the calculation of the costs per job-year, accrue locally.24 If we scale our
estimates accordingly, the multiplier in tight labor markets is around 1.14, while
in slack labor markets the multiplier is at most 0.42.
3.4.2 IV Results
One concern for identifying the effect of PV installations on employment is that
investment decisions may depend on expected labor market dynamics via an
unobserved third channel, such as local credit markets. As many rooftop PV
systems are credit-financed, changes in local lending might influence both, em-
ployment and investments and thus bias the estimates in either direction.25 For
24According to an industry survey in 2013, the local installation costs amount to about 20 per-
cent of the total costs, while the remaining 80 percent are spent on solar panels and components
(EuPD Research, 2013). According to anecdotal evidence from industry experts, installation firms
charge an additional 10 percent of the total costs as a mark-up on the panels and components, so
that roughly one third of the total costs contribute to local demand.
25Financial service provision in Germany has a strong regional focus due to the nationwide
presence of local savings banks (Sparkassen) and credit cooperations (Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken).
In 2012, there were 423 savings banks, the area of business of which is often defined by county
borders, and more than 900 credit cooperations. Statistics on the share of debt-financing of PV
systems do not exist. However, the state-owned bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) reports
that in the years 2007 to 2012, between 42 percent and 74 percent of the yearly investments in
PV systems have been at least partially backed by their subsidized loans program (Bickel et al.,
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example, OLS could overestimate the effect of PV installations on employment
if favorable lending conditions drive employment growth and investment. OLS
could also underestimate the effect of PV installations on employment if loans
for safe investments into PV systems are particularly attractive when the local
economy is on a downward trajectory.
To address such concerns, we instrument local investments into PV systems by
their profitability which is captured by remuneration potential as defined in Sec-
tion 3.3.1. Remuneration potential is a function of time-varying factors (the feed-in
tariff, the costs of components, mortgage rates) that are determined at the global
or national level and thus unrelated to the trajectories of local labor markets, as
well as by pre-determined geographic characteristics (the rooftop potential, local
solar radiation) that are likely fixed over time and thus unresponsive to labor
market developments as well. At the same time, remuneration potential strongly
predicts investments, as shown in Figure 3.3. Taken together, the variable remu-
neration potential hence likely meets the identifying assumptions of relevance and
exogeneity. Appendix C.2.2 provides additional details regarding the first stage
and further arguments for why the exclusion restriction is likely to hold.
Table 3.2 summarizes the IV estimates of the main empirical model (3.1). The IV
results are qualitatively similar to the findings from OLS. The employment gains
due to PV installations in slack labor markets are larger than the overall average
and much larger than the employment gains in tight labor markets. At average
installation costs, the estimated employment gains from physical investments
imply that e 100,000 in PV installations increase employment by about five job-
years in slack and by about one job-year in tight labor markets, both in the time
series and the cross-sectional split.26 Due to these large differences, we reject the
various years) .
26The difference in the magnitude of the OLS and IV estimates could be driven by higher in-
vestment incentives in less prosperous regions that lead to a downward bias of the OLS estimates.
Another part of the explanation may be that the IV estimates are, despite their strong first stage,
much more noisy than the OLS estimates. Furthermore, the IV estimates a local average treatment
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Table 3.2: The Effect of PV Installations on Employment (IV)
Employment Rate
Split along Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Installed capacity p.c. 52.57∗∗∗ 148.43∗∗∗ 22.60∗∗ 180.11∗∗∗ 30.52∗∗
(13.60) (45.38) (10.86) (37.73) (12.01)
Population growth 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Construction p.c. −0.24 −0.20 0.48∗ 0.36 −0.25
(0.23) (0.14) (0.29) (0.30) (0.27)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
P-value slack < tight 0.003 0.000
Jobs per e100,000 1.68 4.76 0.72 5.77 0.98
F-statistic instrument 88.22 22.11 59.15 28.43 79.67
Observations 4000 2044 1956 1783 2189
Note: The dependent variable is the average yearly employment rate (employment normalized
by the working-age population in 2003) between 2003 and 2012. Installed capacity p.c. are yearly
PV installations measured in megawatt peak (MWp) normalized by the working-age population
in 2003 (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”). Population Growth is the ratio of the working-age
population in a given year to the working-age population in 2003. Construction p.c. is the number
of residential and non-residential buildings completed in a given year. P-Val slack < tight reports
the p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that the employment effect of PV installations is
smaller in slack than in tight labor markets. F-statistic instrument is the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic
of remuneration potential p.c. in the first stage. The year fixed effects are estimated at the level of the
state × county type (rural or urban county). Note that the observations in the cross-sectional split
do not sum to 4000 due to singleton groups. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
level of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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hypothesis that employment is more responsive to investments in tight than in
slack labor markets at the one percent level, even though the IV estimates are less
precise than the corresponding OLS results. Finally, note that with Kleibergen-
Paap F-statistics of the excluded instruments equal to 22 or higher, the first stage
is strong in all specifications.
3.4.3 Alternative Classifications of Slack and Tight Labor Mar-
kets
Table 3.3 uses alternative classifications of slack and tight labor markets to show
that our finding of differential employment effects does not crucially depend
on the specific classification.27 Each row of Table 3.3 reports the results of an
alternative sample split. Panel A reports the OLS estimates and Panel B the
corresponding IV results.
Rows (1) and (8) in boldface repeat the baseline time series and cross-sectional
splits from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, for comparison purposes. Row (2)
contains an alternative time series split that defines all years prior to 2007 as
times of slack and all years after 2008 as times of tight labor markets. Rows (3)
to (6) split the sample based on unemployment benchmarks calculated across
time and space. In row (3), a county is said to have a slack labor market if its
unemployment rate in year t − 1 is above the average national unemployment
rate between 2003 and 2012. Otherwise, the labor market is said to be tight. In
rows (4) and (5), labor markets are classified accordingly, but with respect to
the 2003 to 2012 state average and the 2003 to 2012 state × county-type average,
effect, while the OLS uses the entire variation in the data. Local average treatment effects are dif-
ficult to interpret because the compliers, for which the treatment effects are estimated, cannot be
identified in the data. We thus cannot assess whether the IV results can be extrapolated to the
entire population.
27In addition, in Appendix C.3.3 we show that for the main slack definitions, the results are
comparable when we split observations into three groups instead of two.
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Table 3.3: Alternative Definitions of Slack in the Labor Market
Slack Tight P-Value
Coeff SE Coeff SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS
Based on time variation in unemployment
(1) Within county mean 36.61 17.09 2.78 3.86 0.017
(2) 2003-2007 vs. 2008-2012 47.79 16.98 1.87 3.25 0.002
Based on aggregate variation in unemployment
(3) 2003-2012 national mean 28.33 26.35 18.69 6.93 0.361
(4) 2003-2012 state mean 49.82 18.22 11.25 6.47 0.013
(5) 2003-2012 state × county type mean 32.09 9.38 14.16 6.99 0.049
(6) Residuals wrt. county and state × year FEs 20.46 5.60 12.50 6.01 0.058
Based on cross-sectional variation in unemployment
(7) Yearly national mean 43.04 23.60 21.22 7.30 0.186
(8) Yearly state mean 37.91 13.83 13.34 6.47 0.036
(9) Yearly state × county type mean 23.56 7.58 19.61 7.17 0.296
(10) State mean in 2002 31.32 12.00 12.78 6.31 0.061
Based on aggregate variation in wage growth
(11) National CPI growth 22.59 7.12 13.10 6.62 0.038
Panel B: IV
Based on time variation in unemployment
(1) Within county mean 148.43 45.38 22.60 10.86 0.003
(2) 2003-2007 vs. 2008-2012 200.21 49.30 11.45 6.44 0.000
Based on aggregate variation in unemployment
(3) 2003-2012 national mean 142.24 73.87 32.50 12.00 0.071
(4) 2003-2012 state mean 193.67 48.04 24.54 10.68 0.000
(5) 2003-2012 state × county type mean 153.87 35.26 18.44 11.38 0.000
(6) Residuals wrt. county and state × year FEs 59.97 15.48 45.32 14.85 0.167
Based on cross-sectional variation in unemployment
(7) Yearly national mean 131.08 53.86 44.45 14.32 0.057
(8) Yearly state mean 180.11 37.73 30.52 12.01 0.000
(9) Yearly state × county type mean 98.36 24.63 33.41 13.37 0.006
(10) State mean in 2002 120.52 31.05 31.98 12.58 0.002
Based on aggregate variation in wage growth
(11) National CPI growth 59.86 13.28 30.38 12.90 0.005
Note: This table presents the employment effects of PV installations in slack and tight labor markets for various alternative
sample splits. Except for rows (2), (6), (10) and (11), the name of each row specifies a different unemployment benchmark
(e.g., in row (3) the benchmark is the 2003-2012 national unemployment mean). The labor market is said to be slack if
unemployment in t − 1 is above the benchmark, and said to be tight otherwise. In row (2), labor markets are defined
as being slack in 2007 and earlier, and tight in 2008 and later. In row (6), a labor market is slack if the residual of
regressing unemployment on county and state-year fixed effects is positive in t− 1. In row (10), a labor market is slack if
its unemployment rate in 2002 was higher than the state mean in 2002, and tight otherwise. In row (11), a labor market is
slack if its year-over-year growth of the median wage in construction is lower than national inflation. Panel A reports the
OLS results, and Panel B reports the IV results with the same model specification as in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Columns entitled “Coeff” report the OLS/IV coefficient estimate of installed capacity p.c. for the subsample with slack and
tight labor market, respectively. Columns entitled “SE” report the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the level of
94 spatial planning regions. The column entitled “P-Value” report the p-values of the test of the null hypothesis that the
employment effect of PV installations is smaller in a slack labor market than in a tight labor market.
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respectively.28 In row (6), we regress unemployment on county and state-year
fixed effects and split the residuals from this regression at zero to determine
whether a county’s labor market is classified as slack or tight. Positive residuals
indicate a slack market and negative residuals indicate a tight market. Rows
(7) to (10) provide cross-sectional splits. In row (7), a labor market is defined
as slack if its unemployment rate in t − 1 is above the national mean in t − 1.
Slack and tight labor markets in rows (8) and (9) are defined similarly, but with
respect to the state and state × county-type average in t − 1, respectively. In
row (10), a labor market is said to be slack if in 2002, the last year before the
sample period, its unemployment rate was above the 2002 state mean, and said
to be tight otherwise. Finally, in row (11) we use wage growth in the construction
sector as a measure of slack. If wage growth lags behind national inflation, the
labor market is defined as slack and tight otherwise.29
The estimated employment effects of investments in slack labor markets are above
the corresponding estimates for tight labor markets in all specifications of Table
3.3. Except in the OLS specifications in row (9) and the IV specification in row
(6), these differences are economically meaningful with the employment gains in
slack market conditions being at least 50 percent larger than the ones in tight con-
ditions. The coefficients are statistically different from each other on conventional
levels in all but four of the 22 specifications.
Taken together, we consistently find that more jobs are created in slack than in
tight markets. This empirical pattern is present irrespective of the exact definition
of labor market slack and robust to using an IV strategy instead of OLS.30
28This means that in row (4), a county is said to have a slack labor market if its unemployment
rate in t− 1 is above the average unemployment rate between 2003 and 2012 in the same state. In
row (5), the unemployment rate in t− 1 is compared to the average unemployment rate between
2003 and 2012 within all counties of the same county type (either urban or rural) and the same
state.
29For this definition of labor market tightness the sample size is smaller than for the other
specifications as the wage data is only available for counties with more than 1,000 employees in
construction due to data confidentiality requirements.
30Appendix C.3 provides further robustness checks regarding data and covariate choices.
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3.5 Discussion of Mechanisms
There are several potential explanations for the empirical pattern of fewer jobs
being created locally when the labor market is tight. First, there may be a
larger incentive to substitute labor with capital. Second, installation firms might
meet their labor demand with hiring workers from outside the local labor mar-
ket. Third, investment in tight labor markets might lead to crowding out, as
in Michaillat (2014). Workers installing PV systems might be effectively drawn
from other jobs if the labor market is tight—putting pressure on wages in the
process, while they might have been unemployed if the labor market is slack.
Finally, there may be direct effects of labor market tightness on the costs of in-
vestment (e.g., due to higher wages for installation workers or higher markups)
implying a lower effective labor demand for each Euro invested in a tight labor
market. However, the latter effect cannot play a role here, as we use the physical
investment volume as explanatory variable.31
Effects across Industries
The first channel, a substitution of labor with capital in tight labor markets, is
unlikely to drive the results in the context of PV investment. The production
function of installing PV systems has been stable over the entire time period.
The production process consists of bringing the PV systems to the customer and
workers carrying solar panels onto rooftops and mounting them there, with little
scope for different installation techniques. The only substitute technology avail-
able for installation are telehandlers that can lift the panels onto roofs, which still
31Another potential explanation for differential effects in tight and slack markets are nonlinear-
ities in the response of employment to PV installations. To allow for non-linear effects, Appendix
C.4.1 computes the marginal effects from a variant of model (3.1) that adds the installed capacity
squared as a covariate. This analysis shows that nonlinearities cannot account for the differential
employment creation in slack and tight markets.
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require extensive manual labor to mount and install the system. Unfortunately,
we do not have data on the usage of telehandlers and hence we provide indirect
evidence that the usage of telehandlers is unlikely to account for the differences
in employment gains in slack and tight labor markets.
To this end, we partition total employment into employment in (i) high exposure
industries, (ii) local non-tradables, and (iii) all other industries. The high expo-
sure industries are directly affected by the demand for PV installations, such as
electricians.32 We classify the retail and wholesale sector, the hospitality industry
(hotels and restaurants) as well as financial service providers as local services.
Companies in these industries might benefit from local demand spillovers. All
remaining industries are classified as belonging to “other industries”.33 If it were
the case that the difference in slack versus tight labor markets was driven by
changes in the installation technology, we would expect that the differential re-
sponse is entirely driven by differences in employment gains in the high exposure
industries. Employment creation in local industries should not exhibit differen-
tial effects, as the labor-saving technology is specific to the installation of PV
systems.34
Table 3.4 reports the OLS estimates of the employment gains due to PV instal-
lations in slack and tight labor markets for each of the three sectors. Panel A
presents the results for the time series split, and Panel B presents the results for
32For classifying industries as being “high exposure,” we take a random sample of firms that are
a member of the Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft (a trade association of the German solar industry)
that install PV systems and consult their Creditreform company profiles to extract their industry
classification. Most of the sampled firms are certified electricians; as such, they belong to various
industries, including building installation and engineering. The union of the industry codes
identified by this procedure constitutes the set of high exposure industries.
33“Social services” (industry code 853) is excluded from “other industries” for two reasons.
First, the employment data in this industry is non-stationary, as it increases from 4.4 percent
to 6.2 percent of the workforce from 2003 to 2012. Second, this sector mostly comprises of the
daycare industry (care of elderly and children), and it is unclear whether these are local services
or, indeed, “other industries”. Table C.1 in Appendix C.1.1 lists the assignment of industry codes
to each of the three subsectors.
34Note that this additionally assumes that the spillovers from the high exposure to the local
sectors do not change with the state of the labor market.
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Table 3.4: Sectoral Employment Conditional on Slack: OLS Results
Industry-specific Employment p.c.
High-exposure Local Other
Slack Tight Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Time Series Split
Capacity p.c. 17.96∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗ 7.67∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗ 20.97 −4.39
(6.49) (1.37) (3.87) (1.23) (23.76) (3.29)
P-val slack < tight 0.012 0.162 0.136
Jobs per e100,000 0.58 0.10 0.25 0.13 0.67 −0.14
Observations 2044 1956 2044 1956 2044 1956
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Split
Capacity p.c. 17.10∗∗ 11.45∗∗∗ 15.18∗∗∗ 6.64∗∗∗ 5.94 −5.45
(8.37) (4.17) (3.16) (2.54) (15.94) (8.47)
P-val slack < tight 0.220 0.008 0.211
Jobs per e100,000 0.55 0.37 0.49 0.21 0.19 −0.17
Observations 1783 2189 1783 2189 1783 2189
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is employment in the high-exposure sectors
(construction and related industries) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (indi-
cated by “p.c.” for “per capita”). The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is employment
p.c. in local industries (wholesale, retail, hospitality, local services). The dependent variable in
columns (5) and (6) is employment p.c. in all remaining industries. Employment by industry is
measured annually on June 30th. Table C.1 in Appendix C.1.1 provides details of the industry
classifications. Capacity p.c. are yearly PV installations measured in megawatt peak (MWp). Ex-
cept for the dependent variables, the empirical specifications are identical to the ones in Table
3.1. In particular, controls are population growth and new construction per capita. The year fixed
effects are estimated at the level of the state × county type (rural or urban county). Panel A re-
ports the results for the time series split, and Panel B reports the results for the cross-sectional
split. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94 spatial planning regions. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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the cross-sectional definition of labor market slackness. The first finding from
Table 3.4 is that in both slack and tight labor markets, PV installations led to a
statistically significant increase in employment only in the high-exposure and lo-
cal sectors. In contrast, the employment gains (or losses) in all other sectors are
very imprecisely estimated. Given the nature of the investments we study, this is
exactly the pattern of employment gains across industries we expect to find.35
A second result from Table 3.4 is that the difference of the employment gains in
slack and tight labor markets is driven by differential employment gains both in
high exposure and local industries. In the time series as well as the cross-sectional
split, the difference in the employment gains between slack and tight markets is
sizable, and, in two cases, significantly different from each other.36 This speaks
against adjustments in the production technology of PV installations conditional
on the state of the labor market as an explanation for the differential employment
gains in slack and tight labor markets.
Spillovers from Neighboring Counties
The second channel, hiring workers from outside the local labor market (a county
in our setting), is also unable to fully explain our findings. First, we control for
population growth in all of our regressions, which should capture migration as
long as workers also change their place of residence. Second, migration and
commuting cannot explain the results of our time-series split, given that almost
all counties are classified as slack and tight at the same time. Third, we show
next that there is no evidence for demand spillovers across regions independent
of the state of the labor market, implying that counties in this setting are indeed
35This mirrors the result for the full sample of counties in Table C.9 in Appendix C.4.2, where
we find that around 60 percent of the entire employment effect originates from the high-exposure
sectors, while 40 percent originates from local industries.
36The corresponding IV results reported in Table C.11 in Appendix C.4.3 mirror the OLS find-
ings.
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self-contained labor markets.
To test for geographic spillovers, we follow the approach of Acconcia et al. (2014)
and include investments in neighboring counties as an additional control vari-
able. We consider three possible definitions of neighboring counties: all other
counties within the same spatial planning region, the five closest counties based
on the distance between both counties’ most populous municipalities, and the
ten closest counties. For each set of a county’s neighbors we calculate the total
PV installations in MWp within the set of neighboring counties and normalize
the total installations with the working-age population in the county of interest.
Given this, we estimate an extended version of the main empirical model (3.1)
that includes aggregate PV installations in neighboring counties as an additional
covariate. As in the main empirical analyses, we classify counties as having slack
or tight labor markets according to their own unemployment rate as described in
Section 3.3.2.
Table 3.5 reports the OLS estimates of the demand spillovers conditional on the
state of the labor market as defined via the time series split (Panel A) as well as
the cross-sectional split (Panel B). In both splits and in all three definitions of a
county’s set of neighbors, the effect of additional PV installations in geographi-
cally proximate regions is at least one order of magnitude smaller than the effect
of additional installations within the county. In addition to their small magni-
tude, all the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The estimated effects of
the demand spillovers also do not differ by much between slack and tight labor
markets, while the differences of the employment gains due to the within-county
investments remain at the same level as in Table 3.1, the main OLS specifica-
tion.37 All in all, the employment effects of PV installations are very local in
nature, so that demand spillovers are largely unimportant for the interpretation
37Appendix C.4.2 shows that there is no evidence for demand spillovers in the full sample
either, and Table C.12 in Appendix C.4.3 demonstrates that the IV estimates lead to the same
conclusions as the OLS estimates.
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Table 3.5: Spillovers from Neighboring Counties: OLS Results
Employment Rate
Planning Region 5 Closest Counties 10 Closest Counties
Slack Tight Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Time Series Split
Capacity p.c. 32.58∗∗ 2.09 34.28∗∗ 2.81 32.80∗∗ 1.76
(16.39) (4.04) (15.79) (4.38) (16.23) (4.29)
Neighboring ca- 3.05 0.43 0.72 −0.01 0.91 0.23
pacity p.c. (2.66) (0.75) (1.67) (0.74) (0.69) (0.39)
P-val slack < tight 0.024 0.017 0.020
Jobs per e100,000 1.04 0.07 1.10 0.09 1.05 0.06
Observations 2044 1956 2044 1956 2044 1956
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Split
Capacity p.c. 42.25∗∗∗ 13.46∗∗ 41.53∗∗∗ 15.36∗∗∗ 37.98∗∗∗ 15.56∗∗∗
(11.20) (6.54) (12.18) (5.84) (10.28) (5.90)
Neighboring ca- −0.86 −0.10 −0.67 −0.86 −0.01 −0.59
pacity p.c. (0.93) (2.06) (0.88) (1.33) (0.57) (0.64)
P-val slack < tight 0.010 0.022 0.024
Jobs per e100,000 1.35 0.43 1.33 0.49 1.22 0.50
Observations 1783 2189 1783 2189 1783 2189
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: Neighboring capacity p.c. is the sum of PV installations (measured in MWp and normalized
by the working-age population) across all other counties in the same spatial planning region
(columns (1) and (2)), the 5 closest counties (columns (3) and (4)), or the 10 closest counties
(columns (5) and (6)). Closeness is measured by the distance between the counties’ most populous
municipalities. Controls are population growth and new construction per capita. The year fixed
effects are estimated at the level of the state × county type (rural or urban county). All other
variables are defined as in Table 3.1. Panel A reports the results for the time series split, and Panel
B reports the results for the cross-sectional split. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the level of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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of our findings.
Wage Growth
Taken together, this leaves crowding out as the most plausible mechanism. Work-
ers installing PV systems might be drawn from other jobs if the labor market is
tight, while they might have been unemployed if the labor market is slack. This is
the mechanism identified by Michaillat (2014), who argues that the employment
response to additional demand is a general function of the state of the labor mar-
ket. In his model, diminishing returns to labor lead to a quasi-labor supply curve
that is convex in labor market tightness, so that additional labor demand leads to
a higher degree of crowding out in a tight than in a slack labor market.
Furthermore, in this model wages respond more strongly to a given demand
shock in tight than in slack labor markets. To test this prediction, we estimate
how wage growth reacts to PV installations using the following model:
[log(wagec,t)− log(wagec,t−k)]
k
= β · 1
k
·
k−1
∑
τ=0
PV Installations p.c.c,t−τ
+ γ1 · 1k ·
k−1
∑
τ=0
Construction p.c.c,t−τ + γ2 · Popc,t − Popc,t−kk · Pop2003
+ δc 1[Statec × CountyTypec] + εc.
(3.3)
Here, the dependent variable is the average yearly growth of the median wage
in construction in county c over k years. The independent variable of interest is
the average amount of yearly PV installations (in per-capita terms) during the
same years. We also control for average construction activity, the average yearly
change in the working age population, and state × county-type fixed effects. As
baseline, we estimate model (3.3) for wage growth between 2003 and 2012 for
the full set of counties. For the cross-sectional split, we consider the same time
horizon and classify counties as slack if their unemployment rate in 2002 exceeds
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the state average unemployment rate in 2002. Along the time series, we split the
sample into the periods of 2003 to 2007 (slack) and 2008 to 2012 (tight).38
This model builds on Autor et al. (2013) and evaluates the effect of PV instal-
lations on wage growth in the medium run. We focus on the medium run to
account for the common finding of sticky wages (Taylor, 2016). Sticky wages
are particularly relevant in the context of PV installations as almost 90 percent
of workers in the construction sector are subject to collective bargaining agree-
ments on the industry and regional level, which on average have a duration of
two years.39 Furthermore, bargaining outcomes may not immediately adjust to
demand shocks.40
Table 3.6 shows the results of estimating equation (3.3) via OLS. For the full set of
counties, there is a statistically significant response of wage growth to additional
PV installations (column (1)). The coefficient of 9.21 implies that a one standard
deviation increase in capacity leads to a yearly increase in the median construc-
tion wage of 0.05 percentage points. The splits in tight and slack labor markets
reveal that this additional wage growth is driven almost exclusively by tight mar-
kets, where the coefficients are around 10 as well. In contrast, the coefficients for
slack markets are small and imprecisely estimated. For this reason, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the effect of PV installations on wage growth is
larger in slack than in tight markets on conventional levels. Overall, these results
mirror the findings of the employment gains and point towards crowding out as
an explanation.41
38The cross-sectional split corresponds to row (10) of Table 3.3 and the time series split to
row (2). Both splits ensure that the classification of slack and tight markets is constant for the
considered horizons.
39For durations of collective bargaining agreements, see https://www.boeckler.de/
wsi-tarifarchiv\_4832.htm, last accessed 25 November 2018.
40The survey evidence by Smets and Lamo (2009) shows that the wage elasticity to idiosyncratic
shocks is low and that firms are more likely to adjust employment than wages in response to
demand shocks. For PV installations, this may be particularly relevant as it was not clear ex ante
how permanent these shocks would be.
41Table C.13 in Appendix C.4.4 shows the corresponding IV results which have the same qual-
itative pattern.
112
Job Creation in Tight and Slack Labor Markets
Table 3.6: Wage Growth
∆ Log(Median Wage in Construction)
Split along
Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
Years 03-12 03-07 08-12 03-12 03-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg. yearly capacity p.c. 9.21∗∗ 3.02 11.17∗∗∗ 6.88 10.09∗∗
(3.53) (18.44) (3.15) (10.27) (4.05)
Population growth −0.00 −0.10 0.16∗∗ −0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08)
Avg. yearly construction 0.11 0.22 −0.49∗∗ 0.42 −0.04
p.c. (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.42) (0.28)
State × county-type FE yes yes yes yes yes
P-value slack > tight 0.206 0.190
Observations 368 363 370 159 209
Note: The dependent variable is the difference in the log median wage in the construction sector
over the years indicated in the row “Years” (referred to as “sample years”). Avg. yearly capacity
p.c. are the average yearly PV installations during the sample years measured in megawatt peak
(MWp) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”).
Population Growth is the difference in the working-age population over the sample years relative to
the working-age population in 2003. Avg. yearly construction p.c. is the average yearly number of
residential and non-residential buildings completed during the sample years. For the time-series
defintion of slack in columns (2) and (3) we split the sample into the years 2003 to 2007 (slack) and
2008 to 2012 (tight). In the cross-section in columns (4) and (5), we split the sample relative to the
mean of the average unemployment rate at the state-level in 2002. P-Val slack > tight reports the
p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that the wage effect of PV installations is larger in slack
than in tight labor markets. The number of observations is smaller than the number of counties
(400) because the wage data is only available for county-years in which the number of employees
in construction exceeds 1000. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94
spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
113
Job Creation in Tight and Slack Labor Markets
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that the employment effects of PV investment in Germany
are state-dependent. It overcomes all three challenges to the estimation of state
dependent multipliers: First, we study an exogenous demand shock, as PV in-
vestment was mainly driven by factors independent of regional labor market
dynamics. Second, this demand shock provides ample variation in all states of
the economy as more than e 60 billion were invested across 400 counties over
ten years. Third, the composition of investments has been constant as each PV
installation of a given size constituted the same shock. This allows us to compare
the estimated multipliers between the different states of the economy.
Our results are consistent with crowding-out being responsible for the low im-
pact of PV installations on employment in tight labor markets. Thus, our chapter
adds evidence for a particular mechanism underlying state-dependence. Tracing
out the mechanism is a plausible way forward in studying state-dependent mul-
tipliers as it might help to reconcile the different results in the literature. This
chapter takes a first step in this direction.
Finally, our chapter has two policy implications: First, investments during a re-
cession pay a double dividend as they put additional people to work, while they
mostly lead to crowding out in booms. Hence, economic downturns are a good
time to undertake public investment programs. Second, place-based policies pro-
vide a better return in terms of jobs in regions with high unemployment than
with low unemployment. This suggests that the design of make-work programs
should take economic circumstances of targeted areas into account, even if we
ignore all equity concerns.
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AAppendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix to Section 1.3: Data
The publication data is from Microsoft Academic.1 We process the roughly 160m
publications in the following steps to arrive at the final prize winner-year panel:
1. We retrieve all publications by matching the last name and first initial of
each prize winner (e.g. A Falk for Armin Falk). For some winners we
additionally search for different spellings (e.g. maiden names or umlauts).
2. We manually validate which author names actually match the Leibniz Prize
winners and keep only matches.
3. All publications containing comments, replies, letters, editorials, errata, and
book reviews are dropped, if they are characterized as such in the title.
4. The remaining ca. 60,000 publications are manually checked for further
inconsistencies.
1The data can be downloaded from https://aminer.org/open-academic-graph, last ac-
cessed 08 March 2019. We use version v1.
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5. Each publication is assigned to a prize winner. Some prize winners co-
author with each other, each publication is then counted equally for each
winner.
6. Years without publications in Microsoft Academic are assigned a publica-
tion count of zero.
7. Publications in top multidisciplinary journals (Nature, Science, Proceedings
of the Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, and Nature
Communications) and top three field journals (see Table A.2) are counted
separately.
The resulting publication counts were manually checked with a sample of publi-
cation lists on prize winner’s websites and were qualitatively similar.
The data on novelty, conventionality and potential high impact publications is
constructed following Uzzi et al. (2013) and Lee et al. (2015) in the following
steps:
1. For all publications in Microsoft Academic, all pairwise combinations of
cited journals are formed. For example, if a paper references the American
Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Journal of Political
Economy, this yields 2 choose 3 combinations: AER and QJE, AER and JPE,
QJE and JPE.
2. The frequency of all of these combinations are counted for each year and the
commonness of these combinations is calculated according to the following
formula for journals j1 and j2:
Nj1,j2,t
Nj1,t
Nt
· Nj2,tNt ·Nt
where Nj1,j2,t is the number of
times journal j1 and journal j2 are referenced together in year t. Nt, Nj1,t,
and Nj2,t are the number of all journal pairs, the number of journal pairs
containing j1 and the number of pairs containing j2 in year t, respectively.
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3. On the paper level this then yields a distribution of these commonness values
for all the journal combinations referenced in a given paper
4. The negative logarithm of the tenth percentile of this distribution is then
assigned as the novelty score for a paper
5. The logarithm of the median of this distribution is assigned as the conven-
tionality score for a paper
6. Following Uzzi et al. (2013), papers are defined to have potential high im-
pact if they score high on novelty and commonness. Specifically, a paper
needs to have a novelty score above the 90th percentile of the vintage spe-
cific distribution of novelty scores across papers. In addition, it also needs
an above median conventionality score relative to the vintage specific dis-
tribution of conventionality scores across all papers.
The text similarity of abstracts is calculated in the following steps:
1. We collect all available abstracts from Microsoft Academic. Abstracts are
available for around two thirds of all publications in our sample.
2. We remove stop words and stem all words and then construct a document
term matrix where each abstract is a document.
3. Next, the document term matrix is tf-idf weighted, i.e. weighted by the
following factor for each term t and document D:
tf.idf(t, D) =
Frequency of term t in document D
Max. Frequency of a term t′ in document D
·
log
Number of Documents
Number of Documents with term t
4. Between each tf-idf vector (i.e. each document in the document-term ma-
trix) we calculate the cosine similarity.
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5. For the similarity measure relative to the early stock of publications, all
abstracts from relative years -10 to -6 are aggregated into a single document.
The similarity of subsequent publications is then calculated relative to this
document.
This publication data is complemented by further information on the prize win-
ners:
1. Data on birth years, year of Ph.D., field and institution at appointment are
from Finetti (2010), recipient CVs and the DFG. In case a winner has multi-
ple affiliations, we give preference to research institutes (if e.g. an individual
is a director at a Max-Planck institute and also an affiliated professor at a
university, we classify her as working at a research institute).
2. Data on the number of individual research grants (Sachbeihilfen) is scraped
from the DFG’s GEPRIS database (gepris.dfg.de). Grants are matched to
prize winners using last names and first initial.
The same data is collected for the early career prize winners in a similar fashion.
The only differences are that we do not collect information on research grants and
affiliation due to data availability. We collect all winners from the prizes listed
in Table A.1 and check via a search of Microsoft Academic and recipients’ CVs
whether they continued in academia. Some of our prizes are prizes for Ph.D.
theses and some winners leave academia immediately afterward. We exclude
these recipients.
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Table A.1: List of Early Career Prizes
Prize Field No. of Winners
Arnold Eucken Prize Engineering 11
Emmy Noether Indep. Junior Research Group
Leader
All fields 87
Eugen Hartmann Prize Engineering 4
Heinz-Maier-Leibnitz Prize All fields 79
Heisenberg Fellowship All fields 227
Masing Prize Engineering 9
Max-Planck Research Group Most fields 46
Note: The Heinz Maier-Leibnitz Prize is awarded to Ph.D. theses in all disciplines by
the DFG. The Emmy Noether and Heisenberg program are programs by the DFG for
post Ph.D. independent researchers. Similarly, Max-Planck Research Groups are headed
by young researchers after their Ph.D. and affiliated with an existing Max-Planck insti-
tute. Since the Max-Planck Society spans most, but not all fields (e.g. not engineer-
ing) and engineers are less likely to participate in programs such the Heisenberg Fellow-
ship and the Emmy Noether program, we include several engineering specific early career
prizes (See e.g. http://www.dfg.de/dfg_magazin/wissenschaftliche_karriere/heisenberg/
was_das_programm_auszeichnet/index.html, accessed on 10 August 2018). The Arnold Eucken,
Eugen Hartmann and Masing Prize are all prizes by different engineering associations for young
researchers, e.g. the Masing Prize is awarded by the German Association for Materials Science
and Engineering. All of these prizes are awarded early on in a researcher’s career and we ap-
proximate when she “should have” received a Leibniz Prize based on her age. Hence, we assign a
placebo Leibniz Prize year by adding the average years between the early career prize and age 45.
The time lags are for each prize: Arnold Eucken (11 years), Emmy Noether (10), Eugen Hartmann
(11), Heinz-Maier-Leibnitz (11), Heisenberg Fellowship (9), Masing Prize (11), Max-Planck (10).
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Table A.2: List of Top 3 Journals by Field
Journal Discipline Rank
Plant Cell Agricultural and Biological Sciences 1
Trends in Ecology and Evolution Agricultural and Biological Sciences 2
Current Biology Agricultural and Biological Sciences 3
Science Arts and Humanities 1
Psychological Bulletin Arts and Humanities 2
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences Arts and Humanities 3
Cell Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecu-
lar Biology
1
Journal of the American Chemical Society Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecu-
lar Biology
2
Nature Genetics Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecu-
lar Biology
3
Academy of Management Journal Business, Management and Ac-
counting
1
Journal of Finance Business, Management and Ac-
counting
2
Strategic Management Journal Business, Management and Ac-
counting
3
Journal of the American Chemical Society Chemical Engineering 1
Angewandte Chemie - International Edition Chemical Engineering 2
Nano Letters Chemical Engineering 3
Chemical Reviews Chemistry 1
Journal of the American Chemical Society Chemistry 2
Angewandte Chemie - International Edition Chemistry 3
Bioinformatics Computer Science 1
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelli-
gence
Computer Science 2
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Computer Science 3
European Journal of Operational Research Decision Sciences 1
Management Science Decision Sciences 2
Research Policy Decision Sciences 3
Astrophysical Journal Earth and Planetary Sciences 1
Journal of Geophysical Research Earth and Planetary Sciences 2
Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society Earth and Planetary Sciences 3
Journal of Finance Economics, Econometrics and Fi-
nance
1
American Economic Review Economics, Econometrics and Fi-
nance
2
Quarterly Journal of Economics Economics, Econometrics and Fi-
nance
3
Journal of Power Sources Energy 1
Journal of the Electrochemical Society Energy 2
Bioresource Technology Energy 3
Advanced Materials Engineering 1
Nano Letters Engineering 2
Nature Materials Engineering 3
Environmental Science & Technology Environmental Science 1
Applied and Environmental Microbiology Environmental Science 2
Journal of Geophysical Research Environmental Science 3
Blood Immunology and Microbiology 1
Journal of Experimental Medicine Immunology and Microbiology 2
Nature Biotechnology Immunology and Microbiology 3
Advanced Materials Materials Research 1
Nano Letters Materials Research 2
Nature Materials Materials Research 3
Bioinformatics Mathematics 1
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelli-
gence
Mathematics 2
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Mathematics 3
New England Journal of Medicine Medicine 1
The Lancet Medicine 2
JAMA - Journal of the American Medical Association Medicine 3
Nature Multidisciplinary 1
Science Multidisciplinary 2
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America
Multidisciplinary 3
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Neuron Neuroscience 1
Journal of Neuroscience Neuroscience 2
Nature Neuroscience Neuroscience 3
Diabetes Care Nursing 1
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition Nursing 2
Stroke Nursing 3
Physical Review Letters Physics and Astronomy 1
Nano Letters Physics and Astronomy 2
Applied Physics Letters Physics and Astronomy 3
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Psychology 1
Psychological Bulletin Psychology 2
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Psychology 3
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Social Sciences 1
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory Social Sciences 2
Child Development Social Sciences 3
Note: The ranking is taken from https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php and we use the
ranking for 2006 based on the Scimago Journal Ranking. According to Scimago, it expresses the
average number of weighted citations received in 2006 by the documents in the journal published
in the three preceding years. We exclude some fields where no Leibniz Prize recipients are active
in, namely dentistry, health professions, and veterinary medicine. We then count the publications
in all of these journals for each individual Leibniz Prize recipient. This also circumvents the issue
of mapping Leibniz Prize recipients into narrow fields.
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Figure A.1: Placebo Treatment Exercise: Number of Publications (all types)
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Note: This figure shows the diff-in-diff coefficient of equation (1.1). For each coefficient, the
treatment indicator has been reassigned to the (prize) year on the x-axis and the following three
prize cohorts. For example, for the case of the 1986 coefficient, the “treated” prize recipients
are those who received their prize between 1986 and 1989. All other prize cohorts are then
considered untreated. The coefficient depicted by the red circle is the baseline coefficient for
the actual treatment group of prize recipients from 2007 to 2010. The dependent variable is the
number of publications (all types). 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors
clustered on the year of prize reception. I use the weights of Iacus et al. (2012) to arrive at the
average treatment effect on the treated.
A.2 Appendix to Section 1.4: Further Robustness
In this section, we provide additional evidence for the plausibility of the identi-
fying assumption using a falsification exercise. Furthermore, our results are not
driven by the choice of the length of the pre-period, the estimation method, or in-
dividual prize cohorts. The normalization of publication counts with the number
of authors does not change the results substantively and weighting publications
with forward citations yields results in line with the proposed mechanism. Lastly,
we show that inference is robust to using the wild cluster bootstrap and show in-
dividual treatment effects for all prize recipients.
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Falsification Exercise
Figure A.1 shows the results from a simple falsification exercise. We re-assign
the treatment indicator to each four-year span between 1986 and 2010. Specif-
ically, we first assign treatment to the Leibniz Prize winners from 1986 to 1989
and re-estimate equation (1.1). Next, we assign treatment to the winners between
1987 and 1990 and use all other winners as controls, etc. The diff-in-diff coeffi-
cient of interest for each of these placebo treatments is shown in Figure A.1. The
last coefficient in red is the actual baseline treatment coefficient. Except when
assigning the treatment indicator to the cohorts 2002 to 2005 or 2003 to 2006, all
other coefficients are insignificant and centered around zero. Given that we es-
timate 21 placebo regressions, one significant coefficient would be expected by
chance alone. Since we define overlapping placebo treatments, it is not surpris-
ing that there are two significant placebo coefficients. Reassuringly, the baseline
coefficient is larger in absolute magnitude than all other coefficients.
Additional Robustness
We first assess robustness to extending the pre-period to ten years prior to prize
reception. Figure A.2 depicts time-varying coefficients for the overall number of
publications. Reassuringly, prior to prize reception, all coefficients are clustered
around zero and post prize become significantly negative. Table A.3 presents
results for the same specification and dependent variables as in the main Table
1.2. The only difference is that since the pre-period is extended to ten years before
prize reception, the measure of abstract similarity relative to the early stock of
publications is not defined for this period. The results are quantitatively similar to
the baseline results and tend to be larger in magnitude (especially for the top field
publications). The publication counts of all types, top ranked multidisciplinary
and top field journals are statistically significant. Hence, extending the pre-period
does not alter our results.
All publication count variables are by definition count variables. Especially for
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Figure A.2: Time-Varying Treatment Effect on the Number of Publications
(Longer Pre-Period)
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Note: This figure shows the yearly average treatment effects on the treated of receiving the
Leibniz Prize in 2007 or later on the average number of publications (all types) per year relative
to the average number of publications of researchers who received the Leibniz Prize in 2006 or
prior. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered on the year of prize
reception. I use the weights of Iacus et al. (2012) to arrive at the average treatment effect on the
treated.
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the top multidisciplinary journals, many observations have zeros as publishing in
these prestigious journals is fairly rare, even for accomplished researchers such
as Leibniz Prize winners. Hence, it may be more appropriate to use count data
estimation methods such as a poisson regression or negative binomial regression.
We re-estimate our main specification for all count variables using both of these
methods in Table A.4. In both cases, the coefficient for the number of all publica-
tions and top field publications is statistically significant. In terms of magnitude,
the poisson regression estimate implies a reduction of 24 percent relative to the
mean number of publications (all types) and the negative binomial regression a
reduction of 14 percent. This is smaller than the OLS estimate of 53 percent, but
qualitatively similar. The increase in the number of publications in top ranked
journals is of similar magnitude as the OLS results, underlining that the results
do not depend on the estimation method.
Next, we investigate how our results change if we weight publication counts by
the number of authors or forward citations. Using forward citations is difficult in
our context since the publications of the treatment group have had little time to
accrue citations. We focus on forward citations in a three year window following
the publication. We drop the last years of the treatment group (relative years 5
to 7 for the 2010 cohort, years 6 and 7 for the 2009 cohort and year 7 for the 2008
cohort) as the publications in these years have not yet had three years to accrue
citations.
Normalizing publication counts with the square root of the number of authors
in columns (1) to (4) of Table A.5 yields results that are qualitatively and quan-
titatively similar to our baseline results. In column (1), the coefficient implies a
reduction of 2.49 publications per author, or 43 percent relative to the mean. For
top multidisciplinary journals there is a significant increase of 44 percent relative
to the mean. In contrast to the raw counts, the coefficient for top field publica-
tions is not significant when normalized with the number of authors (p-value =
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0.23). In turn, though, the coefficient on potential high impact publications is
statistically significant on the 10 percent level.
Columns (5) to (8) focus on the same publication counts, but these are now
weighted with the number of citations received in the three years following publi-
cation. There is no significant decrease in the overall number of citation-weighted
publications and positive point estimates for publications in top multidisciplinary
journals (not significant), top field journals (significant on 1 percent level) and po-
tential high impact publications (almost significant, p-value = 0.10). The fact that
there is no significant decrease in the overall number of publications when we
weight these with their follow-on citations is in line with the proposed mecha-
nism of Leibniz Prize recipients focusing on fewer high quality publications in
response to the reform of 2007. However, given that the last prize cohorts have
not had enough time to accrue forward citations we drop the last years from the
analysis. Figure 1.2 shows that the reduction in the number of publications gets
stronger over time, so we are dropping the years with the largest reduction in the
number of publications. Hence, we do not want to over-interpret the finding of
no reduction in the overall number of citation-weighted publications.
Last, we investigate whether the results are driven by a specific prize cohort.
To this end, each prize cohort is dropped in turn and the main regression re-
estimated in a leave-one-out fashion. The weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2012)
are re-calculated in every iteration. Figures A.3 and A.4 show the results of this
exercise. Each of the eight panels shows the estimated coefficient for the Post
2007 × Post Prize interaction and accompanying 90 percent confidence intervals
for each of the eight dependent variables. As comparison, the red line in each
figure shows the baseline coefficient for the full sample. Although there is some
movement in the coefficients, by and large the confidence intervals overlap and
the coefficients are close to each other and the baseline estimate, indicating that
individual cohorts do not drive the results.
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T
he
estim
ation
equation
is
as
in
equation
(1.1).
The
dependent
variable
in
colum
n
(1)
is
the
count
of
alltypes
of
publication
per
year.
In
colum
n
(2)
only
publications
in
top
general
interest
journals
(Science,N
ature,PN
A
S,N
ature
C
om
m
unications)
are
counted.
C
olum
n
(3)
uses
publications
in
field
specific
top
3
journals
(See
Table
A
.2
for
the
fulllistof
journals).In
colum
n
(4),the
dependentvariable
is
the
textsim
ilarity
of
abstracts
to
each
other
w
ithin
a
given
year.
In
colum
n
(5),text
sim
ilarity
is
calculated
relative
to
the
early
stock
of
publications
of
an
author.
N
ote
that
the
num
ber
of
observations
drops
as
not
every
researcher
publishes
in
every
year.
In
colum
ns
(6)
and
(7),novelty
and
conventionality
are
defined
as
in
Lee
et
al.(2015).
Lastly,in
colum
n
(8),the
dependent
variable
is
the
count
of
publications
w
ith
potentialhigh
im
pact,i.e.
having
high
conventionality
and
novelty.
In
all
regressions,w
e
use
the
w
eights
suggested
by
Iacus
et
al.(2012)
to
identify
the
average
treatm
ent
effect
on
the
treated.
P-values
in
parentheses
are
clustered
on
the
level
of
the
year
of
the
prize
and
are
calculated
using
the
unrestricted
(restricted)
w
ild
cluster
bootstrap
in
Panel
A
(PanelB)
as
proposed
by
C
am
eron
et
al.(2008)
w
ith
1000
repetitions. ∗, ∗∗
and
∗∗∗
denote
significance
on
the
10
percent,5
percent
and
1
percent
level,
respectively.
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Table A.7: Robustness of Inference II: Triple Difference Comparison Relative to
Early Career Prize Winners (Wild Cluster Bootstrap)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Top Multi. Top Field Abstract Abstract Nov. Conv. High Imp.
Pubs Pubs Pubs Simil. I Simil. II Pubs
Panel A: Unrestricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize −0.88∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 −0.00 0.03∗ −0.06 0.05 −0.02
(0.02) (0.76) (0.82) (0.65) (0.05) (0.61) (0.35) (0.43)
Post Prize × 1.68∗∗∗ 0.00 0.06 0.01 −0.04∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.01 0.02
Post 2007 (0.00) (0.70) (0.36) (0.12) (0.00) (0.50) (0.94) (0.35)
Post Prize × 3.84∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.00 0.21∗ −0.09 0.04
Leibniz (0.01) (0.81) (0.00) (0.17) (0.40) (0.08) (0.21) (0.14)
Post Prize × Leib- −4.66∗∗ 0.06 0.11 −0.05∗ −0.00 −0.23 0.10 0.02
niz × Post 2007 (0.02) (0.14) (0.49) (0.10) (0.80) (0.31) (0.41) (0.75)
Constant −1.12∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.04∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ −1.52∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.06) (0.00) (0.20) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Panel B: Restricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize −0.88∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 −0.00 0.03∗∗ −0.06 0.05 −0.02
(0.00) (0.81) (0.81) (0.63) (0.01) (0.50) (0.30) (0.26)
Post Prize × 1.68∗∗∗ 0.00 0.06 0.01 −0.04∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.01 0.02
Post 2007 (0.00) (0.71) (0.33) (0.14) (0.00) (0.45) (0.94) (0.19)
Post Prize × 3.84∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.00 0.21∗∗ −0.09 0.04∗
Leibniz (0.00) (0.83) (0.01) (0.17) (0.43) (0.03) (0.18) (0.08)
Post Prize × Leib- −4.66∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.11 −0.05∗ −0.00 −0.23 0.10 0.02
niz × Post 2007 (0.00) (0.08) (0.36) (0.08) (0.76) (0.20) (0.36) (0.68)
Constant −1.12∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.04∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ −1.52∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.03) (0.00) (0.15) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Mean Dep. 8.50 0.06 0.23 0.22 0.13 2.20 −0.90 0.03
Observations 7345 7345 7345 5620 5794 6222 6222 7345
Note: This table shows the results from a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation with five years before receiving
the Leibniz Prize as pre-period and seven years after as post-period. Additional differences are between Leibniz Prize
recipients and early career prize winners and between prize cohorts before and after 2007. The year of prize reception for
Early Career Prize Winners is assigned by the average difference between receiving an early career prize and receiving
the Leibniz Prize. The treatment indicator, Leibniz Prize indicator, and post 2007 prize reception indicator are all taken
up by the individual scientist fixed effects. The estimation equation is given in equation (1.2). The dependent variable
in column (1) is the count of all types of publication per year. In column (2) only publications in top general interest
journals (Science, Nature, PNAS, Nature Communications) are counted. Column (3) uses publications in field specific top
3 journals (See Table A.2 for the full list of journals). In column (4), the dependent variable is the text similarity of abstracts
to each other within a given year. In column (5), text similarity is calculated relative to the early stock of publications
of an author. Note that the number of observations drops as not every researcher publishes in every year. In columns
(6) and (7), novelty and conventionality are defined as in Lee et al. (2015). Lastly, in column (8), the dependent variable
is the count of publications with potential high impact, i.e. having high conventionality and novelty. In all regressions,
we use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2012) to identify the average treatment effect on the treated. P-values in
parentheses are clustered on the level of the year of the prize and are calculated using the unrestricted (restricted) wild
cluster bootstrap in Panel A (Panel B) as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) with 1000 repetitions. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote
significance on the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table A.8: Robustness of Inference III: Funding Amount and Funding Duration
(Wild Cluster Bootstrap)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Top Multi. Top Field Abstract Abstract Nov. Conv. High Imp.
Pubs Pubs Pubs Simil. I Simil. II Pubs
Panel A: 2000 to 2006 Prize Cohorts vs. 1986 to 1992 Prize Cohorts – Varying Funding Amount
Unrestricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize 0.57 0.01 −0.14 −0.03 −0.00 0.06 0.03 −0.01
(0.61) (0.85) (0.47) (0.38) (0.56) (0.49) (0.50) (0.79)
Post Prize × −0.40 −0.05 0.13 0.06∗ 0.00 0.01 −0.10 −0.01
Pre 1992 (0.78) (0.48) (0.59) (0.06) (0.73) (0.89) (0.29) (0.85)
Restricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize 0.57 0.01 −0.14 −0.03∗ −0.00 0.06 0.03∗ −0.01
(0.45) (0.20) (0.26) (0.07) (0.45) (0.53) (0.09) (0.97)
Post Prize × −0.40 −0.05 0.13 0.06∗ 0.00 0.01 −0.10 −0.01
Pre 1992 (0.76) (0.44) (0.61) (0.08) (0.74) (0.90) (0.29) (0.84)
Mean Dep. 10.77 0.16 0.55 0.27 0.13 1.81 −0.65 0.06
Observations 1911 1911 1911 1554 1349 1684 1684 1911
Panel B: 1986 to 1992 Prize Cohorts vs. 2007 to 2010 Prize Cohorts – Varying Funding Duration
Unrestricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize 0.38 −0.05 0.04 0.02 −0.01 0.06 −0.10 −0.03
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.42) (0.16) (0.46) (0.43) (1.00)
Post Prize × 0.14 0.08 −0.10 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01 0.14 0.16
Post 2007 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.84) (0.95) (0.98) (0.40) (1.00)
Restricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize 0.38 −0.05 0.04 0.02 −0.01 0.06 −0.10 −0.03
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.40) (0.17) (0.44) (0.21) (1.00)
Post Prize × 0.14 0.08 −0.10 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01 0.14 0.16
Post 2007 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.83) (0.95) (0.98) (0.46) (1.00)
Mean Dep. 10.92 0.18 0.58 0.28 0.14 1.83 −0.70 0.05
Observations 1482 1482 1482 1165 946 1268 1268 1482
Panel C: 2000 to 2006 Prize Cohorts vs. 2007 to 2010 Prize Cohorts – Varying Funding Amount and Duration
Unrestricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize 2.64∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.22 0.01 0.01 0.14 −0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.67) (0.30) (0.55) (0.62) (0.10) (0.59) (0.65)
Post Prize × −4.83∗∗∗ 0.05 0.38∗ −0.04 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.11 0.10 0.12
Post 2007 (0.00) (0.27) (0.08) (0.41) (0.00) (0.38) (0.35) (0.31)
Restricted Wild Cluster Bootstrap
Post Prize 2.64∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.22∗ 0.01 0.01 0.14∗∗ −0.02 0.02
(0.00) (1.00) (0.06) (0.15) (0.62) (0.04) (0.16) (1.00)
Post Prize × −4.83∗∗ 0.05 0.38 −0.04 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.11 0.10 0.12
Post 2007 (0.03) (0.36) (0.13) (0.41) (0.00) (0.37) (0.37) (0.23)
Mean Dep. 12.86 0.18 0.64 0.30 2.09 −0.77 0.08
Observations 1339 1339 1339 1223 1227 1286 1286 1339
Note: This table shows the results from a difference-in-differences estimation with five years before receiving the Leibniz
Prize as pre-period and seven years after as post-period. The estimation equation is as in equation (1.1). The dependent
variable in column (1) is the count of all types of publication per year. In column (2) only publications in top general
interest journals (Science, Nature, PNAS, Nature Communications) are counted. Column (3) uses publications in field
specific top 3 journals (See Table A.2 for the full list of journals). In column (4), the dependent variable is the text
similarity of abstracts to each other within a given year. In column (5), text similarity is calculated relative to the early
stock of publications of an author. Note that the number of observations drops as not every researcher publishes in every
year. In columns (6) and (7), novelty and conventionality are defined as in Lee et al. (2015). Lastly, in column (8), the
dependent variable is the count of publications with potential high impact, i.e. having high conventionality and novelty.
In Panel A, we re-assign treatment to the prize recipients from 1986 to 1992 and use the recipients from 2000 to 2006 as
control group. In Panel B we use the prize recipients from 1986 to 1992 as control group, whereas in Panel C we use only
the cohorts from 2000 to 2006 as control group (the treatment group remains the same). In all regressions, we use the
weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2012) to identify the average treatment effect on the treated. P-values in parentheses are
clustered on the level of the year of the prize and are calculated using the unrestricted (restricted) wild cluster bootstrap
as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) with 1000 repetitions. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Figure A.3: Leave-One-Out: Dropping Prize Cohorts I
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Note: This figure shows the average treatment effect on the treated of receiving the Leibniz
Prize in 2007 or later, dropping each prize cohort one by one. In each iteration, we re-calculate
the weights of Iacus et al. (2012) to arrive at the average treatment effect on the treated. The
dependent variable in Panel (a) is the count of all types of publication per year. In Panel (b) only
publications in top general interest journals (Science, Nature, PNAS, Nature Communications) are
counted. Panel (c) uses publications in field specific top 3 journals. In Panel (d), the dependent
variable is the text similarity of abstracts to each other within a given year. 90 percent confidence
intervals are based on standard errors clustered on the year of prize reception.
Adjusting for Small Number of Clusters
One potential issue in our setting could be the fairly small number of clusters
for the calculation of the standard errors. In the main specification we have 25
clusters (prize years), well below the cutoff of 42 recommended by Angrist and
Pischke (2008). This issue is exacerbated in the triple diff analysis and in the
mechanism analysis, as the number of prize years drops to as low as 11. To
mitigate any concerns regarding a small cluster bias, we use the wild cluster
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Figure A.4: Leave-One-Out: Dropping Prize Cohorts II
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Note: This figure shows the average treatment effect on the treated of receiving the Leibniz
Prize in 2007 or later, dropping each prize cohort one by one. In each iteration, we re-calculate
the weights of Iacus et al. (2012) to arrive at the average treatment effect on the treated. The
dependent variable in Panel (a) is the text similarity of abstracts relative to the early stock of
publications of an author. Panels (b) and (c) use novelty and conventionality as defined by Lee
et al. (2015) as a dependent variable, respectively. Lastly, in Panel (d), the dependent variable
is the count of publications with potential high impact, i.e. having high conventionality and
novelty. 90 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered on the year of
prize reception.
bootstrap method proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) to deal with exactly this
issue. We re-run our analyses using both the restricted and unrestricted wild
cluster bootstrap in Tables A.6 to A.8. Below each coefficient we show the associ-
ated p-value in parentheses. In Table A.6 we repeat the baseline analysis of Table
1.2. Only the coefficient on the publications in top field journals loses significance
(p-value of 0.23 to 0.28), compared to the baseline results. In addition, the results
are close to each other using both the restricted and the unrestricted wild cluster
136
Appendix to Chapter 1
bootstrap. This mitigates concerns voiced by MacKinnon and Webb (2017) that
the wild cluster bootstrap may be inappropriate with very different cluster sizes
or few treated clusters. The former is not an issue here, but the latter may be of
more concern a priori. However, MacKinnon and Webb (2017, p.14) conclude that
agreement between WCR [restricted wild cluster bootstrap] and WCU [unrestricted wild
cluster bootstrap] seems to rule out really severe errors of inference, which is the case
here.2 Similarly, in Tables A.7 and A.8, inference in the triple-differences exercise
and the differentiation by the increase in real resources is also unchanged. The
only differences are the following: In the triple-differences exercise, for publica-
tions in top multidisciplinary journals, the coefficient turns significant on the 10
percent level using the restricted wild cluster bootstrap. For publications in top
field journals, the coefficient loses significance (p-value = 0.13) in the differentia-
tion according to an increase in real funding amount and period when using the
restricted wild cluster bootstrap. Overall, however, there is little evidence for a
bias in our standard errors due to the comparably small number of clusters.
Additional Heterogeneity Analysis
To show the heterogeneity of the estimated treatment effect across individual
prize recipients, we estimate individual treatment effects for each post 2007 Leib-
niz Prize recipient. This is done in two ways: first, a simple mean comparison
is undertaken for each treated prize recipient relative to the control prize win-
ners in the same field by university/research institute stratum. For example, in
the smallest stratum (social sciences by research institute), Ulman Lindenberger
would be compared to Wolfgang Klein and Wolfgang Prinz, before and after re-
ceiving the Leibniz Prize. Second, we interact the treatment dummy with each
prize recipient. Figures A.5 to A.8 show the results of this exercise. The blue cir-
cles denote positive coefficients and the red diamonds negative ones. For brevity,
2In addition, in unreported regressions we use randomization based inference as proposed by
MacKinnon and Webb (2018) and find that results tend to be more significant using this approach.
The results are available from the author upon request.
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we focus on the results for all publications and publications in top ranked jour-
nals, as these are significant in the main specification. 78 percent (86 percent) of
the estimated treatment effects on the overall number of publications are nega-
tive if we do the simple mean comparison (the interaction analysis). Similarly, a
majority of coefficients is positive for the number of publications in top ranked
multidisciplinary and field specific journals (the proportion ranges from 56 per-
cent to 78 percent). There is a sizable tail of individuals with very large treatment
effects, but it is re-assuring that the majority of treatment effects are in line with
the estimated baseline effect.
A.3 Appendix to Section 1.6: Grant Applications
We provide additional suggestive evidence that the increase in truly legendary free-
dom of the Leibniz Prize reform allows scientists to spend less time on activities
that positively affect their research budget. We focus on other, non Leibniz-Prize
grants at the DFG and show that they decline for both groups and appear to do
so more strongly for the treatment prize cohorts.
The DFG is the main source of research funding in Germany, spending around
e 3 billion in 2017.3 We scrape information on traditional individual research
grants (Sachbeihilfen) from the DFG’s GEPRIS database. It contains information
on all grants of the DFG since the early 2000s.4 We focus on individual research
grants as they are quantitatively important (accounting for one third of the DFG’s
budget) and it is at the sole discretion of the individual researcher whether or not
to apply for a grant.5 The data encompasses the title of the project, the applicant’s
3http://www.dfg.de/dfg_profil/zahlen_fakten/statistik/programmbezogene_
statistiken/index.html, last accessed on 08 August 2018.
4The data can be found at http://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/OCTOPUS, last accessed on 07 Au-
gust 2018.
5The other main funding lines of the DFG are larger scale joint efforts such as collaborative re-
search centers, excellence clusters, or graduate schools. These programs usually require multiple
professors to apply and may span multiple institutions.
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Figure A.5: Individual Treatment Effects – Means I
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Note: This figure shows the estimated treatment effects for each post 2007 Leibniz Prize recipient.
The treatment effect is estimated via a regression for each treatment recipient, using all control
recipients in the same university/research institute by field stratum. The dependent variable in
Panel (a) is the count of all types of publication per year. In Panel (b) only publications in top
general interest journals (Science, Nature, PNAS, Nature Communications) are counted. Panel
(c) uses publications in field specific top 3 journals. In Panel (d), the dependent variable is the
text similarity of abstracts to each other within a given year. Hollow diamonds depict negative
coefficients, hollow circles positive ones.
name, and the duration of the project. Unfortunately, we do not observe the
grant amounts nor grant applications and hence focus only on successful grant
applications.6
We scrape all available grants (around 60,000) and merge them to the Leibniz
Prize recipients via their names. Due to the limited coverage of the data on
6This is not an issue as long as the success probability is the same across the two groups of
Leibniz Prize winners. There is no indication that this would not be the case, as any “Matthew
effect” where Leibniz Prize recipients find it easier (or harder) to receive a grant should affect
both groups in the same fashion.
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Figure A.6: Individual Treatment Effects – Means II
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Note: This figure shows the estimated treatment effects for each post 2007 Leibniz Prize recipient.
The treatment effect is estimated via a regression for each treatment recipient, using all control
recipients in the same university/research institute by field stratum. The dependent variable in
Panel (a) is the text similarity of abstracts relative to the early stock of publications of an author.
Panels (b) and (c) use novelty and conventionality as defined by Lee et al. (2015) as a dependent
variable, respectively. Lastly, in Panel (d), the dependent variable is the count of publications
with potential high impact, i.e. having high conventionality and novelty. Hollow diamonds
depict negative coefficients, hollow circles positive ones.
the post 2000 period, we can only study the prize cohorts from 2004 to 2010 to
observe some years prior to prize reception. Figure A.11 shows the three year
moving average of the number of grants for the two groups of Leibniz Prize
winners from four years prior to the prize to seven years after. One can see that
around two years after prize reception, the number of grants in both groups drops
and continues to decline for the post 2007 group. However, for the 2004 to 2006
prize cohorts, the number picks up again five years after receiving the prize, right
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Figure A.7: Individual Treatment Effects – Interactions I
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Note: This figure shows the estimated treatment effects for each post 2007 Leibniz Prize recipient.
The treatment effect is estimated by including an interaction for each post 2007 Leibniz Prize
recipient. The dependent variable in Panel (a) is the count of all types of publication per year.
In Panel (b) only publications in top general interest journals (Science, Nature, PNAS, Nature
Communications) are counted. Panel (c) uses publications in field specific top 3 journals. In
Panel (d), the dependent variable is the text similarity of abstracts to each other within a given
year. Hollow diamonds depict negative coefficients, hollow circles positive ones.
around the time when the Leibniz funding ends for this group. This suggests that
the prize recipients do substitute regular grants with the Leibniz funding and that
this effect is stronger for the group with a larger funding amount.7
7The (unreported) regression coefficient implies a reduction of 15% relative to the mean, but
this is not statistically significant.
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Figure A.8: Individual Treatment Effects – Interactions II
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Note: This figure shows the estimated treatment effects for each post 2007 Leibniz Prize recipient.
The treatment effect is estimated by including an interaction for each post 2007 Leibniz Prize
recipient. The dependent variable in Panel (a) is the text similarity of abstracts relative to the early
stock of publications of an author. Panels (b) and (c) use novelty and conventionality as defined
by Lee et al. (2015) as a dependent variable, respectively. Lastly, in Panel (d), the dependent
variable is the count of publications with potential high impact, i.e. having high conventionality
and novelty. Hollow diamonds depict negative coefficients, hollow circles positive ones.
142
Appendix to Chapter 1
Figure A.9: Effect on Scientific Productivity (Non-Parametric Evidence, not aver-
aged)
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(b) No. of Hit Publications
Note: Mean number of publications (all types in Panel (a), hit publications in Panel (b)) per year,
relative to year of Leibniz Prize reception. Means within groups are calculated using the weights
of Iacus et al. (2012). Values are normalized with respect to relative year -1.
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Figure A.10: Number of Publications (all types): Leibniz Prize Winners vs. Early
Career Prize Winners
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(b) After Matching
Note: Five year moving average number of publications (all types) per year, relative to year of
(assigned) Leibniz Prize reception. Panel (a) shows the means without prior coarsened exact
matching on scientific field and number of publications prior to Prize reception. Panel (b) shows
the means after matching. Only prize winners from 2000 to 2010 are used due to data availability.
Prior to matching, 565 (early career and Leibniz Prize) winners are used, after matching 224 are
retained. Means within groups are calculated using the weights of Iacus et al. (2012). Values are
normalized with respect to relative year -1. Data for relative years 6 and 7 is not averaged.
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Figure A.11: Effect of the Leibniz Prize Reform on the Number of Other Grants
(Non-Parametric Evidence)
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Note: Three-year moving average of the number of grants per researcher for the Leibniz Prize
winners from 2004 to 2006, relative to the year before prize reception. Only traditional individual
research grants (Sachbeihilfen) are counted. The data on grants is taken from the DFG’s GEPRIS
online database. I use the weights of Iacus et al. (2012) to arrive at the average treatment effect on
the treated. Relative years -4 and 7 are not averaged.
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B.1 Appendix to Section 2.3: Defining Product Entry
and Exit
Product entry is defined as the producing of a product code that a company did
not produce in the previous year. Analogously, product exit is when a company
does not produce a product anymore that it produced in the previous year. Our
production data on the 9-digit level is originally on the plant level, which we
aggregate to the firm level using the firm identifiers in our data. The German
product classification is based on the European Prodcom classification. Although
the German classification does not change each year as the Prodcom data does,
there is one large change in the classification during our period of study. In 2009,
the new classification system GP 2009 replaced the old system GP 2002. This is
an issue for our measurement of product entry and exit, as they would be grossly
inflated if we did not adjust for the change in classification.
The change in the classification comes in two forms. Simple changes are when a
single code from the GP 2002 matches into a single code from the GP 2009. Com-
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plex changes are when one or more codes from the old classification are mapped
into one or more codes from the new classification. One approach in the liter-
ature to generate a concordance between two classifications has been developed
by Van Beveren et al. (2012). They map all codes into synthetic codes and then
analyze product entry and exit using these time-consistent synthetic codes. This
is especially advantageous when the unit of observation is the product code itself.
Since we are interested when a specific firm introduces a new product or drops
an old one, we develop a different procedure. The key advantage is that it does
not rely on synthetic codes. Synthetic codes can get quite large and encompass
many original product codes. This makes it difficult to interpret these codes still
as narrowly defined products if they span groups of multiple products.
We exploit the fact that we study a balanced panel and observe firms both before
and after the change in the product classification. Hence, in the year of the
classification change, a product code not produced by the firm in the previous
year is only counted as a product entry if none of the following applies:
1. There is a one-to-one mapping between the old and new classification. The
company produces the old code in the previous year and the new code after
the classification change.
2. There is a mapping of many old codes to one new code. The company
produces the new code after the classification change and one of the old
codes.
3. There is a mapping of one old code to many new codes. The company
produces the old code in the previous year and one of the new codes in the
year after the classification change.
4. There is a mapping of multiple old codes to multiple new codes. The com-
pany produces one of the old codes in the previous year and one of the new
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codes in the year after the classification change.
The same procedure is applied to define product dropping, except now the com-
pany has to cease production of the code. We thus get a measure of product
adding and dropping on the firm level.
B.2 Appendix to Section 2.4: Summary Statistics
In Table B.1 we present some summary statistics for the firms in our sample
for the first and last year of study. Given that our control firms have higher
employment, they unsurprisingly also have higher R&D expenditures of around
e 6.7m and sales of e 382m. They are somewhat less likely to be in East Germany,
mirroring our results in Figure 2.1. Reassuringly, the propensity to have positive
R&D expenditures is very similar across the two groups, with around 70 percent
of firms engaging in R&D. We do not present results on industry affiliation, as
our CEM procedure ensures balancing on this dimension.
Table B.1: Summary Statistics
Control firms Treatment Firms
2007 2011 2007 2011
R&D spending 6696.16 6485.11 3211.71 3438.63
R&D employees 63.04 61.81 28.19 30.13
R&D indicator 0.70 0.72 0.68 0.70
Sales 382.16 382.94 211.50 217.62
Add product 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01
Drop product 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
East Germany 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
Number of firms 225 764
Note: Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States,
AFiD Panel Industrieunternehmen [2008-2011], own calculations.
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C.1 Appendix to Section 3.2: Data
C.1.1 Data Sources and Definitions
Table C.1: Data Sources and Definitions
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variables
Employment rate Employees subject to social security contri-
butions in the county of residence normal-
ized by the working-age population.
Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagentur
für Arbeit)
Employment p.c.
in high-exposure
sectors
Employees subject to social security con-
tributions in the county of residence
in photovoltaic-related industries (industry
codes 31, 321, 332, 401, 453, 454, 518, 519,
524, 731, 742, 743) of the German Classifi-
cation of Economic Activity, Version 2003,
normalized by the working-age popula-
tion. From 2008 onwards, the original data
is classified following the revised German
Classification of Economic Activity, Version
2008. The set of industry codes is the union
of industry codes of a random sample of
Employment data at
the three-digit indus-
try level purchased
from the Federal
Employment Agency.
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Variable Description Source
firms that are members of the German Solar
Association (Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft)
We cross-walk the data from the industry
classification in 2008 into the industry clas-
sification of 2003 following the official cor-
respondence table.
Employment p.c.
in local services
Employees subject to social security contri-
butions in the county of residence in local,
non-tradable industries (wholesale and re-
tail–industry codes G except 518, 519, 524;
hospitality–industry code H; and financial
services–industry codes 651, 652) of the
German Classification of Economic Activity,
Version 2003, normalized by the working-
age population. The data from 2008 on-
wards follows a revised industry classifica-
tion. Converted into the industry classifica-
tion as of 2003 as described above.
Employment data at
the three-digit industry
level purchased from
the Federal Employ-
ment Agency.
Employment p.c.
in other sectors
Employees subject to social security contri-
butions in the county of residence in all the
industries not included in “high-exposure
sector,” “local services,” and except social
services (industry code 853), normalized by
the working-age population. The data from
2008 onwards follows a revised industry
classification. Converted into the industry
classification as of 2003 as described above.
Employment data at
the three-digit industry
level purchased from
the Federal Employ-
ment Agency.
Working-age popu-
lation
The population of working age (between
15 and 65 years of age) in 2003. In our
analysis, most variables are normalized by
the working-age population (indicated by
“p.c.” in the variable name).
German Statistical Of-
fice, population statis-
tics (code 173-21-4)
Median wage in
construction
The monthly gross median wage in con-
struction, averaged over employees and
year. The data is only accessible for county-
years in which construction employment
exceeded 1000.
Wage data purchased
from the Federal Em-
ployment Agency.
Photovoltaic Investments, Instruments, and Classification of Tight / Slack Labor Markets
Photovoltaic instal-
lations (in MWp)
Capacity and location of each PV system
in Germany measured in MWp and day of
connection to the energy grid. We aggregate
capacity from the project lists using county
and municipality identifiers.
Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Sonnenenergie;
project lists here: http:
//www.energymap.info.
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Variable Description Source
Rooftop potential Estimates of rooftop space based on the
aerial maps of 4500 dwellings; see Ap-
pendix C.1.2 for details.
Lödl et al. (2010)
Solar radiation Yearly average global irradiance on the op-
timally inclined surface.
PVGIS project of the Eu-
ropean Union
Feed-in tariff Guaranteed price per kWh of produced
electricity for installations with an output
capacity of less than 30 kWp.
Renewable Energy Act
Costs of solar in-
stallation
Industry survey on total installation costs
per kWp.
Janzing (2010); Bun-
desverband Solar-
wirtschaft e.V. (2012,
2014)
Interest rate Average interest rate on mortgage loan
(prior to 2003), effective interest rates of
commercial banks for housing loans.
Bundesbank (series
BBK01.SU0010 and
BBK01.SUS131)
Ownership struc-
ture
Buildings by type of ownership: multiple
ownership, private person, housing coop-
erative, region or state, municipal housing
companies, private housing company, other
private companies and non-profits.
Housing questionnaire
of the Census 2011
Unemployment
rate
Individuals receiving unemployment bene-
fits in the county of residence normalized
by the working-age population. At the
state and national level, we compute the
unemployment rate as the sum of unem-
ployed individuals divided by the sum of
the working-age population.
Federal Employment
Agency
Control Variables
County type Counties comprise either of a single munic-
ipality (so-called city counties or Kreisfreie
Städte) or multiple municipalities (so-called
rural counties or Landkreise).
Federal Office for
Building and Regional
Planning (Bundesamt
für Bauwesen und
Raumordnung)
Population growth The ratio of the working-age population in
any given year and the working-age popu-
lation in 2003.
German Statistical Of-
fice, population statis-
tics (code 173-21-4)
Construction Number of residential and non-residential
buildings completed in a given year.
German Statistical Of-
fice, construction statis-
tics of completed build-
ings (code 311-21)
Total area, settle-
ment and dwelling
area
The total area of a county in km2 as of 2008.
Includes data on the usage of data for set-
tlement, dwellings and in eleven other cate-
gories.
German Statistical Of-
fice, area statistics (code
331-11)
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Variable Description Source
Square meters (liv-
ing area)
Floor space in residential buildings. Data is
measured on 31.12.2008.
German Statistical Of-
fice, housing statistics
(code 035-21-5)
Apartments/
building
Number of apartments per residential
building. Raw data gives number of build-
ings with 1, 2 or more apartments. For the
last category an average of six apartments
per building is assumed. Data is measured
on 31.12.2008.
German Statistical Of-
fice, housing statistics
(code 035-21-5)
Population / pop-
ulation density
Total population, measured on 31.12.2008.
Population density is population per area
in km2.
German Statistical Of-
fice, population statis-
tics (code 173-01-5)
Education shares Employment Shares by Education. The ra-
tio of employees with a university degree to
the total number of employees and the ratio
of employees with vocational training to the
total number of employees as of Q2 2003.
The baseline is the share of employees with
less education than vocational training.
Federal Employment
Agency
Industry shares A vector of three variables, all as of Q2 2003:
the share of employees in agriculture (in-
dustry codes 01–03), the share of employees
in manufacturing (industry codes 05–39),
and the share of employees in construction
(industry codes 41–43). The omitted cate-
gory is the share of employees in services
(industry codes 45–95).
Employment data at
the three-digit industry
level purchased from
the Federal Employ-
ment Agency
School & univer-
sity students p.c.
The official statistics provide the numbers
of school students for ten different school
types. We use the sum across all school
types.
Both the number of school students and
the number of university students are mea-
sured in 2003 and normalized by the
working-age population.
German Statistical
Office, school statistics
(code 192-32-4)
University statistics of
the German Rectors’
Conference (Hochschul-
rektorenkonferenz)
Solar panel manu-
facturer
Locations of the establishments of German
solar panel and components manufacturers.
EEM Energy & Environ-
ment Media GmbH
Redistricting
The administrative boundaries of counties changed in three East German states
(Saxony-Anhalt in 2007, Saxony in 2008, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania in 2011)
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during the sample period. These reforms took place in response to declining ru-
ral population in East Germany and mainly merged several former counties into
a single one in order to save administrative costs. We recalculate all the variables
from before the administrative reforms to the level of the county boundaries after
the reform. All but three former counties are completely merged into new coun-
ties, so that the aggregation of these data is straightforward. For the three coun-
ties, whose municipalities are assigned to two or three new counties (Demmin,
county code 13052, in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, and Zerbst/Anhalt, county
code 15151, as well as Aschersleben-Staßfurt, county code 15352 in Saxony-Anhalt),
we disaggregate each statistic based on the relative population shares before the
county merger. That is, if the old county A is split to merge into the new counties
B and C and if 2/3 of the pre-reform population of county A will be assigned
to county B (leaving 1/3 for county C), we construct (virtual) counties B and C
before the reform by assigning 2/3 of the value of each statistic (e.g., employment
in manufacturing) from county A to the (virtual) county B and 1/3 of the value
of each statistic to the (virtual) county C.
C.1.2 Estimation of Rooftop Potential
Following the approach of Lödl et al. (2010) we estimate the rooftop potential for
each county in Germany with the following three steps:
1. We classify each German municipality according to the five criteria in Table
C.2 into four types: very rural, rural, suburban or urban.
2. In a next step, we multiply the settlement area of each municipality with
the estimated rooftop potential per km2 of settlement area by municipality
type. Lödl et al. (2010) calculate the average rooftop potential for each
municipality type shown in Table C.2 based on aerial maps of Bavaria and
assumptions on roof angles and exposition.
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Table C.2: Estimating Rooftop Potential Following Lödl et al. (2010)
Category Very Rural Rural Suburban Urban
Thresholds for Classification
Population ≤ 2000 ≤ 5000 ≤ 20000 > 20000
Population density (per km2) ≤ 100 ≤ 200 ≤ 300 > 300
Settlement area (in km2) ≤ 0.4 ≤ 0.8 ≤ 1.5 > 1.5
Living area p.c. (in m2) > 48 > 45 > 42 ≤ 42
Number of apartments ≤ 1.4 ≤ 1.6 ≤ 1.8 > 1.8
Rooftop Potential Estimates from Lödl et al. (2010)
Settlement area per dwelling (in
m2)
3734 1793 795 795
Rooftop potential per dwelling
(in kWp)
25.8 13.9 5.7 0.25× 5.7
Number of Municipalities
N 4413 3997 1854 946
3. In a last step, we aggregate the estimates of rooftop potential of all munici-
palities to the county level.
C.2 Appendix to Section 3.3: Empirical Strategy
C.2.1 Persistence
In this section, we follow the approach by Shoag (2015) to provide suggestive
evidence that PV installations affect employment predominantly in the same year
they are installed, without significant long-lasting effects. To this end, we sum
the variables on both sides of equation (3.1) over a number of adjacent years and
estimate the effect of the sum of PV installations on the sum of employment for
the relevant time period. More precisely, we estimate models of the following
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Figure C.1: Persistence of Employment Effects
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Note: This figure plots the coefficients of the sum of PV installations across adjacent years esti-
mated via model (C.1) along with their 95 percent confidence interval. The coefficient for the sum
across t and t + 1 is obtained by regressing the sum of employment p.c. across t and t + 1 on the
sum of installed capacity p.c. across t and t + 1 (along with the sums of all other covariates). The
coefficients for the sums across t to t + 2 and t to t + 3 are obtained from equivalent regressions.
For the sum containing only the current year t, the coefficient is equal to the baseline coefficient
of installed capacity p.c. in column (1) of Table 3.1.
form for different horizons j:
t+j
∑
τ=t
Employment p.c.c,τ = β j
t+j
∑
τ=t
PV Installations p.c.c,τ + CountyFEc
+δc,t 1[Yeart · Statec · CountyTypec] +
t+j
∑
τ=t
Controlsc,τ + εc,t.
(C.1)
If the effects of PV investment on employment were long-lasting, the coefficient
β j should rise with longer horizons j as past and current effects accumulate. If,
on the other hand, the effects were predominantly contemporary, the coefficients
β j should be close to the baseline effect estimated from model (3.1) regardless of
the length of the horizon j.
Figure C.1 shows the coefficients β j for horizons up to j = 3 together with a line
at 19.98, which is the baseline effect reported in column (1) of Table 3.1. The
coefficients rise at best slightly above the baseline value when adding additional
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years, suggesting that there are no substantial dynamic effects of PV investment
on employment.
C.2.2 Discussion of IV Assumptions
Section 3.3 points out that remuneration potential as described in Section 3.3.1
can serve as an instrument for investments in rooftop PV systems. Section 3.4.2
presents the main results when estimating the empirical model (3.1) using remu-
neration potential p.c. as an instrument for installed capacity p.c. of rooftop systems.
The IV strategy serves as a check for whether unobserved factors drive our re-
sults. In this section, we discuss the two main IV assumptions, relevance and
exogeneity.
Relevance and First Stage
Table C.3 shows that the time variation in remuneration potential at the county
level is a strong predictor of annual PV installations. For the pooled sample of
all German counties in column (1), an increase in the remuneration potential of
e 1m led to additional PV installations of 0.023 MWp (or 23 kWp) on average,
similar to the coefficients for the years 2004 and 2010 in Figure 3.3. Given the
(weighted) average price of installations of e 3,121 per kWp, this implies addi-
tional investments of about e 72,000. Comparing counties with and without slack
labor markets, the average change in investments in response to changes in the
remuneration potential tends to be smaller if the labor market is classified as
being slack, both according to the time series and the cross-sectional definition.
Nevertheless, even then a e 1m increase in remuneration potential leads to addi-
tional PV installations of at least 8 kWp, corresponding to investments of around
e 25,000. Moreover, these effects are precisely estimated, so that the remunera-
tion potential is a strong instrument with Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics of 22 and
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Table C.3: First Stage
Installed Capacity p.c. (in MWp)
Split along Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Remuneration p.c. 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0034)
Population growth 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Construction p.c. 0.0026∗ 0.0007 0.0025 −0.0016 0.0048∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0020)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
F-stat. instrument 88.22 22.11 59.15 28.43 79.67
Observations 4000 2044 1956 1783 2189
Note: The dependent variable installed capacity p.c. are PV installations measured in megawatt
peak (MWp) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (as indicated by “p.c.” for “per
capita”). Remuneration p.c. is the remuneration potential for PV systems of the size of the county’s
rooftop potential, given local solar radiation, the current installation costs, and the applicable
feed-in tariff. Population Growth is the ratio of the working-age population in a given year to the
working-age population in 2003. Construction p.c. is the number of residential and non-residential
buildings completed in a given year. The year fixed effects are estimated at the level of the state ×
county type (rural or urban county). F-statistic instrument is the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of the
instrument (remuneration potential p.c.). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level
of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
higher, well above the critical value of 10.
Exclusion Restriction
The exclusion restriction requires that conditional on covariates, the instrument
does not directly influence employment outcomes. In particular, the instrument is
not allowed to influence local employment over and above the common employ-
ment trends that is filtered out by the time fixed effects at the state × county-type
level. While this assumption is untestable, it is unlikely that any of the factors
that drives the variation in the remuneration potential directly affects the county-
specific employment outcomes.
For one, there is no indication for the existence of direct feedback effects between
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the time-varying components of the remuneration potential (feed-in tariff, instal-
lation costs, interest rates) and the heterogeneous local employment outcomes net
of the time fixed effects. The feed-in tariff is chosen at the national level in order
to ensure a certain volume of renewable energy production, in line with the aim
of the Renewable Energy Act. Accordingly, the feed-in tariff has been adjusted
in response to total installed capacity, either by amendments of the law (in 2009)
or directly linked to the level of past installations by law (from 2009 onwards).
The feed-in tariff has never been altered in response to labor market conditions in
particular counties or states. Similarly, the changes in the national average costs
of PV installations are mainly driven by conditions on the world market for solar
panels, which is dominated by Asian manufacturers.1 In Appendix C.3 we also
show that the results are unaffected by excluding those counties that host estab-
lishments of German solar panel manufacturers. Finally, the mortgage rate tracks
the ECB refinancing rate, which is set for the Euro zone as a whole irrespective
of the idiosyncratic labor market conditions in specific German counties.
The exclusion restriction also fails if the cross-sectional variation in rooftop poten-
tial × radiation is correlated with labor market dynamics. Yet, it is unlikely that
the stock of housing foreshadows local labor market dynamics. According to the
German Census of 2011, 87.9 percent of private houses were built before 2000
and 95 percent before 2004. Rooftop potential was hence largely fixed before the
photovoltaic investment boom between 2004 and 2012. To alleviate the potential
concern that our estimates pick up effects from construction nevertheless, we di-
rectly control for construction activity in all regressions. Solar radiation, in turn,
is unlikely to have a direct impact on labor markets. The climate is temperate
across all German regions so that potential effects of heat on labor productivity
(e.g., Dell et al., 2012) are irrelevant.
1Between 2000 and 2013, the share of German manufacturers in world solar cell production
has never exceeded 20 percent, while Asian manufacturers produced at least 48 percent (http:
//www.earth-policy.org/data\_center/C23, last accessed on April 5th 2018).
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Figure C.2: Reduced Form Coefficient of Rooftop Potential× Radiation over Time
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Note: The connected circles show, for each year between 2001 and 2012, the average differences
in employment relative to 2000 for each 1,000 MW of potential peak solar energy production (as
measured by the product of rooftop potential and radiation). The 90 percent confidence intervals
are plotted as dashed lines. The estimates are obtained from the model described in Footnote 2.
Figure C.2 provides a plausibility check for whether the cross-sectional variation
in rooftop potential × radiation is correlated with employment via channels other
than PV installations. It displays the reduced form effect of rooftop potential ×
radiation on employment, that is, the average increase in employment relative to
2000 for each 1,000 MW of potential peak solar energy production.2 The exclu-
sion restriction implies that rooftop potential × radiation affects employment only
via PV installations. The magnitude of the estimated employment effects are
hence expected to track the overall time path of PV investments displayed in
Panel (b) of Figure 3.1. The results in Figure C.2 support this hypothesis. The
2Formally, Figure C.2 displays the estimates γˆt of the following regression:
Employment p.c.c,t =
2012
∑
t=2001
γt (Rooftop Potentialc · Radiationc p.c.c) · 1[Yeart]
+ CountyFEc + δ˜c,t 1[Yeart · Statec · CountyTypec] + Controlsc,t + ec,t.
Rooftop Potentialc · Radiationc p.c.c is the product of a county’s potential for rooftop PV instal-
lations (measured in 1,000 MWp) and the county’s average solar radiation, normalized by the
county’s working-age population. As such, it measures the potential yearly energy production in
1,000 MWp under optimal conditions, if the entire available suitable roof space was covered by
PV systems. All other variables are as defined in equation (3.1).
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employment gains predicted by rooftop potential × radiation become statistically
and economically different from zero only after the start of the photovoltaic in-
vestment boom in 2004, peak at the height of the boom in 2010 and 2011, and
drop in 2012 mirroring the drop in investments in this year.
C.3 Appendix to Section 3.4: Main Results
This section evaluates the robustness of the main finding that the employment
gains of investments are larger when the labor market is slack compared to when
it is tight, both for our OLS and our IV specification.
C.3.1 Robustness of the OLS Results
For brevity, each row in Table C.4 documents the result for a different specifi-
cation and reports the OLS estimates for the observations with slack and tight
labor markets according to both the time series and cross-sectional classifications
of the state of the labor market. Columns entitled as “Coeff” report the coefficient
estimates for the relevant sample, and columns entitled “SE” present the corre-
sponding standard errors clustered at the level of 94 German spatial planning
regions (as in the main specification). The columns “P-Val” contain the p-values
of the test of the null hypothesis that the effect of PV installations on employment
is smaller in slack than in tight labor markets. For comparison, row (0) reports
these statistics for the corresponding empirical specifications from Table 3.1.
Determinants of Rooftop Potential
The first set of robustness checks adds those variables as additional covariates
that are components of the highly non-linear estimate of rooftop potential used
for constructing the instrument (see Appendix C.1.2 for details on the estimation
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of rooftop potential following Lödl et al., 2010). These variables are geographic
characteristics of counties and their municipalities that exhibit little time varia-
tion, but that are strongly correlated with total PV installations. We test whether
these characteristics are correlated with employment dynamics as well by hold-
ing them constant as measured in 2008 (exactly as in the estimation of rooftop
potential) and interacting them with year dummies.
Different measures of a county’s area constitute the first type of variable used for
the estimation of rooftop potential. In addition to the standard covariates, row (1)
controls for total county area, row (2) controls for total settlement area (area des-
ignated to buildings and transport), and row (3) controls for total dwelling area
(area designated to buildings). The second determining factor for the measure
of rooftop potential is population density, for which we control in row (4). The
final set of variables concerns housing, with the square meters of housing per
individual of working age being an additional covariate included in row (5), and
the average number of apartments per residential building being added in row
(6). Overall, none of the additional covariates changes the results substantially,
suggesting that there is no single cross-sectional determinant of PV installations
that explains away the main findings. That being said, the addition of the num-
ber of apartments per building has the largest effect on the results, leading to a
drop in the coefficients by at least one third. A potential reason for this is that the
number of apartments per building are strongly correlated with the ownership
structure of housing.3 As installing PV systems requires unanimous consent of
all owners of a building, a diverse ownership structure increases the transaction
costs of the investment decision, leading to lower investments. As a consequence,
the number of apartments per building, via their strong correlation with the own-
ership structure, is a strong predictor of PV installations, and hence absorbs parts
3The correlation coefficient between the number of apartments per building and the number
of individually owned buildings per capita is -0.92.
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of their employment effects.4 Nevertheless, even with the number of apartments
per building as an additional covariate, the p-value of the null hypothesis that the
effect of investments on employment is larger in tight than in slack labor markets
remains below 0.1.
Structural Characteristics
The second set of robustness checks explores whether controlling for structural
characteristics alters the results. As for the determinants of rooftop potential,
these characteristics hardly vary over time, so that we allow for flexible, year-
specific effects of the structural characteristics as measured in 2003. We first con-
sider structural features with respect to education, as individuals with different
levels of education may face different employment prospects over time. In row
(7), we add employment shares by education (with a college degree, with com-
pleted vocational training both interacted with year dummies) to the standard set
of covariates, and in row (8) we add the number of school and university students
(as share of the working-age population and interacted with year dummies) as
an additional regressor. Next, we investigate whether the results are driven by
industry-specific shocks that may be, for some reason, correlated with PV instal-
lations. Row (9) allows for flexible, year specific shocks to the main sectors of
the economy—agriculture, manufacturing, and construction (services serve as a
baseline)—by including the employment share in each of these industries (inter-
acted with year dummies) as control variables. Finally, row (10) allows for both
industry and education specific shocks by adding the employment shares by both
industry and education to the empirical model. Neither of these alternative spec-
ifications substantially reduces the difference between the employment effects of
PV installations across slack or tight labor markets.
4We use ownership structure as an alternative instrument in row (17) of Table C.5 in Appendix
C.3.2. Table C.8 shows that single ownership is a strong predictor for PV installations.
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Model Specification
The last set of robustness checks alters the specification of the empirical model.
In the main analyses of the chapter, the variable measuring investments is the
sum of a county’s installed output capacity of PV systems smaller than 500 kWp.
In row (11), we estimate the employment effects of total investments, i.e., the
sum of a county’s installed capacity regardless of the size of the systems. This
results in a few PV systems of large size, most likely greenfield systems, driving
a significant amount of the variation in (uncleaned) PV investments. As a result,
the OLS coefficients drop significantly, and are equal for slack and tight labor
markets in the cross-sectional split. Note, however, that the IV estimates in Table
C.5 remain at their baseline level, presumably because the variation of PV in-
stallations explained by the instrument—the remuneration potential for rooftop
systems—primarily predicts variation in rooftop installations.5
Finally, we check whether the composition of the sample has an effect on the
results. In row (12), we exclude the 52 counties from the sample that include
establishments of solar panel manufacturers.6 The concern here is that we pol-
lute the estimates of the employment effects of PV installations with employment
effects of the solar panel manufacturers, for which the German Renewable En-
ergy Act constituted a significant demand shock, but which also faced increasing
competition from abroad. The results with the restricted sample are very close to
5One explanation for this finding is that the planning and installation of large greenfield PV
systems is undertaken by more specialized firms than the installation of mostly small rooftop
systems, so that local variation in demand for greenfield installations does not translate into local
employment gains, in contrast to the variation in demand for rooftop systems. While, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no hard data on the relative number of firms installing rooftop and
greenfield systems, one indication for firms installing greenfield systems being more specialized
is that the newest amendment of the Renewable Energy Act prescribes a procurement process
for systems larger than 750 kWp. A cursory search for firms installing rooftop and greenfield
systems, respectively, also suggests that the latter serve geographically much larger markets.
6The web portal “solarserver.de” lists the major German solar panel manufacturers and their
locations: https://www.solarserver.de/service-tools/statistik-und-marktforschung/
photovoltaik/unternehmen.html, last accessed on May 3rd, 2018. About half of the establish-
ments of solar manufacturers are located in former East Germany.
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the baseline results, however, so that the main findings are unlikely to be driven
by employment in solar panel manufacturing. This also corroborates the findings
regarding the employment effects by industry in Section 3.5. Finally, rows (13)
and (14) ask whether our findings are driven by city counties (Kreisfreie Städte) or
rural counties (Landkreise). Given that buildings in rural counties are much more
suitable for rooftop PV systems due to the availability of larger rooftops that are
not shaded by neighboring buildings, it comes with little surprise that our effects
are mostly driven by rural counties.
C.3.2 Robustness of the IV Results
Table C.5 performs the same robustness checks using IV as the ones performed
via OLS in Table C.4. In addition, Table C.5 also shows that the IV results are
robust to alternative definitions of the instrument. Apart from the already well-
known differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients, the robustness checks as
estimated via IV lead, by and large, to the same conclusions as the ones estimated
via OLS. For this reason, we abstain from describing each of the rows in Table
C.5, but focus instead on those rows in which the OLS and the IV results differ.
Determinants of Rooftop Potential
The first set of robustness checks adds those variables as covariates that are pre-
dictors for the estimate of rooftop potential.7 Given equation (3.2), the functional
form of the instrument remuneration potential, these are particularly demanding
for the IV strategy. This is due to the fact that controlling more strongly for the
cross-sectional determinants of rooftop potential results in identification relying
more strongly on the interaction of rooftop potential and radiation. Nevertheless,
the main findings are robust to adding these determinants. The most noticeable
7Appendix C.1.2 provides the details of this estimation.
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difference to the OLS results is that adding the interaction of a county’s area with
year dummies in row (1) leads to larger coefficient estimates in almost all subsam-
ples. These estimates are, however much less precise than the baseline results.
Similar to the OLS estimates, adding the number of apartments per building re-
duces the estimates, presumably (and as discussed in Appendix C.3.1) due to
their strong predictive power for PV installations.
Structural Characteristics
The second set of robustness checks adds structural characteristics as additional
covariates. As for OLS, these additional controls do not alter the results substan-
tially. In comparison to the OLS results, the IV coefficients and standard errors
are inflated in the cross-sectional split when we control for industry structure.
Most likely, this is a result of the instrument becoming weaker due to the addi-
tion of a large number of regressors that vary in the cross-section.
Model Specification
The third set of robustness checks modifies the model specification. The biggest
difference of the IV estimates to the OLS estimates of Table C.4 in rows (11) to (14)
is that the coefficients of the IV results do not drop significantly when we consider
all the PV installations in the data (instead of only the smaller systems with
a capacity of less than 500 kWp) as our measure of physical investments in row
(11). The drop in the OLS results is most likely due to the small local employment
effects of large commercial greenfield systems that are installed by specialized
firms. In contrast, the instrument captures the potential profitability of rooftop
systems so that instrumented investments are much less prone to “measurement
error” due to considering all investments in solar energy.
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Alternative Instrument Definitions
Finally, in rows (15) to (17) we explore whether alternative definitions of the
instrument alter the results. The first stages of all alternative instruments are
reported below.
Row (15) splits up the time-varying instrument remuneration potential as defined
by equation (3.2) into the present value of the net income stream (the product of
rooftop potential and the discounted sum of the net income flows in the second
line of (3.2)) and the current installation costs (the product of rooftop potential and
costs), so that there are two time-varying instruments. The remaining two instru-
ments rely on cross-sectional variation only and are interacted with year dum-
mies to obtain (a large number of) time-varying instruments. Row (16) employs
rooftop potential × radiation as the instrument, with a similar motivation as before:
rooftop potential and radiation jointly determine the return on investment. Row
(17), in turn, exploits the alternative idea that the ownership structure of build-
ings affects the transaction costs of installing a rooftop PV system. As mentioned
already in Appendix C.3.1, there has to be unanimous consent of all owners of
a building for alterations to the building as a whole, including the installation
of solar panels. The implied transaction costs are absent for buildings owned by
single individuals or firms. The number of buildings with a single owner (rela-
tive to the working-age population) is hence a valid instrument if the ownership
structure is independent of labor market developments, arguably a stronger as-
sumption than for the stock of available rooftop space. One potential concern for
this idea is that in growing economies (and tight housing markets), individuals
may be more inclined to join ownership cooperations, invalidating this potential
instrument.
The results for all three of these alternative IV strategies show that the estimated
magnitudes of the employment gains in slack and tight labor markets do not
170
Appendix to Chapter 3
differ from the baseline estimates in the cross-sectional split. The same is true for
the time series split in the specification with costs and income as the instruments
(row (15)). Instrumenting via year-specific effects of rooftop potential × radiation
and single ownership × radiation leads to smaller estimated employment gains in
the time-series split (rows (16) and (17)). However, the estimates also become
more precise, so that we can reject the null hypothesis that the employment gains
are smaller in slack than in tight labor markets at the ten percent level (with
p-values at or below 0.055).
Tables C.6, C.7, and C.8 report the associated first stages for the alternative in-
struments used in rows (15), (16), and (17), respectively. In Table C.6, the present
value of the net income stream predicts investment positively and costs predict
investment negatively, as one would expect. The first stage F-statistics range from
16.25 to 58.65, indicating strong predictive power. Due to the interaction of rooftop
potential × radiation with year dummies, we have nine instruments in Table C.7.
All interactions predict investment positively with F-statistics of over 14.74 in all
specifications. There are missing coefficients in the time series split, as in some
years not a single county is classified as having either a slack or tight labor mar-
ket. Last, Table C.8 shows that single ownership × radiation (× year) also positively
predicts investment. However, in our cross-sectional splits the predictive power
is somewhat lower with a F-statistic of around seven.
C.3.3 Robustness of the Slack Definition
To assess whether the difference between slack and tight labor markets is driven
by the tails of labor market slackness and tightness, we split the observations into
three instead of two groups.8 For the time series definition, we split the ten years
of observations for each county into terciles according to lagged unemployment.
8Splitting even finer into quartiles and quintiles runs into the issue of quickly decreasing
sample sizes in the individual groups, making valid inference difficult.
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Table C.6: First Stage: Costs and Income
Installed Capacity p.c. (in MWp)
Split along Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Income p.c. 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0035) (0.0015) (0.0026)
Cost p.c. −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0289∗∗∗ −0.0080∗∗∗ −0.0281∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0038) (0.0016) (0.0034)
Population growth 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Construction p.c. 0.0029∗∗ 0.0009 0.0025 −0.0014 0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0018)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
F-stat. instrument 58.65 16.25 29.15 17.99 54.10
Observations 4000 2044 1956 1798 2202
Note: The dependent variable installed capacity p.c. are PV installations measured in megawatt
peak (MWp) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (as indicated by “p.c.” for “per
capita”). Income p.c. is the net present value of the potential income stream for PV systems
of the size of the county’s rooftop potential, given the local solar radiation and the applicable
feed-in tariff. Cost p.c. is the time-varying installation cost of PV systems of the size of the
county’s rooftop potential. Both income and cost are measured in million Euro.Population Growth
is the ratio of the working-age population in a given year to the working-age population in 2003.
Construction p.c. is the number of residential and non-residential buildings completed in a given
year. The year fixed effects are estimated at the level of the state × county type (rural or urban
county). F-stat. instrument is the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of the instruments (income p.c. and
cost p.c.). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94 spatial planning regions.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.7: First Stage: Rooftop Potential × Radiation × Year
Installed Capacity p.c. (in MWp)
Split along Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
× 2003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
× 2004 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0009) (0.0016)
× 2005 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0039) (0.0010) (0.0014)
× 2006 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (.) (0.0011) (0.0013)
× 2007 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0014) (.) (0.0013) (0.0026)
× 2008 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0029 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0183∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0019) (0.0044)
× 2009 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗
(0.0041) (.) (0.0041) (0.0024) (0.0063)
× 2010 0.0490∗∗∗ 0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0070) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0067)
× 2011 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0320∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0042)
× 2012 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗
(0.0021) (.) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.0032)
Population growth 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Construction p.c. 0.0026∗∗ 0.0008 0.0006 −0.0012 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0017)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
F-stat. instruments 28.22 26.14 28.04 14.74 34.51
Observations 4000 2044 1956 1798 2202
Note: The dependent variable installed capacity p.c. are PV installations measured in megawatt
peak (MWp) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (as indicated by “p.c.” for “per
capita”). Rooftop potential p.c. × radiation is the interaction of rooftop potential p.c. (measured
in kWp) and the county’s average yearly radiation (measured in kWh). Rooftop potential p.c. ×
radiation interacted with year dummies constitutes the set of time-varying instruments. There are
missing coefficients in the time series split, as in some years not a single county is classified as
having either a slack or a tight labor market. Population Growth is the ratio of the working-age
population in a given year to the working-age population in 2003. Construction p.c. is the number
of residential and non-residential buildings completed in a given year. The year fixed effects are
estimated at the level of the state × county type (rural or urban county). F-stat. instruments is the
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of the instruments. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the level of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.8: First Stage: Single Ownership × Radiation × Year
Installed Capacity p.c. (in MWp)
Split along Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
× 2003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
× 2004 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗∗ 0.2390∗∗∗ 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.1280∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0250) (0.0524) (0.0158) (0.0391)
× 2005 0.1122∗∗∗ 0.1160∗∗∗ 0.2245∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.1511∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0217) (0.0457) (0.0158) (0.0389)
× 2006 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0823∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0172) (.) (0.0168) (0.0360)
× 2007 0.1349∗∗∗ 0.1383∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.1678∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0317) (.) (0.0164) (0.0656)
× 2008 0.2555∗∗∗ 0.1330∗∗∗ −0.0129 0.1237∗∗∗ 0.3678∗∗∗
(0.0515) (0.0250) (0.0594) (0.0246) (0.1169)
× 2009 0.5344∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.3297∗∗∗ 0.2450∗∗∗ 0.8157∗∗∗
(0.0942) (.) (0.0541) (0.0451) (0.1876)
× 2010 0.8016∗∗∗ 1.0217∗∗∗ 0.6010∗∗∗ 0.3939∗∗∗ 1.1540∗∗∗
(0.1166) (0.2240) (0.0746) (0.0648) (0.2223)
× 2011 0.6275∗∗∗ 0.6045∗∗∗ 0.4233∗∗∗ 0.3359∗∗∗ 0.9172∗∗∗
(0.0904) (0.0901) (0.0578) (0.0604) (0.1544)
× 2012 0.3564∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.1630∗∗∗ 0.1877∗∗∗ 0.5172∗∗∗
(0.0539) (.) (0.0557) (0.0332) (0.1122)
Population growth 0.0002∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Construction p.c. 0.0025∗ 0.0007 0.0011 −0.0007 0.0046∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0020)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
F-stat. instruments 10.30 13.56 16.92 7.58 6.80
Observations 4000 2044 1956 1798 2202
Note: The dependent variable installed capacity p.c. are PV installations measured in megawatt
peak (MWp) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (as indicated by “p.c.” for “per
capita”). Single ownership p.c. × radiation is the number of individually owned residential build-
ings per capita times the county’s average yearly radiation (measured in kWh). Single ownership
p.c. × radiation interacted with year dummies constitutes the set of time-varying instruments.
There are missing coefficients in the time series split, as in some years not a single county is
classified as having either a slack or a tight labor market. Population Growth is the ratio of the
working-age population in a given year to the working-age population in 2003. Construction p.c.
is the number of residential and non-residential buildings completed in a given year. The year
fixed effects are estimated at the level of the state × county type (rural or urban county). F-statistic
instrument is the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of the instruments. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the level of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
174
Appendix to Chapter 3
Figure C.3: Tercile Splits of the Main Slack Definitions
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(b) Cross-Sectional Split
Note: This figure reports the OLS (left axis) and IV (right axis) coefficient and their 95 percent
confidence intervals for the main specification from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 with sample splits accord-
ing to terciles of labor market slackness instead of two groups. Panel (a) reports the result of
the tercile split along the time series definition of labor market tightness, and Panel (b) splits the
sample according to the cross-sectional definition. The labels on the horizontal axis indicate the
tercile of slackness, with “1” indicating the observations with the lowest lagged unemployment
rate, and “3” indicating the highest lagged unemployment rate.
For the cross-sectional definition, we split the observations within each state-year
cell into terciles according to lagged unemployment.
Figure C.3 depicts the results of this exercise. In Panel (a), we split along the time
series dimension and in Panel (b) along the cross-sectional dimension. The hori-
zontal axis shows the different states of the labor market, ranging from 1 (tight)
to 3 (slack). The values of the OLS coefficients (black diamonds) are depicted on
the left vertical axis and the values of the IV coefficients (grey circles) are shown
along the right vertical axis. The capped lines depict 95 percent confidence inter-
vals. For both definitions and for OLS and IV, the effects grow monotonically as
the labor market exhibits a higher level of slack. Hence, the difference between
slack and tight labor markets does not seem to be solely driven by the tails.
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C.4 Appendix to Section 3.5: Discussion of the Mech-
anism
This section verifies that investment has a stronger effect on employment in slack
than in tight markets when allowing for nonlinear effects (Appendix C.4.1). We
also perform the analyses outlined in Section 3.5 for the full sample, i.e., without
the sample splits (Appendix C.4.2), and use IV instead of OLS for the estimation
(Appendix C.4.3).
C.4.1 Nonlinear Employment Effects in Slack and Tight Markets
Nonlinearities in the effect of PV installations on employment in tight and slack
markets are another potential explanation for the observed differences in employ-
ment creation. If the marginal effect of PV installations on employment differs
across its domain, and if the mass of installed capacity in tight markets is concen-
trated on values with small marginal effects, and vice-versa for slack markets,
this could explain our main findings in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
To investigate this potential concern, we allow for non-linear effects of PV instal-
lations on employment by adding a squared term of PV Installations p.c.c,t to the
empirical model (3.1).9 We estimate this specification for the two main sample
splits and compute the marginal effects of PV installations on employment up to
the 99th percentile of installed capacity p.c.
Figure C.4 plots these marginal effects along with their 90 percent confidence
intervals. Overall, the marginal effect of PV installations on employment is de-
creasing for both the time series split in Panel (a) and the cross-sectional split
9Adding a cubic term does not alter the results discussed below.
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Figure C.4: Marginal Effects Allowing for Nonlinearities
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Note: This figure shows the marginal effect of installed capacity p.c. on employment p.c. estimated
via OLS from a variant of model (3.1) that includes (PV Installations p.c.c,t)2 as an additional
covariate. Panel (a) shows the marginal effects for the time series split, and Panel (b) for the
cross-sectional split. The black solid line depicts the marginal effects for the slack labor markets
(with shaded 90 percent confidence intervals), and the red dashed line shows the marginal effect
for tight labor markets (with thin dashed lines indicating the 90 percent confidence intervals).
in Panel (b). However, the marginal effect is always larger in slack than in tight
markets for all levels of installed capacity. The difference is most pronounced for
smaller values of installed capacity p.c., which are the observations with the high-
est mass: The 95th percentile within all subsamples is smaller than 0.00026. As a
consequence, these results rule out nonlinearities in the employment response as
an explanation for the main findings.
C.4.2 Employment Gains by Sector and Geographic Spillovers:
Full Sample
Table C.9 reports the results for employment gains by industry.10 As should be
expected, the employment gains due to PV installations primarily originate from
the high-exposure sectors, while local services contribute around 40 percent to
the overall employment increase. For the “other” sector the coefficient is eco-
10See Section 3.5 for the classification of industries as “high-exposure,” “local,” and “other”.
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Table C.9: Sectoral Employment: Baseline
Industry-specific Employment p.c.
OLS IV
High-exp. Local Other High-exp. Local Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capacity p.c. 15.04∗∗∗ 8.37∗∗∗ −4.62 23.64∗∗∗ 16.98∗∗∗ −3.47
(4.74) (2.36) (8.58) (5.92) (3.62) (11.48)
Population growth 0.02∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Construction p.c. −0.09 −0.17∗∗ 0.11 −0.09 −0.16∗∗ 0.11
(0.12) (0.08) (0.24) (0.12) (0.08) (0.24)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Jobs per e100,000 0.48 0.27 −0.15 0.76 0.54 −0.11
F-stat. instr. 88.22 88.22 88.22
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is employment in the high-exposure sectors
(construction and related industries) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (indi-
cated by “p.c.” for “per capita”). The dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is employment
p.c. in local industries (wholesale, retail, hospitality, local services). The dependent variable in
columns (3) and (6) is employment p.c. in all remaining industries. Employment by industry
is measured annually on June 30th. Table C.1 in Appendix C.1.1 provides details of the indus-
try classifications. All other variables are defined as in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In columns (4) to (6),
installed capacity p.c. is instrumented by remuneration potential p.c. as defined in Section 3.3.1. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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nomically close to zero, and we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that it
actually equals zero. The concentration of the effect in the high-exposure sector
suggests that we indeed measure the effect of PV investments on employment.
Table C.10 reports the employment gains due to PV installations for the full sam-
ple when we account for spatial spillovers.11 The results show that the spatial
spillovers of PV installations are small at best, both when estimated via OLS
(Panel A) or IV (Panel B). Compared to the baseline estimates in column (1), the
employment effect of within-county PV installations remains unchanged when
adding PV installations in neighboring counties as an additional independent
variable. Moreover, the estimates of the effect of the neighboring counties’ PV
installations on employment are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the
effect of the within-county PV installations. This holds for all definitions of the
set of neighboring counties and for both the OLS and IV estimates. Taken to-
gether, the results in Table C.10 suggest that the labor market for PV installations
is very local in nature, so that the baseline estimates are a good approximation of
the total employment gains due to differential investments across regions.
C.4.3 Employment Gains by Sector and Geographic Spillovers:
IV Results
For brevity, Section 3.5 discusses the additional results regarding the employment
gains across sectors and geographic spillovers in terms of their OLS estimates.
This Appendix reports the IV results of the exact same analyses. The general
observation is that the IV results qualitatively mirror the OLS results. The main
difference is in the magnitude of the estimates obtained via both strategies, as
should be expected given the differences in magnitude in the main OLS and IV
results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
11See Section 3.5 for the definition of neighboring counties.
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Employment Gains by Sector
Table C.11 reports the IV estimates of the employment gains due to PV instal-
lations in slack and tight labor markets in each of the subsectors defined by the
partition of employees into high-exposure, local, and all other sectors. As for the
OLS results in Table 3.4, Panel A presents the results for the time series split, and
Panel B presents the results for the cross-sectional split. As before, two results
stand out. First, in both slack and tight labor markets, PV installations led to
a statistically significant increase in employment only in the high-exposure and
local sectors. Second, the difference of the employment gains in slack and tight
labor markets is driven by high-exposure and local industries. In both the time
series and the cross-sectional split, the difference in employment gains between
slack and tight labor markets is sizable. Also, for the IV results we reject the null
hypothesis that the employment gains are smaller in slack than in tight labor
markets for the high-exposure and local sector in both sample splits. This is a
stronger result than the one obtained from OLS, where we reject this hypothesis
only for half of the respective coefficients. In sum, the IV results are hence similar
if not stronger than the findings from OLS reported in Section 3.5.
Geographic Spillovers
Next, we use the IV strategy to test for geographic spillovers along the line of the
corresponding OLS analysis in Section 3.5. As for OLS, we consider three defini-
tions of neighboring counties: all other counties within the same spatial planning
region (Raumordnungsregion), the five closest counties based on the distance be-
tween both counties’ most populous municipalities, and the ten closest counties.
For the IV specification, we instrument for the neighbors’ investments via the
sum of the estimated remuneration potential in the neighboring counties, nor-
malized by the working-age population of the county of interest. Given this, we
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estimate an extended version of the main empirical model (3.1) that includes ag-
gregate PV installations in the neighboring counties as additional covariate and
that instruments the county’s own as well as the neighboring PV installations
via the county’s own and the neighbors’ aggregate remuneration potential. We
classify counties as having slack or tight labor markets according to their own
unemployment rate as described in Section 3.3.2, exactly as in the main empirical
analyses.
Table C.12 reports the IV estimates. Panel A contains the results of the time se-
ries split and Panel B contains the results of the cross-sectional split. In both
splits and in all three definitions of a county’s set of neighbors, the effect of ad-
ditional PV installations in geographically proximate regions is at least one order
of magnitude smaller than the effect of additional installations within the county.
In addition to their small magnitude, these coefficients are mostly statistically
insignificant. The estimated effects of the demand spillovers also do not differ
between slack and tight labor markets, while the differences of the employment
gains due to the within-county investments remain at the same level as in Table
3.2, the main IV specification. As for the OLS results in Table (3.5), we hence
conclude that the employment effects of PV installations are very local in nature,
so that demand spillovers are unimportant for the interpretation of our main
findings.
C.4.4 Wage Response: IV Results
Table C.13 presents the wage response from estimating equation (3.3) using IV
instead of OLS. Here, we instrument average yearly PV installations with the av-
erage yearly remuneration potential. Similarly to the OLS results in Table 3.6,
there is an overall positive effect of PV installations on wage growth in the con-
struction sector. Once again, this is mainly driven by tight labor markets both in
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the cross-sectional and time series split, though the difference is only statistically
significant for the time series split. Thus, this also points towards crowding out
as the most plausible mechanism.
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Table C.10: Spillovers from Neighboring Counties: Baseline
Employment Rate
Base- Planning 5 Closest 10 Closest
line Region Counties Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Capacity p.c. (MWp) 19.98∗∗∗ 19.38∗∗∗ 20.20∗∗∗ 18.96∗∗∗
(6.35) (5.99) (5.63) (5.87)
Neighboring cap. p.c. 0.32 −0.08 0.20
(1.21) (0.85) (0.49)
Jobs per e100,000 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.61
Panel B: IV
Capacity p.c. (MWp) 52.57∗∗∗ 50.20∗∗∗ 52.77∗∗∗ 50.98∗∗∗
(13.60) (13.76) (13.63) (13.25)
Neighboring cap. p.c. 1.17 −0.06 0.28
(2.01) (1.49) (0.73)
Jobs per e100,000 1.68 1.61 1.69 1.63
F-stat. instrument(s) 88.22 45.15 53.92 47.72
PopGrowth & constr. yes yes yes yes
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000
Note: Neighboring cap. p.c. is the sum of PV installations (measured in MWp and normalized
by the working-age population) across all other counties in the same spatial planning region
(column (2)), the 5 closest counties (column (3)), or the 10 closest counties (column (4)). Closeness
is measured by the distance between the counties’ most populous municipalities. In Panel B,
capacity p.c. and neighboring capacity p.c. are instrumented by remuneration potential p.c. as defined in
Section 3.3.1 and the sum of remuneration potential in the set of neighboring counties, normalized
by the (main) county’s working-age population. The year fixed effects are estimated at the level of
the state × county type (rural or urban county). All other variables are defined as in Tables 3.1
and 3.2. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94 spatial planning regions.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.11: Sectoral Employment Conditional on Slack: IV Results
Industry-specific Employment p.c.
High-exposure Local Other
Slack Tight Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Time Series Split
Capacity p.c. 36.99∗∗ 6.92∗ 42.81∗∗∗ 10.45∗∗∗ 18.55 4.23
(15.95) (3.57) (12.99) (3.29) (34.57) (9.28)
P-val. slack < tight 0.033 0.006 0.342
Jobs per e100,000 1.18 0.22 1.37 0.33 0.59 0.14
F-stat. instrument 22.11 59.15 22.11 59.15 22.11 59.15
Observations 2044 1956 2044 1956 2044 1956
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Split
Capacity p.c. 52.13∗∗ 12.56∗∗ 44.63∗∗∗ 11.90∗∗∗ 42.88 −3.86
(24.26) (5.71) (16.60) (3.39) (32.22) (11.85)
P-val. slack < tight 0.057 0.026 0.081
Jobs per e100,000 1.67 0.40 1.43 0.38 1.37 −0.12
F-stat. instrument 28.43 79.67 28.43 79.67 28.43 79.67
Observations 1783 2189 1783 2189 1783 2189
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is employment in the high-exposure sectors
(construction and related industries) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (indi-
cated by “p.c.” for “per capita”). The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is employment
p.c. in local industries (wholesale, retail, hospitality, local services). The dependent variable in
columns (5) and (6) is employment p.c. in all remaining industries. Employment by industry
is measured annually on June 30th. Table C.1 in Appendix C.1.1 provides details of the indus-
try classifications. Capacity p.c. are yearly PV installations measured in megawatt peak (MWp),
which are instrumented by remuneration potential p.c. as defined in Section 3.3.1. Except for the
dependent variables, the empirical specifications are identical to the one in Table 3.2. In partic-
ular, controls are population growth and new construction. The year fixed effects are estimated at
the level of the state × county type (rural or urban county). Panel A reports the results for the
time series split and Panel B reports the results for the cross-sectional split. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94 spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table C.12: Spillovers from Neighboring Counties: IV Results
Employment Rate
Planning Region 5 Closest Counties 10 Closest Counties
Slack Tight Slack Tight Slack Tight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Time Series Split
Capacity p.c. 144.40∗∗∗ 18.35 147.19∗∗∗ 18.90 144.50∗∗∗ 14.84
(48.55) (11.57) (46.72) (12.03) (47.33) (11.86)
Neighboring ca- 1.92 1.87 0.33 1.04 0.68 1.24
pacity p.c. (5.61) (1.39) (4.58) (1.43) (2.29) (0.83)
P-val slack < tight 0.005 0.004 0.003
Jobs per e100,000 4.63 0.59 4.72 0.61 4.63 0.48
F-stat. instr. 10.95 28.74 15.95 32.42 10.96 31.66
Observations 2044 1956 2044 1956 2044 1956
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Split
Capacity p.c. 193.21∗∗∗ 33.49∗∗ 200.80∗∗∗ 40.22∗∗∗ 201.16∗∗∗ 39.14∗∗∗
(41.08) (13.01) (39.31) (13.85) (39.51) (13.12)
Neighboring ca- −2.37 −2.21 −3.16∗ −3.62 −1.67 −1.94∗
pacity p.c. (2.36) (2.72) (1.78) (2.31) (1.03) (1.11)
P-val slack < tight 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jobs per e100,000 6.19 1.07 6.43 1.29 6.44 1.25
F-stat. instr 11.72 40.21 10.43 40.70 10.60 39.03
Observations 1783 2189 1783 2189 1783 2189
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: Neighboring cap. p.c. is the sum of PV installations (measured in MWp and normalized
by the working-age population) across all other counties in the same spatial planning region
(columns (1) and (2)), the 5 closest counties (columns (3) and (4)), or the 10 closest counties
(columns (5) and (6)). Closeness is measured by the distance between the counties’ most popu-
lous municipalities. Installed capacity p.c. and neighboring capacity p.c. are instrumented by remu-
neration potential p.c. as defined in Section 3.3.1 and the sum of remuneration potential in the set
of neighboring counties, normalized by the (main) county’s working-age population. F-statistic
instruments reports the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of both excluded instruments. Controls are
population growth and new construction per capita. The year fixed effects are estimated at the
level of the state × county type (rural or urban county). All other variables are defined as in
Table 3.2. Panel A reports the results for the time series split and Panel B reports the results for
the cross-sectional split. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94 spatial
planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.13: Wage Growth (IV Specification)
∆ Log(Median Wage in Construction)
Split along
Time series Cross-section
Baseline Slack Tight Slack Tight
Years 03-12 03-07 08-12 03-12 03-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg. yearly capacity p.c. 7.30∗ −15.61 20.42∗∗∗ −3.36 10.60∗
(4.35) (24.25) (5.10) (11.06) (5.41)
Population growth −0.01 −0.11 0.18∗∗∗ −0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07)
Avg. yearly construction 0.16 0.33 −0.88∗∗∗ 0.60 −0.06
p.c. (0.20) (0.26) (0.30) (0.44) (0.26)
State × county-type FE yes yes yes yes yes
P-value slack > tight 0.080 0.131
F-statistic instrument 125.29 68.68 127.53 56.47 87.81
Observations 368 363 370 159 209
Note: The dependent variable is the difference in the log median wage in the construction sector
over the years indicated in the row “Years” (referred to as “sample years”). Avg. yearly capacity
p.c. are the average yearly PV installations during the sample years measured in megawatt peak
(MWp) normalized by the working-age population in 2003 (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”).
This is instrumented with the average remuneration potential per capita over the sample years.
Population Growth is the difference in the working-age population over the sample years relative to
the working-age population in 2003. Avg. yearly construction p.c. is the average yearly number of
residential and non-residential buildings completed during the sample years. For the time-series
defintion of slack in columns (2) and (3) we split the sample into the years 2003 to 2007 (slack) and
2008 to 2012 (tight). In the cross-section in columns (4) and (5), we split the sample relative to the
mean of the average unemployment rate at the state-level in 2002. P-Val slack > tight reports the
p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that the wage effect of PV installations is larger in slack
than in tight labor markets. The number of observations is smaller than the number of counties
(400) because the wage data is only available for county-years in which the number of employees
in construction exceeds 1000. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 94
spatial planning regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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